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Summary
In this thesis, I study two important issues in the field of industrial organization:
competition between firms with different business models and its effects on market
allocation, and the relation between innovative activity and employment at the firm
level.
The first chapter entitled “Employment and innovation: Firm level evidence from
Argentina” is a joint work with David Giuliodori and Rodolfo Stucchi. This chapter
provides evidence about the effect of innovation on employment in Argentina in the
period 1998-2001. In particular, we quantify the effect of process and product inno-
vations on employment growth and the skill composition. Our results show that: (i)
Product innovations have a positive effect on employment growth biased toward skill
labor; (ii) Process innovations do not affect employment growth or composition; (iii)
There are no heterogeneous effects in technology intensity and size, (iv) Most of the
contraction in employment in this period was explained by noninnovators.
The second chapter entitled “Industry equilibrium with open-source and propri-
etary firms” is a joint work with Gasto´n Llanes. This chapter presents a model of
industry equilibrium to study the coexistence of open-source and proprietary firms.
Two novel aspects of the model are (i) participation in open source arises as the opti-
mal decision of profit-maximizing firms, and (ii) open-source and proprietary firms may
(or may not) coexist in equilibrium. Firms decide their type and investment in R&D,
and sell packages composed of a primary good and a complementary private good.
Open-source firms share their technological advances on the primary good, whereas
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proprietary firms keep their innovations private. The main contribution of the chapter
is to determine conditions under which open-source and proprietary firms coexist in
equilibrium. Interestingly, this equilibrium is characterized by an asymmetric market
structure, with few large proprietary firms and many small open-source firms.
The third chapter entitled “Competition between single-market and multimarket
banks: Evidence from the US Banking Industry” estimates comparative advantages
and disadvantages between single-market and multimarket banks. In the banking
industry, due to the relevance of the branch’s location, the relevant market is a local
market. Based on this fact, the chapter defines two types of competitors: banks with
branches in only one local market called single-market banks, and banks with branches
in multiple local markets called multimarket banks.
The main results of the paper are: (i) incumbent single-market banks have a com-
parative advantage with multimarket banks in a sample of small urban and rural
markets, and (ii) single-market banks face higher expansion costs into other local mar-
kets than mutlimarket banks. This chapter presents two main contributions. First, it
contributes to the discussion about agency problems for hierarchical firms in markets
with asymmetric information. Second, it suggests the possibility of unexpected con-
sequences after a deregulation of the expansion restrictions that lesser the barrier to
entry for multimarket banks.
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Resumen
En esta tesis se estudian dos problemas relevantes en el campo de la organizacio´n
industrial: competencia entre firmas con distintos modelos de negocios (firmas “open
source” y propietarias en el cap´ıtulo 2, y firmas multimercado y unimercado en el
cap´ıtulo 3) y sus efectos sobre el mercado como asignador de recursos, y la relacio´n
emp´ırica entre actividad innovadora y empleo al nivel de firma.
El primer cap´ıtulo llamado “Empleo e innovacio´n: Evidencia al nivel de firma
para Argentina” es un trabajo conjunto con David Giuliodori y Rodolfo Stucchi. Este
cap´ıtulo muestra evidencia del efecto de la innovacio´n en el empleo para Argentina en el
per´ıodo 1998-2000. En particular, se mide el efecto de innovacio´n en proceso y producto
en la tasa de crecimiento del empleo y la composicio´n de la cualificacio´n del empleo.
Los resultados del cap´ıtulo muestran que: (i) Las innovaciones de producto tienen un
efecto positivo en el crecimiento del empleo sesgado hacia el trabajo calificado; (ii)
las innovaciones de proceso no afectan el crecimiento del empleo o las composicio´n
de la cualificacio´n del empleo; (iii) no hay efectos heteroge´neos en funcio´n del sector
tecnolo´gico al que pertenece firma y el taman˜o de la firma; (iv) La mayor parte de la
contraccio´n del empleo en el per´ıodo se explica por la decisiones de contratacio´n de la
firmas no innovadoras.
El segundo cap´ıtulo llamado “Equilibrio en la industria con firmas “open source” y
propietarias” es un trabajo conjunto con Gasto´n Llanes. En este cap´ıtulo se presenta
un modelo de equilibrio en una industria para estudiar la coexistencia entre firmas
“open source” y propietarias. El modelo presenta dos aspectos novedosos (i) la parti–
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cipacio´n en un proyecto open source surge endo´genamente a partir de las decisiones
o´ptimas de firmas maximizadoras de beneficios, y (ii) las firmas open source y propi-
etarias pueden coexistir o no en equilibrio. Las firmas deciden su tipo y su inversio´n
en I+D, y venden paquetes conformados por un bien primario y un bien complemen-
tario privado. Las firmas open source comparten sus avances tecnolo´gicos en el bien
primario mientras que las firmas propietarias mantienen sus innovaciones privadas. La
principal contribucio´n del cap´ıtulo es determinar las condiciones que permiten la co-
existencia de ambas firmas en equilibrio. Un resultado importante es que el equilibrio
se caracteriza por una estructura asime´trica de mercado con un nu´mero reducido de
firmas propietarias de gran taman˜o y numerosas firmas open source de menor taman˜o.
El tercer cap´ıtulo llamado “Competencia entre bancos unimercado y multimercado:
Evidencia para la industria bancaria de EEUU” estima las ventajas y desventajas
comparativas entre bancos unimercado y multimercado. El mercado relevante en la
industria bancaria de EEUU, debido a la importancia de la distancia geogra´fica en
la industria, es esencialmente local. El trabajo considera dos tipos de competidores
en funcio´n a la localizacio´n de las sucursales bancarias: bancos con presencia en un
so´lo mercado local llamados bancos unimercado, y bancos con presencia en ma´s de un
mercado local llamados bancos multimercado.
Los resultados principales del trabajo son: (i) los bancos unimercado incumbentes
tienen ventajas comparativas frente a los bancos multimercados en mercados urbanos
de menor taman˜o y en mercados rurales, y (ii) los bancos unimercados enfrentan may-
ores costos de expansio´n hacia otros mercados locales que los bancos multimercado.
Este cap´ıtulo presenta dos contribuciones principales. Primero, contribuye a la dis-
cusio´n sobre los problemas de agencia de firmas ma´s jera´rquicas en mercados con
problemas de informacio´n asime´trica. Segundo, sugiere la posibilidad de consecuen-
cias no esperadas de una pol´ıtica de desregulacio´n a la expansio´n de las sucursales
bancarias que disminuye la barreras a la entrada de los bancos multimercado.
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Chapter 1
Employment and innovation: Firm
level evidence from Argentina
(with David Giuliodori and Rodolfo
Stucchi)
1.1 Introduction
The effect of innovation on employment has been attracting the attention of economists
and policy makers for a long time. This fact is not surprising. On the one hand, it has
been argued that technical change could destroy jobs and, on the other hand, economic
theory does not provide a clear answer about the employment effect of innovation. The
relationship between innovation and employment is not straightforward. The literature
has documented several compensation mechanisms that can counterbalance the initial
effect of innovation and render the final effect undetermined (see Petit (1995); Pianta
(2005); Piva and Vivarelli (2005); Vivarelli (1995, 2014)). Innovation can create or
destroy jobs depending on the institutional setting, market structure, and the type of
innovation the firm introduces.
The development –or the adoption– a new production process usually leads to
2
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greater efficiency in production, with savings in labor and/or capital and with a po-
tential for price reduction. The first expected outcome is higher productivity with loss
of employment. However, demand could grow after the innovation due to increased
quality or lower price, and this increase in demand could lead to higher employment.
The introduction of a new or significantly improved product increases employment
via an increase in demand. However, if after the innovation the innovator enjoys
market power, it can set prices that maximize its profits but imply a reduction in
output. Therefore, the net effect of a product innovation could be a contraction in
employment. A new product can also destroy jobs if it is designed to reduce costs.
It is also possible that product innovations do not change employment; this would be
the case if new products replace old products without changes in demand.
Despite the fact that the theoretical effect of innovation on employment is ambigu-
ous, several firm level studies have found that the fear that innovation could destroy
jobs has little empirical support. In fact, the evidence shows a positive relationship
between innovation and employment (Blanchflower and Burgess (1998); Entorf and
Pohlmeier (1990); Giuliodori and Stucchi (2012); Piva and Vivarelli (2005); Smolny
(1998); Van Reenen (1997)).
Firm-level evidence also suggests that while product innovation creates jobs, pro-
cess innovation might in fact destroy jobs. To capture this idea, Harrison, Jaumandreu,
Mairesse, and Peters (2014) pose a simple model to study the differential effect of prod-
uct and process innovation on employment growth. They estimate their model for the
manufacturing and service sectors in France, Germany, Spain, and the United King-
dom. They find that the increase in employment due to product innovations is large
enough to compensate the negative effect of process innovations. The results are sim-
ilar across countries, although there emerge some interesting differences. In fact, they
find no evidence for a displacement effect of process innovation in Spanish manufac-
turing firms. They argue that this result can be explained by a greater pass-through of
productivity improvements in lower prices. Hall, Lotti, and Mairesse (2008) estimate
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Harrison, Jaumandreu, Mairesse, and Peters (2014)’s model using Italian data and
find similar results.
Innovation affects not only the number of employees but also the composition of
employment within each firm. The basic intuition is that innovations are skill biased
because they replace tasks traditionally carried out by unskilled workers, with new
jobs demanding qualified workers. Acemoglu (1998) argues that new technologies
are not complementary to skills by nature, but innovators decide the direction of
technological change. Acemoglu shows that an increase in the supply of skills can
explain skill-biased technical change in the United States. More relevant to our article,
Acemoglu (2003) extends the basic model of directed technical change to study the
interaction between technology and international trade. In his model, technical change
in developing countries is skill biased due to the transfer of technology from developed
countries.
There is a vast empirical literature on the skill bias of technological change for
developed countries. After the seminal work by Griliches (1969), the effect of inno-
vation on the skills composition has been largely studied (Autor, Katz, and Krueger
(1998); Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002); Caroli and Van Reenen (2001);
Doms, Dunne, and Troske (1997); Greenan (2003)). Giuliodori and Stucchi (2012)
analyze a related question about the effect of innovation on the composition of em-
ployment in terms of labor contract. They present evidence for Spain, where the labor
market is segmented in temporary and permanent contracts, and find that innovations
can affect both types of contracts depending on the institutional environment.
Firm-level studies discussed above focus on the direct effect of innovation on em-
ployment –that is, the effect of innovation on the level of employment of the innovating
firm. Innovation also has indirect effects –that is, on noninnovating firms. The indirect
effects are intuitive for product innovations; it is not difficult to imagine a scenario in
which a product innovation increases the demand of the innovating firm and its employ-
ment but reduces the demand of its competitors and their employment level. Process
4
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innovation also has indirect effects. The innovating firm can increase its productivity
and by reducing price can gain market share, increase its demand for labor, and re-
duce the demand of labor of competitors. Pianta (2005) reviews several industry-level
studies addressing these issues. The empirical evidence reviewed by Pianta (2005)
shows that the effect of product innovation on employment is positive in industries
characterized by high demand growth and an orientation toward product (or service)
innovation, while process innovation leads to job losses. The evidence about overall
effect is mixed; it depends on the country and period considered.
The evidence on the relationship between innovation and employment in Latin
America is scarce, and because of the idiosyncratic nature of innovation in Latin
America –mainly acquisition of technological knowledge from abroad– the evidence
from developed countries cannot be simply extrapolated to this region. In addition,
in Latin America there are important structural features that might lead to different
outcomes of innovation on employment. First, the current production structure is
strongly dominated by small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Second, Latin
America’s production structure is heavily dominated by the manufacturing of com-
modities and low technologically intensive goods. The available evidence comes from
Benavente and Lauterbach (2008)), who estimate the Harrison, Jaumandreu, Mairesse,
and Peters (2014) model for Chile. Contemporaneous to our article, Aboal, Garda,
Lanzilotta, and Perera (2015), Alvarez, Benavente, Campusano, and Cuevas (2011),
and Monge-Gonzalez, Rodriguez-A´lvarez, Hewitt, Orozco, and Ruiz (2011) estimate
Harrison, Jaumandreu, Mairesse, and Peters (2014) ’s model for Chile, Costa Rica,
and Uruguay, and Crespi and Tacsir (2013) present a comparative analysis for the sev-
eral countries. They find that while product innovations increase employment, process
innovations do not affect it. Additional evidence on the relation between innovation
and employment comes from the evaluation of innovation public policies. Alvarez,
Benavente, Campusano, and Cuevas (2012), who evaluate the effect of two innovation
programs (FONTEC and FONDEF) in Chile, find that these programs increased em-
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ployment and productivity. Castillo, Maffioli, Rojo, and Stucchi (2014) evaluate the
effect of the Support Program for the Organizational Change in Argentina. They find
that while support for both process and product innovation lead to increased employ-
ment, the support for product innovation has a higher effect on wages, survival rate,
and exporting probability.
This article aims at providing evidence about the relationship between innovation
and employment in the manufacturing sector in Argentina. More precisely, we aim
at answering two important questions: (1) How do different types of innovation –
product and process innovations– affect employment? (2) How do the different types of
innovation affect the skill composition? In addition, given the Argentinean production
structure, we are interested in knowing whether the results vary between low- and
high-tech industries or small and large firms. To answer those questions, we use data
from Innovation Surveys for Argentina for the period 1998-2001. This period coincides
with one of the deepest recessions of Argentina’s history. As a consequence, it provides
an interesting opportunity to estimate the effects of innovation on employment growth
in a highly recessive scenario. A few statistics help to describe the rough economic
environment in Argentina in 1998-2001. The gross domestic product fell 8.4 percent
between 1998 and 2001 (a negative average growth rate of 2.9 percent per year).
Unemployment rose from 13.2 percent in May 1998 to 18.3 percent in October 2001.
Investment plunged at an average annual rate of 12 percent. The manufacturing
sector showed a significant contraction; the index of manufacturing activity fell 22
percent between 1998 and 2001. The innovation survey we use in the analysis shows
a contraction in employment of 8 percent between 1998 and 2001. Interestingly, the
reduction in employment was different between innovators and noninnovators. The
reduction in employment was 7 percent in those firms that reported process or product
innovations and 13 percent in firms that did not introduce any innovation.
We find that while product innovation creates jobs, process innovation does not
affect the level of employment. Another important finding is that product innovation
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is skilled biased. In fact, we find that while product innovation creates both skilled
and unskilled jobs, it creates a higher proportion of skilled jobs. In the case of process
innovation, we find that there is no effect on skilled or unskilled jobs. These findings
provide evidence not only against the fear that innovation could destroy jobs but also
against the hypothesis that innovation could destroy unskilled jobs. From a policy
perspective, our results shed light on two important issues. First, Argentina – like
the rest of Latin American economies – faces a productivity problem that calls for
attention. Our results point out that innovation programs – whose main objective is
to increase productivity – could be attractive also from an employment point of view.
Some warnings on SME policies that distort the size distribution of firms have been
raised because they could affect the aggregate level of productivity (Guner, Ventura,
and Xu (2008); Page´s (2010)). Interestingly, this is not the case of innovation policies
because innovation is one of the main drivers of productivity growth. Second, the com-
plementarity of innovation and skilled workers justify the need for training programs
in addition to innovation programs.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the analytical
framework. Section 1.3 presents the data and some descriptive statistics. Section
1.4 presents the main results of innovation on employment. Section 1.5 discusses
the robustness of our results. Section 1.6 decomposes the contribution of product
innovators, process innovators and noninnovators to employment growth. Finally,
Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Analytical Framework
The analytical framework follows the model in Harrison, Jaumandreu, Mairesse, and
Peters (2014). In this framework, a firm produces two types of products in period
t: old or only marginally modified products (“old products” denoted by Y1t ) and
new or significantly improved products (“new products” denoted by Y2t). Assuming
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separability in the production of old and new products, the production function for
product of type i in period t can be written as
Yit = θitF (Lit, Kit,Mit)e
η+ωit ,
where F (.) is homogeneous of degree one in labor (Lit), capital (Kit), and intermediate
goods (Mit); θit is a Hicks neutral technical change parameter (which can depend on
process innovation); and eη+ωit is unobserved firm’s productivity that can be decom-
posed in firm’s attributes that are mainly time invariant (η) and productivity shocks
(ωit).
Under perfect competition in input markets, the cost function of a firm in period
t is
Ct(wt, Y1t, Y2t) = c(wt)
(
Y1t
θ1teη+ω1t
+
Y2t
θ2teη+ω2t
)
,
where wt are input prices, and the conditional labor demand function is
Lit = cwL(wt)
Yit
θiteη+ωit
,
where wL is the price of labor, and cwL = ∂c/∂wL.
Using the labor demand function, we can approximate employment growth at the
firm level as
∆L
L
≈ log
(
L12
L11
)
+
L22
L11
= −(log θ12 − log θ11) + (log Y12 − log Y11) + θ11
θ22
Y22
Y11
− (ω12 − ω11)
Employment growth is then decomposed into the part due to the increased effi-
ciency in production of old products (which could be related to process innovations),
the part due to sales of old products, and the part due to the introduction of new
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products. The estimating equation is given by
l = α0 + α1 d+ g1 + β g2 + v, (1.2.1)
where l is total employment growth; g1 is the nominal growth in sales of old products;
g2 is the nominal growth in sales of new products (product innovations); and d captures
the introduction of process innovations in the production of old products.
The parameter β captures the relative efficiency in the production of old and new
products: when β < 1 (β > 1) new products are produced more (less) efficiently
than old products. The constant in Equation (1.2.1) represents (minus) the average
efficiency growth in the production of old products for noninnovators.
We observe employment and total sales in 1998 and 2001, and firms report whether
they introduced product or process innovations between those years. This is important
because it provides us with information before and after the innovation. Moreover,
in 2001, it is possible to know the percentage of sales corresponding to new products.
This information is crucial to estimate Equation (1.2.1).
The effect of innovations on employment composition is estimated with a version
of Equation (1.2.1) for employment growth of skilled and unskilled workers. For the
two types of workers, skilled (s) and unskilled (u), we estimate
lq = αq0 + α
q
1 d+ g1 + β
q g2 + v
q q = s, u, (1.2.2)
where lq is the growth rate of employment of type q .
A concern about the identification1 of the coefficients in Equation (1.2.1) is the
fact that innovation can be correlated with the error term, then ordinary least squares
(OLS) can produce inconsistent estimates. The endogeneity of innovation comes from
the fact that productivity is omitted from Equation (1.2.1), and it can be correlated
1The identification discussion focuses on Equation (1.2.1), but similar arguments apply to the
identification of Equation (1.2.2).
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with innovation. This is the case because innovations are the result of investment
decisions, such as R&D, and those decisions depend on the firm’s productivity. Then,
if productivity is in the error term because it is an omitted variable, the error term
will be correlated with innovation leading to an endogeneity problem.
In order to better understand the endogeneity problem, it is useful to decompose
productivity in two unobserved components: firm’s attributes that are mainly time
invariant (such as managerial skills or organizational capital) and productivity shocks
(which might lead the firm to reduce labor costs). Equation (1.2.1) is specified as a
growth equation, and the influence of the time invariant part of productivity is removed
from the error term.
The remaining source of correlation between innovation outputs and productivity
are productivity shocks.
Part of the correlation between innovation and productivity shocks is the relation-
ship between these variables and the business cycle. If both innovation and produc-
tivity are related to the business cycle as some literature has found –see, for example,
Barlevy (2007) for innovation and Basu and Fernald (2001) for productivity– then
endogeneity is a valid concern. To avoid this source of correlation, we include a set
of industry dummies in the growth Equation (1.2.1). A set of industry dummies in
Equation (1.2.1) is equivalent to the interaction between industry dummies and a 2001
dummy in a level equation. Therefore, these variables will capture the business cycle
effect.
Once we control for time-invariant unobservables and industry-specific temporal
shocks, there are good reasons to think that process innovation can be exogenous.2
First, innovations expenditures are usually made well before they result in applicable
innovations. Second, it seems realistic to assume that firms cannot predict future labor
problems, supply chain disruptions, or demand shocks when deciding their innovations
2It should be noted that similar arguments can apply for product innovations. However, as we
argue below, our measure of product innovation is measured with error. This additional source of
endogeneity in the product innovation variable is not present in the process innovation variable.
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expenditures. For these reasons, we treat process innovation as exogenous, but we run
a robustness exercise instrumenting the process innovation variable.
Another possible source of endogeneity is the presence of measurement error in g1
and g2 . Ideally, we would use growth in real production, but we only observe growth
in nominal sales. Then the growth in the price of old and new products is in the
error term, and the correlation between the growth in prices and g2 can create an
attenuation bias in the estimation of β. To deal with this measurement error problem,
we follow Harrison, Jaumandreu, Mairesse, and Peters (2014) . First, we use industry
price indexes pi as a proxy for the growth in prices of old products. Second, we use
instrumental variables that are correlated with real growth in the production of new
products but uncorrelated with its nominal growth.
The main advantage of Harrison, Jaumandreu, Mairesse, and Peters (2014)’s ap-
proach is the use of economic theory to model the possible mechanisms linking inno-
vation and employment. In particular, under the assumption of perfect competition
in input markets and general assumptions about the firm’s technology, Harrison, Jau-
mandreu, Mairesse, and Peters (2014) derive an estimating equation linking process
and product innovation with optimal hiring decisions. This, in turn, leads to param-
eters with a clear and meaningful economic interpretation. In comparison, a reduced
form approach that regresses employment growth on innovative variables is difficult
to interpret, and the mechanisms are difficult to disentangle. We illustrate this point
by running a reduced form approach in Table 1.2 and remark how difficult it is to
interpret the coefficients in that model.
Another advantage is that Harrison, Jaumandreu, Mairesse, and Peters (2014)
estimate their model for several European countries that can serve as a benchmark for
the effects of innovation on employment in developing countries. In that sense, we can
not only interpret the evidence for Argentina, but also compare it with the evidence
for developed countries.
An important point concerns the identification strategy and how it compares with
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alternative approaches. An alternative identification strategy used in the literature
is a generalized method of moments (GMM) system estimator proposed in Blundell
and Bond (1998). For a recent application, see Lachenmaier and Rottmann (2011).
The basic approach is to specify a labor demand equation that depends on lags of
the dependent variable, contemporaneous and lags of the innovation variables, indus-
try controls, and a firm level fixed effect. Such a model is estimated using lagged
level variables to instrument the difference equation and lagged differences to instru-
ment the level equation. In this article, identification relies on contemporaneous level
variables to instrument the difference equation controlling for industry and location
dummies. Unfortunately, the data available consist of two periods, and this prevents
us from including lagged variables as instruments. For that reason, we run several
exercises to show that the results in the article are robust to departures from the basic
assumptions such as instrument validity, alternative controls, and exogeneity of the
process innovation.
1.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We use data from the Second National Innovation Survey (ENIT01).3 ENIT01 was
conducted in 2003 by the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INDEC) and
collected retrospective information for each year between 1998 and 2001. The firms
that were surveyed are the same firms surveyed in the Annual Industrial Survey –
manufacturing firms with ten or more employees. The sample is representative of the
manufacturing sector in the sense that the percentage of aggregate sales by industries
in the sample is close to the percentage of sales by industry using the Annual Industrial
Survey (Instituto Nacional de Estad´ısticas y Censos 2003).
The survey contains detailed information on firms’ characteristics, innovative ac-
tivity, and employment. Importantly, it also has detailed information on the compo-
3Segunda Encuesta Nacional de Innovacio´n y Conducta Tecnolo´gica de las Empresas Argentinas
1998-2001.
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sition of sales, which allows us to compute the percentage of sales corresponding to
new products. A firm in the survey reports the share of domestic sales (pnd) and
the share of exports (pxd) that correspond to new or significantly improved prod-
ucts in 2001. Using that information, we construct sales of new products in 2001 as
Y22 = Domestic Sales 2001
pnd
100
+ Exports 2001pxd
100
and sales of old products in 2001
as Y12 = Domestic Sales 2001
100−pnd
100
+ Exports 2001100−pxd
100
. Using the above defi-
nitions, we can decompose the nominal growth in sales as g =
(
Y12+Y22
Y11
− 1
)
100 =[(
Y12
Y11
− 1
)
+ Y22
Y11
]
100 = g1+g2, where g1 is the nominal growth in sales of old products,
and g2 is the nominal growth in sales of new products.
ENIT01 has also detailed information about the composition of employment by
educational level, which allows us to study the effect of innovation on skill composition.
We define skilled workers as employees with a university degree or tertiary education
(one- to three-year degree related to technical professions), and unskilled workers are
employees with primary or secondary education. As usual with firm-level data, prices
are not reported at the firm level, and we use industry price indexes at the two-digit
level to deflate nominal variables. Given that product prices can differ between firms
or even within the firm for multiproduct firms, the use of price indexes introduces a
measurement error problem in the estimation. In the empirical implementation, we
use instrumental variables to correct this measurement error bias.
We classify firms in mutually exclusive categories according to their innovative
activity: product innovators, process-only innovators, and noninnovators. Product
innovators are firms that introduce product innovations; process-only innovators are
firms that introduce process innovations or organizational change innovations, exclud-
ing product innovators; and noninnovators are firms not classified as product or process
innovators.4
4Following Harrison, Jaumandreu, Mairesse, and Peters (2014), we classify firms that have intro-
duced both product and process innovations as product innovators. The implicit assumption is that
product and process innovators are more similar to product innovators than to process innovators.
We will present some evidence supporting this assumption in the next section.
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Table 1.1 shows the descriptive statistics for the share of innovative firms, employ-
ment growth, sales growth, and labor productivity, where labor productivity is defined
as real sales per worker. A large share of firms (63 percent) introduced at least one
innovation in 1998-2001. Most of the innovators are product innovators (48 percent)
rather than process-only innovators (15 percent). Harrison, Jaumandreu, Mairesse,
and Peters (2014) report a similar share of innovative firms for France, Germany,
Spain, and the United Kingdom. The higher ratio of R&D expenditure to sales in
developed countries suggests, however, that innovative activities undertaken by firms
in Argentina are different from those in developed countries. Innovative firms in Ar-
gentina aim more at assimilating foreign technology or consist of incremental, marginal
innovations, while innovative firms in developed countries invest primarily in research
and development.
Interestingly, the reduction in employment was different between innovators and
noninnovators. The annual reduction in employment was 2.5 percent for product
innovators and 3.9 percent for process-only innovators while it was 6 percent for non-
innovators. A similar pattern is observed in sales growth with a smaller reduction in
sales for innovators than for noninnovators. The annual reduction in sales was 6.6 per-
cent for product innovators, 8.1 percent for process-only innovators, and 12.5 percent
for noninnovators.
For product innovators we decompose growth in sales in the part corresponding to
old products (g1) and the part corresponding to new products (g2), as explained above.
It is remarkable the rapid pace at which product innovators substituted old products
with new products during the analyzed period in Argentina: sales of old products
decreased 45 percent while sales of new products increased 40 percent. This pace,
especially the decrease in sales of old products, is significantly faster than that for
France, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom reported in Harrison, Jaumandreu,
Mairesse, and Peters (2014). This difference might be explained by the recessive
scenario in 1998-2001 in Argentina or by new products presenting only incremental,
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marginal innovations with respect to old products.
The decrease in labor productivity was 4.2 percent for product innovators, 4.3 for
process-only innovators, and 6.5 percent for noninnovators. This evidence suggests
that innovators might be able to compensate a negative aggregate shock through the
introduction of new products or processes. Table 1.1 shows the descriptive statistics
for skilled and unskilled labor. In our sample, employment contracted at an annual
rate of 4 percent. However, skilled employment decreased 1.6 percent while unskilled
employment decreased 5.3 percent. Differences in skilled-unskilled labor growth rates
were greater for innovators than for noninnovators suggesting complementarity be-
tween innovation and skilled labor.
We study the presence of heterogeneous effects for sectors with different techno-
logical intensity. The nature of innovations can be very different for low-tech and
high-tech, and this can be reflected in the employment effects of innovations. Sec-
tors are classified as low-tech or high-tech sectors following Czarnitzki and Thorwarth
(2012), who study the productivity effects of basic research in low-tech and high-tech
industries in Belgium. The low-tech sectors are food, beverages, and tobacco (ISIC
15 and 16); textiles, wearing apparel, and leather products (ISIC 17, 18, and 19);
wood, wood products, and furniture (ISIC 20 and 36); pulp, paper, and paper prod-
ucts (ISIC 21); publishing, printing, and reproduction of recorded media (ISIC 22);
rubber and plastic products (ISIC 25); and basic metals, fabricated metals, and non-
metallic mineral products (ISIC 26, 27, and 28). The high-tech sectors are chemicals
and chemical products, coke, refined petroleum, and nuclear fuel (ISIC 23 and 24);
machinery, equipment, office machinery, computers, communication equipment, elec-
trical machinery, and medical, precision, and optical instruments (ISIC 29, 30, 31, 32,
and 33); and motor vehicles and transport equipment (ISIC 34 and 35). Low-tech
sectors have a lower share of skilled labor but greater growth in employment than
high-tech sectors. However, the difference in employment growth for innovators and
noninnovators is similar for low-tech and high-tech sectors.
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We also study the presence of heterogeneous effects for firms with different sizes.
In developing countries, and Latin America in particular, the share of small firms
in manufacturing is important. Thus, it is relevant to study whether the effects of
innovation on employment vary by firm size. Small firms are firms with fewer than
fifty employees, and large firms are firms with more than fifty employees. The share
of innovators is 44 percent for small firms and 72 percent for large firms (Table 1.1).
However, the difference in employment growth for innovators and noninnovators is
greater for small firms than for large firms. This suggests that heterogeneous effects
may exist between small and large firms.
1.4 Empirical Results
Exploratory Regressions
Table 1.2 shows OLS exploratory regressions of employment growth on innovation
variables, real growth in sales, industry and location dummies, and a foreign owner-
ship dummy. We run these regressions for two reasons: first, and more important,
to illustrate how challenging it is to understand the mechanisms linking innovation
and employment without imposing additional structure; second, to justify grouping
product-only innovators and product and process innovators.
Columns (1), (2), and (3) differ in the allocation of those firms that introduce both
product and process innovations. In column (1), product and process innovators are
included in separate categories; in column (2), product and process innovators are
included with product innovators; and in column (3), product and process innovators
are included with process innovators.
The estimate of the constant is approximately -2.2 percent, and it captures the
mean employment growth for noninnovators. Innovators are associated with a 2 per-
cent higher employment growth than noninnovators. There are not statistically signifi-
cant differences between product and process-only innovators, product-only innovators,
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and product and process innovators. It will be difficult to estimate separate effects
on employment for process-only innovators, product-only innovators, and product and
process innovators. Thus, we decide to group all product innovators (product and
process innovators and product-only innovators). This decision is supported by the
point estimates shown in the table.
The estimated coefficient on real growth in sales suggests that sales are associated
with a less-than-proportional increase in employment: a 1 percent increase in sales
growth of old products implies a 0.32 percent increase in employment growth. As
a comparison, Harrison, Jaumandreu, Mairesse, and Peters (2014) found elasticities
between 0.35 and 0.45 for European countries.
Innovation and Employment
Column (1) in Table 1.3 shows the estimates of the effect of innovations on employment
using the Harrison, Jaumandreu, Mairesse, and Peters (2014) model. In all the spec-
ifications, we control for two-digit industry dummies, location dummies,5 and foreign
ownership. Panel A in Table 1.3 shows the OLS estimates. These results show that
while product innovation has a positive and significant effect on employment, process
innovation does not have a significant effect. The estimated coefficient on g2 is close
to one, which indicates no differences in efficiency in the production of old and new
products. Panel B in Table 1.3 shows the instrumental variable (IV) estimates. As
we discussed in the Analytical Framework section, there are two endogeneity problems
that can bias the OLS estimation: an omitted variable problem because productivity
shocks are included in the error term (with a negative sign), and a measurement error
problem due to unobservability of prices at firm level. These endogeneity issues tend
to generate a downward bias in the OLS estimate of the coefficient on g2 .
The instrument used in the IV estimation is an indicator of the firm knowledge of
5“Location dummies” means a dummy variable for each province in Argentina. We consider that
a firm is located in a province if its headquarters are located in that province. There are twenty-three
provinces in Argentina, and around 64 percent of the firms are located in the city of Buenos Aires.
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public support for innovation activities. The identification strategy relies on knowledge
of public programs being exogenous once we control for industry, location, size, and
time-invariant productivity. We believe this is a valid assumption for several reasons.
First, if information acquisition is costly, only more productive and larger firms will be
willing to make such an investment. Given that we control for invariant productivity
and size, these effects are taken into account. In addition, it seems less likely that
firms decide to invest in information acquisition because of productivity shocks that
could be temporary. Second, public innovation policies can be targeted to specific
regions, industries, or sizes. In those cases, the information cost would vary at that
level, and we control for that. Third, in 1998-2001 in Argentina, there were policy
changes that can provide some exogenous shocks that we exploit in the estimation.
In particular, the main innovation program in Argentina is FONTAR. In 1998, this
program introduced a new source of financing in the form of fiscal subsidies applied
to income taxes (Binelli and Maffioli (2007)). Another important innovation program
in this period was PRE, which was created at the end of 1997. These programs
targeted SMEs, and conditional on size, there were no additional requirements to bias
the provision of information about the public programs (Castillo, Maffioli, Rojo, and
Stucchi (2014)).
A valid instrument must also satisfy a relevance condition that requires signifi-
cant correlation between the instrument and the endogenous variable. This condition
can be tested with a joint significance test on the excluded exogenous variables in
the first-stage regression. Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002) recommend an F statis-
tic greater than ten to avoid weak instruments problem that can create small sample
bias in IV estimates. The first column shows that this F statistic is approximately
fourteen, showing no evidence of weak instruments problem. In addition, given that
just-identified models are better behaved in small samples, we are confident that the
instrument satisfies the relevance condition and the estimates have good small-sample
properties.
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Table 1.3 shows that the IV estimates of the coefficient on g2 move upward, which
is consistent with a downward bias in the OLS estimate. The estimate increases
from 0.96 in the OLS estimation in panel A to 1.15 in the IV estimation in panel
B. A coefficient greater than one offers evidence that new products are produced less
efficiently than old products. However, this evidence is tenuous because the estimate
is not statistically different from one. These results show that there is evidence that
product innovations create employment (creation effect) due to demand enlargement.
Table 1.3 also shows that the IV estimate of the coefficient on process innovation
is also corrected upward. The estimated coefficient is positive but not significant,
suggesting that process innovations have no effect on employment. There are two
plausible explanations for this result. First, process innovations may not generate
important productivity gains; hence, there is no displacement effect on employment.
Second, process innovations may generate productivity gains (displacement effect),
which induce a demand enlargement through market competition (creation effect). In
the end, the creation effect on employment compensates the displacement effect on
employment.
We run a Davidson-MacKinnon test to assess the endogeneity of g2 . We reject
exogeneity of g2 at 10 percent. Thus our preferred specification for the innovation-
employment model is the IV estimation where g2 is endogenous.
Skill-Biased Innovations
The effect of innovation activity on skilled and unskilled labor is central for the design
of public policy. If innovation activities and skilled labor are complements, we expect
that the introduction of innovations will be mainly reflected in a higher demand for
skilled labor. This can justify the implementation of labor-training programs simulta-
neously with pro-innovation policies. Columns (2) and (3) in Table 1.3 show the OLS
and IV results for skilled and unskilled labor. Consistent with the expected downward
bias in the OLS estimation, the IV estimates of the coefficients in g2 and d are greater
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than the OLS estimates.
Interestingly, the IV results suggest that product innovations are more skilled in-
tensive. The p-value of the test H0 : β
u = βs vs. H1 : β
u 6= βs is equal to 0.106. If
the alternative hypothesis is that innovation is skilled biased–that is, H1 : β
u < βs–it
is possible to reject the null hypothesis at 10 percent (p-value 0.053). There is no
evidence that process innovations affect the skill composition.
It should be noted that we cannot reject exogeneity of g2 in the case of unskilled
labor. Given the difference in point estimates between OLS and IV, the test fails
to reject exogeneity of g2 because of the lack of precision in IV estimates. For this
reason, we follow the more conservative approach of treating g2 as endogenous in all
the specifications.
Heterogeneous Effects by Technology Intensity and Size
In Tables 1.4 and 1.5, we study heterogeneous effects by technology intensity (low-tech
and high-tech sectors) and size (small and large firms).
Table 1.4 shows the results for low-tech and high-tech firms. There is no evidence of
heterogeneous effects by technology intensity in the effect of innovation on employment.
There is evidence of heterogeneous effects in the effect of innovation on employment
composition: product innovations are skill biased for low-tech firms but not for high-
tech firms. The evidence comes from a one-sided test against the alternative that
product innovations are skill biased, and we reject the null at 10 percent. This result
is even more surprising given that the power of the test is lower when we split the
sample into low-tech and high-tech firms.
Table 1.5 shows the results for small and large firms. On the effect of innovation
on employment and skill composition, there is no evidence of heterogeneous effects by
firm size. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that product innovations are not skill
biased, but this may be due to the small sample and the lack of power in the test.
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1.5 Robustness checks
Innovation and Employment
In this section, we run some robustness checks to evaluate the sensitivity of the results
about the effect of innovation on employment to alternative modeling assumptions.
First, we include additional instruments to test for exogeneity of the instruments using
a Sargan-Hansen overidentification test. The additional instrument is an indicator of
positive R&D investment in each year (continuous R&D dummy). If continuous R&D
is correlated with time-invariant firm attributes–something we control for–rather than
productivity shocks, continuous R&D satisfies the exogeneity assumption. Given the
definition of continuous R&D, exogeneity of continuous R&D seems like a sensible
assumption. Column (1) in Table 1.6 shows the estimates for the overidentified model.
The Sargan-Hansen test does not reject exogeneity of the instruments. These results
provide additional evidence of the validity of the chosen instrument.
Second, we estimate the Harrison, Jaumandreu, Mairesse, and Peters (2014) model
under the assumptions that both g2 and process-only innovation are endogenous. Col-
umn (2) in Table 1.6 shows the results. The estimate on the coefficient on process-only
innovation experiences an important loss in precision. However, the estimate of the
coefficient on g2 is similar to the estimate under exogeneity of the process innova-
tion. Accordingly, the Davidson-MacKinnon test does not reject exogeneity of the
process-only innovation variable.
Third, we evaluate whether product-only innovators are different from product and
process innovators. To do that, we add an interaction between g2 and a product and
process innovator dummy as an additional covariate. This new variable is endogenous,
so we use the interaction between knowledge of support for innovation activity and
the product and process innovator dummy as an additional instrument. Column (3)
in Table 1.6 shows the results. Although the estimated coefficient on g2 increases, the
interaction is not significant. We conclude that there is no compelling evidence to
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treat product and process innovators separately from product-only innovators.
Fourth, we control for industry-location shocks including the average employment
growth at the industry-regional level as an additional regressor. In the basic spec-
ification, we control for industry specific shocks using two-digit industry dummies,
and we control for location-specific shocks using location dummies. To control for
industry-location shocks, we define five regions: Buenos Aires, Center, Cuyo, South,
and North.6 Then we construct the mean employment growth at the industry-regional
level. We expect that this variable is able to capture industry-location-specific shocks.
Column (4) in Table 1.6 shows that the variable is not significant and the results are
similar to the basic model.
Fifth, given that part of the endogeneity comes from unobserved productivity,
we include labor productivity as a proxy for unobserved productivity. The proxy for
unobserved productivity is labor productivity in 1998 defined as real sales over workers.
Column (5) in Table 1.6 shows that the variable is not significant and the results are
similar to the basic model.
Sixth, measurement error in sales of new products can potentially bias our results.
To ease concerns about the presence of measurement error in sales of new products,
we use a more restricted definition for g2 . We consider new products not already sold
in local or international markets by other firms. Column (6) in Table 1.6 shows that
the results are similar to the basic model.7
Skill-Biased Innovations
In this section, we run some robustness checks to evaluate the sensitivity of the results
on the effect of innovation about employment composition. Table 1.7 shows the results
6Buenos Aires includes the city of Buenos Aires; Center includes the provinces of Buenos Aires,
Co´rdoba, and Santa Fe; Cuyo includes Mendoza, San Luis, and San Juan; South includes Chubut,
Neuque´n, La Pampa, Santa Cruz, Rio Negro, and Tierra del Fuego; and North includes the rest of
the provinces.
7We also extended the model to consider non-CRS. However, we could not reject the CRS hypoth-
esis. These results are available from the authors on request.
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of the different robustness exercises.
As in the previous case, we first include continuous R&D as an additional instru-
ment. In this case, the effect of process innovation is again nonsignificant and therefore
robust to different instruments. The effect of product innovation, however, is equal
for skilled and unskilled labor. This contradicts the skill bias found using our pre-
ferred specification using only knowledge of public support. The fact that different
instruments yield different results is shown in the fact that we reject overidentification
for skilled labor. We interpret these results in two ways. First, if we have to choose
between the two instruments, we are inclined to believe in the exogeneity of knowl-
edge of public support. The arguments behind this statement are written in detail
in the Empirical Results section. Second, if the effect of innovation is heterogeneous
across firms, even if the two instruments are equally valid, the difference between two
IV instruments is related to the fact that the IV estimate measures a local effect on
compliers.
Next, we include several regressors used in the literature of skilled technical change
for developing countries (see, for example, Meschi, Taymaz, and Vivarelli (2011)). We
include log of exports; log of imports of physical capital, equipment, and inputs; and
log of technology transfer. Exports capture skill-enhancing effects of exporting activity
(learning-by-exporting); imports capture technological transfers embedded in physical
capital; and technology transfers capture explicit transfer of technology through li-
censes and patents. The results in [2] in Table 1.7 show that these variables are not
significant and the results do not change.8
8We also included in the regression the mean employment growth at the industry-regional level to
capture industry-location-specific shocks. The coefficient of this variable is not significant, and the
results do not change. The same occurs when we include labor productivity in 1998 as an additional
regressor. These results are available from the authors on request.
23
Chapter 1: Employment and innovation: Firm level evidence from
Argentina (with David Giuliodori and Rodolfo Stucchi)
1.6 Quantifying the Effect of Innovation on Em-
ployment and Productivity
The effect of each type of innovation on employment growth can be decomposed in
a productivity trend, the contribution of noninnovators, the contribution of process-
only innovators, and the contribution of product innovators. This decomposition is
similar to the employment growth decomposition proposed in Harrison, Jaumandreu,
Mairesse, and Peters (2014), but we modify the original decomposition to present sep-
arately the contribution of noninnovators. Firm’s employment growth can be written
as
li =
(∑
j
αj industryji +
∑
k
αk locationki
)
+ 1(g2i = 0)(1− di)(g1i − pii)+ (1.6.1)
di1(g2i = 0)(α1 + g1i − pii)+
1(g2i > 0)(diα1 + g1i − pii + βg2i) + vi,
where industryji’s are industry dummy variables; locationki’s are location (province)
dummy variables; and 1(.) is an indicator function. Thus employment growth can
be decomposed into four main components. The first component (
∑
j αj industryji +∑
k αk locationki) measures the contribution of the (industry-location specific) pro-
ductivity trend; the second component (1(g2i = 0)(1 − di)(g1i − pii)) measures the
contribution of noninnovators; the third component (di1(g2i = 0)(α1 + g1i − pii)) mea-
sures the contribution of process-only innovators; and the fourth component (1(g2i >
0)(diα1 + g1i − pii + βg2i)) measures the contribution of product innovators.
Column (1) in Table 1.8 shows the contribution of the different components to
employment growth using the IV estimates. The contribution of the productivity
trend is -0.6 percent, which shows a negligible increase in labor productivity in this
period. This trend in productivity may be explained, at least in part, by the business
cycle. Sales contracted at 9 percent per year, but firms did not translate the full
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extent of the adjustment to the labor force. This can be an optimal decision for the
firms under the presence of labor adjustment costs or if firms have more optimistic
expectations for the future (Basu and Fernald (2001)).
The contribution of noninnovators is -4.1 percent. This is the largest contribution
and shows that the destruction of jobs during this period was concentrated in noninno-
vators. The contribution of process-only innovators is -0.6 percent. Two factors affect
this contribution. First, there are few firms that introduce only process innovations (15
percent of the sample). Second, process innovations seem to have rather small effects
on employment. The contribution of product innovators is 1.4 percent. These results
show that product innovators substitute old products with new products at a rapid
pace even in a recessive scenario. The result of the innovation-employment model that
there are no efficiency gains in the production of new products might also suggest
that product innovators are selling a similar product with small changes (incremental
innovation).
Columns (2) and (3) in Table 1.8 show the decomposition for low- and high-tech
sectors. Employment growth for low-tech firms is -3.5 percent, and employment growth
for high-tech firms is -4.9 percent. The decomposition shows that the difference in
employment growth can be fully explained by the contribution of product innovators.
Given that the relative efficiency of new products is similar for low- and high-tech
firms, the differential contribution of product innovators is associated with the larger
real sales for product innovators in low-tech sectors.
Columns (4) and (5) in Table 1.8 show the decomposition for small and large firms.
Employment growth for small firms is -3.5 percent, and employment growth for large
firms is -4.2 percent. The decomposition shows that both innovators and noninnovators
in small firms destroy more employment than innovators and noninnovators in large
firms. Thus, the larger employment growth for small firms is explained by the lower
productivity trend.
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1.7 Conclusions
This article presents evidence about the relationship between innovation and employ-
ment in the manufacturing sector in Argentina. We aim at understanding whether
different types of innovation create or destroy employment and the type of employment
that is created or destroyed. To accomplish this, we estimated the model proposed in
Harrison, Jaumandreu, Mairesse, and Peters (2014) using an IV approach with data
from the Argentinean Innovation Surveys for the period 1998-2001.
The estimation of the effect of the different types of innovation on employment
shows that product innovation generates employment, but process innovation has no
effect on employment. In the case of product innovations, we find no evidence that
new products are produced more efficiently than old products. Thus, the displacement
effect of product innovation on employment has no empirical support in our data.
In the case of process innovation, there are two plausible explanations for its lack
of effect on employment.
First, a process innovation may not generate important productivity gains; hence,
there is no displacement effect on employment. Second, a process innovation may gen-
erate productivity gains (displacement effect), which induce a demand enlargement
through market competition (creation effect). In the end, the creation effect on em-
ployment compensates the displacement effect on employment. Unfortunately, with
the available data, we cannot distinguish one explanation from the other. Specification
tests support use of an IV approach and the validity of the chosen instruments. These
results are robust to using additional instruments, allowing different effects for product
and process innovators, adding additional controls, endogeneity of process innovation,
and using a different definition of new products.
Our results also show that product innovation is skilled biased. Although the
innovation created both skilled and unskilled jobs, the proportion of skilled jobs was
higher than the proportion of unskilled jobs. Therefore even if the innovation replaces
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tasks traditionally carried out by unskilled workers with new jobs demanding qualified
workers, the increase in demand also leads to an increase in the demand of unskilled
workers.
During the period we analyzed, there was an important contraction in employment
due to the recession. We found that most of the contraction in employment was due
to noninnovators. Process only innovators contributed –although marginally– to the
reduction in employment while product innovators more than compensated for the
effect of process innovators. These results were valid both for low- and high-tech
industries and for small and large firms. Interestingly, low-tech firms destroyed fewer
jobs than high-tech firms because sales decreased less for low-tech product innovators
than for high-tech product innovators. Small firms destroyed fewer jobs than large
firms because small firms had a lower productivity trend than large firms.
Appendix A: Figures and tables
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Table 1.2: Exploratory regressions, OLS estimation
All firms Low Technology High Technology
Dependent Variable: l [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2]
(Employment growth)
Constant -2.219* -2.214* -2.122 -2.117 -2.462 -2.459
(1.049) (1.047) (1.241) (1.239) (1.891) (1.887)
Process only innovator 0.944 0.942 0.711 0.708 1.992 1.990
(non-product innovator) (0.893) (0.893) (1.053) (1.052) (1.754) (1.753)
Product only innovator 1.804 1.838 1.648
(non-process innovator) (1.125) (1.519) (1.819)
Product and process innovator 2.035** 2.075* 1.780
(0.735) (0.850) (1.538)
Product innovator 2.002** 2.040* 1.763
(0.714) (0.817) (1.516)
Real sales growth (g − pi) 0.325*** 0.326*** 0.311*** 0.312*** 0.357*** 0.357***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.033) (0.070) (0.070)
R-squared 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.27 0.27
Tests (p-values)
Process&Product=Product only 0.825 0.875 0.918
Process&Product=Process only 0.196 0.207 0.872
Number of firms 1,415 1,415 953 953 462 462
Notes: i Robust standard errors. ii Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10%.
iii All regressions include as additional controls a dummy variable taking value one for those firms with more than 20 per-
cent of foreign capital, dummy variables for the province where the firm’s headquarters are located, and two-digit industry
dummies. iv A product innovator is a firm that has introduced at least one product innovation. A process innovator is a
firm that has introduced at least one process innovation or organizational change innovation.
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Table 1.3: The Effect of innovation on employment and skill composition: OLS and IV
Estimation of the Harrison et al. (2014) model
Dependent Variable: l − (g1 − pi) Labor Skilled Unskilledlabor labor
A) OLS
Process only innovator (d) -0.560 -0.125 0.755
(1.025) (1.176) (1.187)
Sales growth due to new products (g2) 0.958*** 0.963*** 0.952***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
R-squared 0.84 0.81 0.80
B) IV
Process only innovator (d) 1.252 2.998 2.265
(1.612) (2.094) (1.818)
Sales growth due to new products (g2) 1.151*** 1.307*** 1.102***
(0.122) (0.165) (0.143)
R-squared 0.80 0.70 0.77
First stage (F-test) 13.94 12.13
p-value 0.000 0.001
Endogeneity test for g2 2.79 6.51 1.17
p-value 0.095 0.011 0.279
Tests (p-values)
H0 : β = 1 0.215 0.062 0.475
H0 : βskilled = βunskilled 0.106
Number of firms 1,415 1,209 1,209
Notes: i Robust standard errors. ii Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10%. iii All re-
gressions include as additional controls a dummy variable taking value one for those firms with more
than 20 percent of foreign capital, dummy variables for the province where the firm’s headquarters
are located, and two-digit industry dummies. iv Skilled workers are employees with a university
degree or tertiary education (one- to three-year degree related to technical professions). Unskilled
workers are employees with primary or secondary education.
v Endogenous variables: g2. Instruments: knowledge of public support for innovation activities.
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Table 1.4: The effect of innovation on employment and skill composition: Heterogeneous
effects by technology intensity
Low Technology High Technology
Dependent Variable: Labor Skilled Unskilled Labor Skilled Unskilled
l − (g1 − pi) labor labor labor labor
A) OLS
Process only innovator (d) -0.754 -0.181 0.261 -0.397 0.550 2.296
(1.219) (1.367) (1.340) (1.959) (2.534) (2.668)
Sales growth due to 0.967*** 0.961*** 0.947*** 0.935*** 0.964*** 0.957***
new products (g2) (0.016) (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.026) (0.025)
R-squared 0.83 0.81 0.80 0.84 0.82 0.80
B) IV
Process only innovator (d) 0.323 1.564 0.523 3.767 7.788 8.171
(1.665) (2.234) (1.820) (3.743) (4.677) (4.719)
Sales growth due to 1.145*** 1.266*** 0.978*** 1.143*** 1.327*** 1.246***
new products (g2) (0.171) (0.253) (0.205) (0.162) (0.199) (0.201)
R-squared 0.80 0.72 0.79 0.80 0.70 0.72
First stage (F-test) 6.56 4.77 8.25 8.47
p-value 0.011 0.029 0.004 0.004
Endogeneity test for g2 1.17 2.09 0.02 1.78 4.62 2.73
p-value 0.280 0.148 0.888 0.183 0.032 0.099
Tests (p-values)
H0 : β = 1 0.397 0.293 0.916 0.376 0.100 0.222
H0 : βskilled = βunskilled 0.179 0.590
H0 : βlow−tech = βhigh−tech 0.994
Number of firms 953 808 808 462 401 401
Notes: i Robust standard errors. ii Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10%.
iii All regressions include as additional controls a dummy variable taking value one for those firms with more than 20
percent of foreign capital, dummy variables for the province where the firm’s headquarters are located, and two-digit
industry dummies. iv Skilled workers are employees with a university degree or tertiary education (one- to three-year
degree related to technical professions). Unskilled workers are employees with primary or secondary education.
v Low-technology includes firms in the sectors of food, beverages, and tobacco; textiles, wearing apparel, and leather
products; wood, wood products, and furniture; pulp, paper, and paper products; publishing, printing, and reproduc-
tion of recorded media; rubber and plastic products; basic metals, fabricated metals, and nonmetallic mineral products.
High-technology includes firms in the sectors of chemicals and chemical products, coke, refined petroleum and nuclear
fuel, machinery, equipment, office machinery, computers, communication equipment, electrical machinery, and medical,
precision and optical instruments, motor vehicles and transport equipment.
vi Endogenous variables: g2. Instruments: knowledge of public support for innovation activities.
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Table 1.5: The effect of innovation on employment and skill composition: Heterogeneous
effects by size
Small firms Large firms
Dependent Variable: Labor Skilled Unskilled Labor Skilled Unskilled
l − (g1 − pi) labor labor labor labor
A) OLS
Process only innovator (d) -3.300 -4.172 -0.598 -0.706 0.185 0.488
(2.522) (3.236) (3.112) (1.118) (1.243) (1.268)
Sales growth due to 0.962*** 0.985*** 0.959*** 0.952*** 0.950*** 0.941***
new products (g2) (0.032) (0.043) (0.039) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016)
R-squared 0.78 0.73 0.75 0.87 0.85 0.83
B) IV
Process only innovator (d) -3.045 -4.183 -0.210 2.158 3.714 2.378
(2.656) (3.816) (3.021) (2.481) (2.705) (2.638)
Sales growth due to 1.150*** 1.357*** 1.075*** 1.170*** 1.239*** 1.085***
new products (g2) (0.208) (0.388) (0.308) (0.174) (0.194) (0.184)
R-squared 0.73 0.61 0.71 0.82 0.77 0.80
First stage (F-test) 6.43 3.29 6.20 6.43
p-value 0.012 0.071 0.013 0.011
Endogeneity test for g2 0.96 1.40 0.14 1.90 3.08 0.64
p-value 0.329 0.237 0.706 0.169 0.080 0.424
Tests (p-values)
H0 : β = 1 0.471 0.358 0.806 0.329 0.218 0.643
H0 : βskilled = βunskilled 0.312 0.328
H0 : βsmall = βlarge 0.994
Number of firms 414 304 304 997 902 902
Notes: i Robust standard errors. ii Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10%.
iii All regressions include as additional controls a dummy variable taking value one for those firms with more than 20
percent of foreign capital, dummy variables for the province where the firm’s headquarters are located, and two-digit
industry dummies. iv Skilled workers are employees with a university degree or tertiary education (one- to three-year
degree related to technical professions). Unskilled workers are employees with primary or secondary education.
v Small firms include firms with fewer than 50 employees. Large firms include firms with more than 50 employees.
vi Endogenous variables: g2. Instruments: knowledge of public support for innovation activities.
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Table 1.6: Robustness exercises on the effect of innovation on employment
Dependent Variable: l − (g1 − pi) [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Process only innovator (d) 0.000 23.066 -3.590 1.218 1.215 1.182
(1.117) (20.216) (3.407) (1.667) (1.593) (1.611)
Sales growth due to 1.018*** 1.099*** 1.632** 1.148*** 1.137*** 1.282***
new products (g2) (0.045) (0.091) (0.557) (0.130) (0.122) (0.237)
g2× product and process innovator -0.467
(g2 × prod&proc) (0.403)
Mean employment growth 0.040
(0.116)
Labor productivity in 1998 0.002
0.002
R-squared 0.83 0.76 0.68 0.80 0.80 0.59
First stage for g2 38.18 40.19 25.37 12.40 13.34 8.81
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003
First stage for d 8.56
p-value 0.000
First stage for g2 × prod&proc 149.12
p-value 0.000
Overidentification test 1.88
p-value 0.170
Endogeneity test for g2 1.52 2.37 2.51 2.53 2.32 2.45
p-value 0.217 0.123 0.113 0.112 0.128 0.118
Endogeneity test for d 1.47
p-value 0.225
Endogeneity test for g2 × prod&proc 1.64
p-value 0.200
Tests (p-values)
H0 : β = 1 0.691 0.277 0.257 0.255 0.264 0.233
H0 : βprod&proc = βproduct only 0.247
Number of firms 1,415 1,415 1,415 1,415 1,415 1,415
Notes: i Robust standard errors. ii Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10%.
iii All regressions include as additional controls a dummy variable taking value one for those firms with more than 20
percent of foreign capital, dummy variables for the province where the firm’s headquarters are located, and two-digit
industry dummies. iv [1] Endogenous variables: g2. Instruments: knowledge of public support for innovation activ-
ities and a continuous R&D dummy. [2] Endogenous variables: g2 and d. Instruments: knowledge of public support
for innovation activities and a continuous R&D dummy. [3] Endogenous variables: g2 and g2 × product and process
innovator. Instruments: knowledge of public support for innovation activities and knowledge of public support for in-
novation activities × product and process innovator. [4] Endogenous variables: g2. Instruments: knowledge of public
support for innovation activities. Additional control: Mean employment growth at the industry and regional level.
[5] Endogenous variables: g2. Instruments: knowledge of public support for innovation activities. Additional control:
Firm’s labor productivity in 1998. [6] Endogenous variables: g2, sales of new products not already sold in the market
by other firms. Instruments: knowledge of public support for innovation activities.
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Table 1.7: Robustness exercises on the effects of innovation on skill composition
[1] [2]
Dependent Variable: l − (g1 − pi) Skilled labor Unskilled labor Skilled labor Unskilled labor
Process only innovator (d) 0.774 1.730 3.479 2.335
(1.285) (1.291) (2.585) (2.077)
Sales growth due to 1.050*** 1.040*** 1.394*** 1.118***
new products (g2) (0.052) (0.053) (0.242) (0.193)
Exports in 1998 (in logs) 0.031 0.061
(0.108) (0.094)
Imports in 1998 (in logs) -0.294 -0.102
(0.201) (0.158)
Technology transfer in 1998 (in logs) -0.592 -0.126
(0.382) (0.307)
R-squared 0.80 0.79 0.65 0.77
First stage (F-test) 35.87 6.71
p-value 0.000 0.010
Overidentification test 4.82 0.26
p-value 0.028 0.612
Endogeneity test for g2 2.51 2.46 5.63 0.81
p-value 0.113 0.117 0.018 0.368
Tests (p-values)
H0 : β = 1 0.335 0.449 0.103 0.542
H0 : βskilled = βunskilled 0.813 0.126
Number of firms 1,209 1,209 1,209 1,209
Notes: i Robust standard errors. ii Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10%.
iii All regressions include as additional controls a dummy variable taking value one for those firms with more than 20
percent of foreign capital, dummy variables for the province where the firm’s headquarters are located, and two-digit
industry dummies. iv Skilled workers are employees with a university degree or tertiary education (one- to three-year
degree related to technical professions). Unskilled workers are employees with primary or secondary education.
v [1] Endogenous variables: g2. Instruments: knowledge of public support for innovation activities and a continuous
R&D dummy. [2] Endogenous variables: g2. Instruments: knowledge of public support for innovation activities. Ad-
ditional controls: Exports in 1998 (in logs), Imports in 1998 (in logs), and Technology transfer in 1998 (in logs).
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Table 1.8: Contributions of innovation to employment growth (annual rates of growth 1998-
2001 in percentage)
All
firms
Low- High- Small Large
technology technology firms firms
Firms’ employment growth -4.0 -3.5 -4.9 -3.5 -4.2
Productivity trend -0.6 -0.5 -0.3 1.9 -2.0
Contribution non-innovators -4.1 -4.2 -3.9 -5.9 -3.4
Contribution process only innovators -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.4 -0.7
Contribution product innovators 1.4 1.8 0.0 0.9 2.0
i Low-technology includes firms in the sectors of food, beverages, and tobacco; textiles, wearing ap-
parel, and leather products; wood, wood products, and furniture; pulp, paper, and paper products;
publishing, printing, and reproduction of recorded media; rubber and plastic products; basic metals,
fabricated metals, and nonmetallic mineral products. ii High-technology includes firms in the sectors
of chemicals and chemical products, coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel, machinery, equipment,
office machinery, computers, communication equipment, electrical machinery, and medical, precision
and optical instruments, motor vehicles and transport equipment. iii Small firms include firms with
fewer than 50 employees. iv Large firms include firms with more than 50 employees.
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Competition between single-market
and multimarket banks: Evidence
from the U.S. Banking Industry
2.1 Introduction
After a long history of branching restrictions, the market structure in the U.S. banking
industry presents direct competition between different organizational forms in the same
geographic market: Single-market and Multimarket banks. For example, in the city of
Boston there is competition between Bank of America and Meetinghouse Bank. Bank
of America owns 4,896 offices located in 35 different states and has 1,600 billions of $
in assets; Meetinghouse Bank owns 2 offices located in Boston and has 126 millions of
$ in assets.
How can such different firms coexist in the same market? A plausible explana-
tion is that single-market banks have a niche market where they enjoy a comparative
advantage over multimarket banks. Who are the clients in this niche market? Pre-
vious work suggest that borrowers with projects whose profitability depends crucially
on the borrower’s reputation.1 Importantly this reputation can only be learned by
1See, for example, Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Stein (2002).
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the lender through personal interaction and cannot be truthfully transmitted within
a hierarchical organization. These loans are usually called “soft information” loans.
On the other hand, multimarket banks have a comparative advantage if the borrower
reputation can be learned using “hard information” like financial statements, credit
history, credit scoring, etc.
In this paper I look for evidence consistent with the relationship lending expla-
nation for the comparative advantage of single-market banks. To do that, I estimate
differences in profitability between single-market and multimarket banks in small geo-
graphic markets. I focus on small geographic markets because in these markets firms
are smaller and less sophisticated thus more likely to be good candidates for a rela-
tionship loan. Moreover, in smaller markets is more likely that the branch manager
has information about the community that is difficult to transmit within a hierarchical
organization. The results of the paper show that single-market banks have a compara-
tive advantage in small markets controlling for market structure, market size variables
and time-invariant market unobservables.
A better understanding of the differences between single-market and multimarket
is a relevant economic question for the U.S. banking industry due to recent regulatory
changes in the industry. Historically the banking industry in the United States was
subject to strict regulation from the state and federal governments. There were par-
ticularly stringent restrictions to opening branches in different geographic markets in
both the same state and across different states. In the period 1970-1990, some states
relaxed some of these regulations, and, finally, in 1994 the Riegle-Neal Interstate Bank-
ing and Branching Efficiency Act almost eliminated any branching restrictions between
states. The welfare effects of the Riegle-Neal may be important. On the one hand,
some economists stress that the act lowers barriers to entry that can increase competi-
tion at the local market level, and it can allow banks to exploit economies of scale and
risk diversification strategies. On the other hand, a change in the distribution of banks
may imply a change in the access to or the cost of credit for agents traditionally served
38
Chapter 2: Competition between single-market and multimarket
banks: Evidence from the U.S. Banking Industry
for single-market banks. If there is compelling evidence that single-market banks have
a comparative advantage with some agents, we may learn that a pro-competition pol-
icy may have some unexpected distributional consequences that policy makers might
want to consider when designing new policies.
After the Riegle-Neal Act the U.S. banking industry shows a slow but continuous
process of structural change in the market structure of the industry. In the sample of
small markets, the average market structure changed from 3 single-market banks and
2 multimarket banks in 1994 to 2 single-market banks and 4 multimarket banks in
2007. What is a reasonable explanation behind this change in the market structure?
A potential suspect is the expansion cost of single-market banks. Although this cost
is unobservable for the researcher, Pakes, Ostrovsky, and Berry (2007)(POB) propose
to infer the entry costs of firms using data on entry and exit decisions, the evolution
of the market structure and the firm’s profit function. I apply an extension of POB
approach to estimate the entry costs for single-market and multimarket firms. The
results show that single-market banks face higher entry costs than multimarket banks.
These results can explain the findings in Aguirregabiria, Clark, and Wang (2015) that
the Riegle-Neal Act opened the door for potential gains due to risk diversification for
banks, but these gains remained largely unexploited for small banks. This paper offers
a plausible explanation: the expansion costs for small banks are too large so it is not
profitable to follow a risk diversification strategy.
This paper relates with several empirical papers that study agency problems in
soft information loans in the banking industry. In a seminal paper Petersen and Ra-
jan (1994) find that a solid relationship with a bank (repeated interaction or number
of products) has a positive effect on the availability of funds but it has no effect on the
interest rate paid by the creditor. In this paper I seek to understand if the bank type
affects whether or not a solid relationship with a bank alleviate financial constraints.
Brickley, Linck, and Smith Jr. (2003) using data from Texas in 1998, estimate the
probability that a large bank owns a branch conditional on the type of local mar-
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ket: large urban market, small urban market, or rural market. They find that the
probability that a large bank owns a branch decreases significantly in a rural mar-
ket. Their findings are consistent with the results is this paper, but the identification
strategy is different. This paper exploits the panel data structure of the data while
Brickley, Linck, and Smith Jr. (2003) exploit the cross-section variation in the data.
Finally, Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein (2005) using bank-firm matched
data find evidence consistent with small banks specialization in soft information loans.
In particular, they find that large banks lend to less opaque borrowers, at a greater
distance between firm and bank headquarters, with less personal interaction with the
borrower, and they form shorter and less exclusive relationships. A difference with
Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein (2005) is that in this paper the relevant
difference between banks is not size but geographic scope that is more relevant for the
soft information story.
A related literature studies the effect of the market structure on small firms.
Sapienza (2002) measures the effects of bank mergers on loan interest rates and credit
supply for Italy. Sapienza finds evidence that, after a large bank acquires a small bank,
small borrowers of the target bank are less likely to borrow from the consolidated bank.
This evidence is consistent with small banks having a comparative advantage in small
business loans. In a recent paper, Canales and Nanda (2012) evaluate whether the
presence of decentralized banks is beneficial for small firms in Mexico. Interestingly,
they find that the result is ambiguous and it depends on the level of competition: only
in a more competitive environment a greater presence of decentralized banks implies
lower loan interest rates for small firms.
Finally, there are some papers that analyze the effects of the Riegle-Neal Act. In a
sample of large urban markets (MSA) Dick (2007) finds that, after the Riegle-Neal Act,
banking markets became less concentrated and banks became more efficient. Rice and
Strahan (2010) find that the Riegle-Neal Act increased the probability of borrowing
from banks for small firms and it decreased the loan interest rates paid by small firms.
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These results do not contradict the findings in this paper because Rice and Strahan
did not distinguish the effects in markets of different size. Finally, Aguirregabiria,
Clark, and Wang (2015) seek to measure efficiency effects due to the Riegle-Neal Act.
They find that the act expanded substantially the potential gains in risk diversification
due to the possibility of expanding to other states. However, few small banks took
advantage of these risk diversification possibilities.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the history
of the U.S. banking stressing recent changes in market structure. The data used to
estimate the model are described in section 2.3. Section 2.4 presents the entry/exit
model used in the structural estimation. Section 2.5 describes the two-stage procedure
used in the estimation. Section 2.6 reports and discusses the main results of the
estimation. Final remarks and conclusions are presented in section 2.7.
2.2 Industry background
The U.S. banking industry has a remarkable feature compared with the banking in-
dustry in other countries: 75 percent of U.S. banking institutions have presence in
only one local market, and these banks make around 40 percent of all banking loans
to small businesses and farms.
This feature of the U.S. banking industry is not random but the consequence of re-
strictions on the geographic expansion of banks that have a long history in the United
States. Because the U.S. Constitution prevented states from issuing fiat money and
from taxing interstate trade, the states used their power to grant bank charters to
generate a substantial part of state revenues. A state received no charter fees from
banks incorporated in other states, so states prohibited out-of-state banks from oper-
ating in their territories. These were called interstate branching restrictions. States
would grant a charter for a specific location or limit bank branches to that city or
county. By adopting branching restrictions, states created a series of local monopolies
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from which they could extract part of the rents. These were called intrastate branching
restrictions.
In the period 1970-1994, states started to deregulate these geographic restrictions.
There were different stages of deregulation. First, states relaxed intrastate branching
restrictions. Second, states signed bilateral agreements allowing banks chartered in
one state to open branches in the other state and vice versa. Though the deregulation
phenomenon was quite extended, different states showed different timing and inten-
sity in their deregulation. See Kroszner and Strahan (1999) for a political economy
explanation of the different speed in the deregulation across states.
In 1994, the Congress passed the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching
Efficiency Act that effectively permitted banks and holding companies to enter any
state. Until 1997 the states had the option to opt-in or opt-out some of the provisions
in the act, but most of the states decided to opt-in in 1994.
In part as a consequence of such regulatory changes, the industry became more
concentrated. Figure 2.1 shows that the number of banks halved between 1979 and
2007 and decreased 25 percent between 1994 and 2007.
Aggregate industry trends may differ with the trends at the local market level.
Table 2.1 shows the evolution of concentration and market structure at the aggregate
level and at the local market level. Local markets are classified as large urban mar-
kets, small urban markets and rural markets. A large urban market is defined as a
Metropolitan Statistical Area, an urban area with a core of more than 50,000 inhab-
itants and contiguous counties. A small urban market is defined as a Micropolitan
Statistical Area, an urban area with a core of more than 10,000 inhabitants but less
than 50,000 inhabitants and contiguous counties. A rural market is a county not clas-
sified as a Metropolitan or Micropolitan Statistical Area.2 Interestingly, concentration
indexes at the local market level remained steady even when aggregate concentration
2Metropolitan Statistical Areas and Micropolitan Statistical Areas are geographic areas defined
by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget and used by the Census Bureau and other federal
government agencies for statistical purposes.
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increased.
The market structure changed after the deregulation. Figure 2.1 shows that the
number of multimarket banks increased a 27 percent in the period 1994-2007 and the
number of single-market banks decreased more than 40 percent in the same period.
Looking at the numbers in terms of branches is even more striking as shown in figure
2.2. Table 2.1 reports the evolution of the market structure for local markets. The
mean market structure in a large urban market changed from 19 single-market banks
(SM banks) and 9 multimarket banks (MM banks) in 1994 to 14 SM banks and 15 MM
banks in 2007; the mean market structure in a small urban and rural market changed
from 3 SM banks and 2 MM banks in 1994 to 2 SM banks and 4 MM banks in 2007.
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 show the sources of variation in the number of single-market
and multimarket branches. The dynamics in the number of branches is decomposed in
the contribution of branch openings, branch closings, mergers at the bank level, and
switching in the bank type (a SM bank becoming a MM bank). Branch opening and
closing explain an important part of the variation in the number of branches. Bank
mergers are important in the sample period. However most of the mergers during this
period were out-of-market mergers and this type of merger do not affect the market
structure at the local market level. In the rest of the paper, I consider that merger
decisions are exogenous from the point of view of the local market. This assumption
is a reasonable approximation to the problem at hand given the difficulty to model
merger decisions taken at the bank level using a model at the level of a local market.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Data sources
The data set consists of yearly data for nearly all commercial banks and thrifts in
United States and socioeconomic data at the market level for the period 1994-2007.
The bank data were obtained from four sources: the Summary of Deposits (SOD) and
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the Institution Directory from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the
Reports on Condition and Income (Call Reports) from the Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago (FED), and the Thrift Financial Reports from the Office of Thrift Supervision
(OTS).
The Summary of Deposits is a yearly survey conducted by the FDIC, a government
corporation that insures deposits, examines and supervises financial institutions, and
manages receiverships. The FDIC requests all FDIC-insured banks to submit a form
with the amount of deposits in each branch at June, 30th each year. The Summary
of Deposits includes deposits, branch’s location, and branch’s ownership information.
The Summary of Deposits data are used to construct the number of SM incumbents,
the number of MM incumbents, and entry and exit variables.
To identify mergers I complemented the data in the SOD with the FDIC’s Institu-
tion Directory. The Institution Directory lists structural changes in bank institutions:
the date a bank began operations, the date a bank finished operations, and the rea-
sons for finishing operations. In case a bank merges with another bank, the Institution
Directory includes the bank code of the acquirer.
Call Reports are available for all commercial banks regulated by the FED, FDIC,
and the Comptroller of the Currency. The Call Reports contain balance sheet infor-
mation collected on a quarterly basis. I use the Call Reports data to construct deposit
interest rates, loan interest rates, default rates, wage expenditures, and other costs. I
use the second quarter information to make it comparable with the SOD information.
Thrift Financial Reports provide the same information for thrifts.
Demographic data at the local market level come from the U.S. Census Bureau,
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
Population, income per capita, number of employees, and average wage come from the
BEA’s Local Area Personal Income, number of establishments comes from the U.S.
Census Bureau’ County Business Patterns, and consumer price indexes come from the
BLS’s CPI.
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2.3.2 Variable definitions
Local market definition
A local market definition should balance two contradictory objectives. On the one
hand, it should be large enough so that households and firms in the local market do
not use banking services from banks outside the local market. On the other hand, it
should be small enough so that there are no distinct or overlapping submarkets within
the local market.
To satisfy those requirements I selected: (i) Small urban markets and rural markets,
(ii) with less than 100,000 inhabitants, and (iii) with less than 8 single-market and 8
multimarket incumbent banks in the period 1994-2007.
As mentioned above, a small urban market is a Micropolitan Statistical Areas, a
set of counties with at least one urban cluster of at least 10,000 but less than 50,000
population, plus adjacent territory that has a high degree of social and economic
integration with the core as measured by commuting ties. A rural market is a county
not classified as Micropolitan or Metropolitan Statistical Areas.3
I dropped large urban areas and markets with more than 100,000 inhabitants to
avoid the presence of distinct and overlapping submarkets. I dropped markets with
more than 8 single-market and 8 multimarket incumbent banks for computational
reasons. The computational time of the estimation increases exponentially in the
number of incumbents so there are practical limits to number of incumbents that the
estimation can handle. I relaxed the selection rule slightly to check that the results
are robust to small changes in the maximum number of incumbents.
The final sample consists of 1,691 local markets. The sample includes small urban
and rural markets and it covers 12 percent of the total population in the United States.
Figure 2.3 shows a map of the United States with large urban markets in grey, small
urban markets in black, and rural counties in white. The map shows that the sample
3A Metropolitan Statistical Area is a set of counties with at least one urbanized area of 50,000 or
more population.
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is more representative of the Midwest and South regions rather than the West and
Northeast regions. For example, the sample represents 30 percent of the population
in the East South Central Division (Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee) and
West North Central Division (Iowa, Nebraska, Kansas, North Dakota, Minnesota,
South Dakota, Missouri), but around 5 percent of the Middle Atlantic Division (New
Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania) and Pacific Division (Alaska, California, Hawaii,
Oregon, Washington).
The selection of the sample reflects the fact that it is difficult to properly identify
a relevant market in large urban areas for retail activities. To deal with this problem,
empirical researchers select markets where a relevant market is clearly defined. For
example, Bresnahan and Reiss (1991)’s seminal paper selected 202 isolated markets at
least 20 miles from the nearest town of 1,000 people or more, Mazzeo (2002) selected
492 markets excluding MSA and counties with more than 15 firms, and Seim (2006)
selected 151 markets which consisted in cities with population between 40,000 and
150,000.
Table 2.4 shows descriptive statistics for the sample of local markets. The median
market has a population of 15,000 inhabitants, an income per capita of $21,000, and 343
business establishments. This shows that local markets in the sample are relatively
small. However there is enough variability in the sample in population, employees,
establishments, and population density that can be exploited in the estimation. As
usual the distribution of population, business employees, and business establishments
per market is asymmetric with a right tail.
Single-market and multimarket banks
The empirical definition of a single-market is a bank that holds more than 80 percent
of its total deposits in a single local market. Otherwise the bank is classified as a
multimarket bank.
Table 2.5 shows differences in observable characteristics between single-market and
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multimarket banks. I compute statistics at the bank-market level and at the bank
level. For the variables at the bank-market level I calculate a simple mean, for the
variables at the bank level I calculate a mean weighted by the number of branches.
Single-market and multimarket banks differ in geographic scope, size, ownership
structure, and lending practices. The average SM bank was active in 2 local markets
and 1 state in 2007 while the average MM bank was active in 73 local markets and 5
states. Also the average SM bank owned 6 branches in 2007 while the average MM
bank owned 570 branches in 2007. These differences in geographic scope and size
have increased since 1994 as a result of deregulation and consolidation in the banking
industry. Regarding ownership structure, 25 percent of SM banks were owned by a
multibank holding company in 2007 while 58 percent of MM banks were owned by a
multibank holding company in 2007.
More relevant are differences in lending practices. In 2007, the average SM bank
lent 86 percent of its business loans to small businesses while the average MM bank
lent 59 percent of its business loans to small businesses. Also, the average SM bank
lent 83 percent of its farm loans to small farms while the average MM bank lent 65
percent of its farm loans to small farms.4 Such ratios show some evidence of SM banks
having a comparative advantage in the provision of loans to small businesses and small
farms.
There are differences between SM and MM banks in average interest rates paid on
deposits and average interest rates charged on loans. The average SM bank paid a
higher interest rate on deposits and charged a higher interest rate on loans than the
average MM bank. The higher interest rate paid on deposits by a SM bank may be
evidence that a SM bank has to offer a higher return to attract depositors. The higher
interest rate paid on loans by a SM bank may be evidence of SM banks exploiting an
4Loans to businesses includes loans secured by nonfarm nonresidential property and commercial
and industrial loans, and loans to farms includes loans secured by farmland and loans to finance
agricultural production and other loans to farmers. Loans to small businesses are loans to businesses
with amounts smaller than $ 1,000,000, and loans to small farms are loans to farms with amounts
smaller than $ 500,000.
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informational advantage when lending to more opaque lenders or may be evidence of
SM lending to riskier lenders. It can also be the case that MM banks charge lower
loan interest rates because they can exploit some economies of scale.
There are also differences in the ratio of equity to assets and non-performing loans
to loans. The average SM bank had a higher equity-assets ratio and a higher non-
performing loans-loans ratio. These might highlight that a MM bank can decrease the
risk in their portfolio through diversification in different geographic markets.
Finally, there does not exist observable differences in the number of branches per
market of an incumbent bank of the SM or MM type. Both type of incumbents owned
approximately 2 branches. This statistic is useful to rule out a possible interpretation
for the differences in entry costs between the 2 types: they are not driven by differences
in the number of branches.
To sum up, the average SM bank has less geographic scope, is smaller, and has
a simpler ownership structure. Hence a SM bank cannot enjoy economies of scale,
economies of scope, or geographic risk diversification but it may be able to exploit
informational advantages in relationship lending.
There is a caveat to the descriptive statistics reported in table 2.5. Given that
most of the statistics are computed at the bank level, a mean at the bank level for
a MM bank includes the lending practices in other local markets where those banks
are incumbents while a mean at the bank level for a SM bank includes the lending
practices in the local markets in the sample. Thus part of the observed differences
for SM and MM banks might be explained by different lending practices across local
markets that affect the means reported by MM banks. The descriptive statistics should
be interpreted with such limitation in mind.
Table 2.6 shows the distribution of market structures in the final sample. Each cell
reports the percentage of times that such market structure is observed in the data.
The most observed market structure is a local market with 2 SM banks and 1 MM
bank. The local markets in the final sample are concentrated markets: 75 percent of
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the observed markets had less than 4 incumbents of each type. It does not exist a
clear pattern between banks types and market concentration that can drive the results
such as SM banks being incumbents in more concentrated markets or vice versa. For
example, a SM monopolist is observed 2.7 percent of the time and a MM monopolist
is observed 3.8 percent of the time.
Potential entrants
I use 2 different definitions to capture potential entrants. For the first definition I
assume one potential entrant of each type, and I drop a few markets that experience
multiple entries. For the second definition I compute the maximum number of SM
incumbents in each market across time, and I define the number of SM potential
entrants in period t as the difference between that maximum and the number of SM
incumbents in a period t. I apply the same procedure the number of MM potential
entrants. The rationale behind this definition is that in each geographic market we
observe all potential entrants being active at some point in time. Dunne, Klimek,
Roberts, and Xu (2013) use a similar definition but for a model with homogenous
firms. To check the sensitivity of the estimates to the definition of potential entrants,
I estimate the model using the 2 different pools of entrants.
Exit and entry definition
I matched branches over time using 7 variables: branch’s FDIC code, bank’s FDIC
code, bank holding company’s FED code, address, city reported, ZIP code, state, and
county.5 I use exact merge and fuzzy merge with different subsets of these variables.
The exact merge matched 95 percent of the branch-year observations and the fuzzy
merge matched an additional 1.5 percent-2 percent of the unmatched branch-year
observations.
5I use multiple variables for the matching because the branch code in the SOD has 10 percent of
missing values and it does not change in a consistent manner.
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The longitudinal data set at the branch level allows me to identify opening and
closing of branches: a new branch in the data set is an opening, and a branch that
drops from the data set is an closing. I use the branch code and branch’s address to
differentiate true opening and closing of branches from changes of ownership, i.e. a
bank acquired by another bank or a bank selling some branches to another bank.
Finally, I identified that a bank enters in a local market when a bank is not an
incumbent in t − 1 but is an incumbent in t and all its branches are opened in t. I
identified that a bank exits from a local market when a bank is an incumbent in t− 1
but is not an incumbent in t and all its branches are closed in t− 1. I do not consider
an entry or an exit those situations where there is a change in ownership: when a bank
acquired another bank or when a bank enters in a local market by buying branches
from another bank.
I clean some cases from the data to avoid measurement error issues. Specifically, I
do not consider as an entry or exit: a bank that enters and exit more than once in the
same local market, and an entry/exit using the bank code but not the branch code.
I also drop banks without deposits, and branches in Hawaii, Alaska, Puerto Rico or
American Islands.
In table 2.7 I computed some entry and exit statistics for the different number of
incumbents in the local market. I observe that both entries and exits increased in
absolute terms with the number of incumbents but the number of entries increases less
than proportionally with the number of incumbent and the number of exits increases
proportionally with the number of incumbents. Dunne, Klimek, Roberts, and Xu
(2013) find a similar evidence for a sample of doctors and chiropractors. Without
a structural model it is difficult to interpret whether this observation is driven by
differences in the number of potential entrants, entry costs, or profitability. I also
observe that the entry proportion is larger than the exit rate. This is evidence of the
geographic expansion of banks after the deregulation and a quite profitable period for
the banking industry. Also, the saving and loans crisis of the 80’s and early 90’s caused
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the more inefficient banks to exit the industry, and this contributed to the lower exit
rate afterwards.
More relevant for this paper are differences between SM and MM banks. I observe
that the entry proportion is larger for SM than for MM banks, and the exit rate is
slightly smaller for SM than MM banks. This evidence shows that the decrease in the
number of SM branches was due either to SM banks downsizing, SM expanding to new
local markets and becoming MM banks, or a MM banks acquiring a SM banks. But
it is also true that SM banks were active players in the industry during this period. It
is not clear whether SM banks continue to open branches because they face low entry
costs than compensate demand or production cost disadvantages with respect to MM
banks, or SM banks face higher entry costs that were compensated by informational
advantages with respect to MM banks.
The structural model introduced in the next section tries to identified such differ-
ences in entry costs, demand, and production costs between SM and MM banks.
2.4 Model
The model is an oligopolistic model of entry/exit with imperfect information similar to
POB. There are incumbent and potential entrant banks competing in geographic mar-
kets. Each period a bank observes a private information shock. An incumbent bank
decides whether to continue or exit, and a potential entrant bank decides whether to
enter or not. Banks choose optimal actions based on their beliefs about their competi-
tors’ behavior. In equilibrium, those beliefs are correct. The model departs from POB
framework by allowing heterogeneity between banks based on their geographic scope:
single-market and multimarket banks.
Both single-market and multimarket banks take entry/exit decisions separately in
each market based on the market profitability. Such an assumption is reasonable for
identification of heterogeneity between single-market and multimarket banks in several
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dimensions: preferences, technology, sell-off value, and entry costs.
There arem ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M} geographic markets and infinite periods t ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,∞}.
Banks are indexed by i ∈ N , where the set of banks N can be partitioned in the set
of single-market banks and the set of multimarket banks.
Bank’s profitability depends on common knowledge and private information state
variables. Common knowledge state variables are number of incumbents of type τ ∈
{1, 2}, nτmt, and market state variables, zmt. The private information state variable for
the incumbent is its sell-off value φτimt, and for the potential entrant is its entry cost
κτimt.
The timing of the game is as follows. First, a bank observes the number of in-
cumbents, the market state, and its private information realization. Second, banks
simultaneously choose actions. Third, entrants pay the entry cost and incumbents
earn current profits. Finally, at the end of the period, banks that exit earn the sell-off
value, entrants become incumbents, and the market evolves to a new state. The timing
is summarized in figure 2.4.
The incumbent’s current payoff is
Πτimt =
 pi
τ (n1mt, n
2
mt, zmt; θ
τ
P ) if a
τ
imt = 1,
piτ (n1mt, n
2
mt, zmt; θ
τ
P ) + β φ
τ
imt if a
τ
imt = 0,
where piτ (.; θτP ) is the bank profit function parameterized by θ
τ
P , β is the intertemporal
discount factor, and aτimt is the action continue/exit for the type τ incumbent or
enter/not enter for the type τ potential entrant. The current payoff is consistent with
the timing of the game: incumbents earn current profits, and, at the end of the period,
exiters receive the sell-off value.
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The potential entrant’s current payoff is
Πτimt =
 −κ
τ
imt if a
τ
imt = 1,
0 if aτimt = 0.
I assume that potential entrants are short-lived to avoid timing of entry issues. En-
trants pay the entry cost this period but become incumbents next period, not entrants
receive a zero payoff.
Private information shocks are IID over banks, markets, and time with CDFs,
φτimt ∼ F (.; θτX),
κτimt ∼ G(.; θτE).
θτX and θ
τ
E are the parameters of the sell-off value CDF and entry cost CDF. Although
the entry costs and sell-off values are private information, their CDF is common knowl-
edge.
To simplify notation the set of parameters is denoted by θ = (θτP , θ
τ
X , θ
τ
E)
2
τ=1, the
set of common knowledge variables is denoted by s=(n1, n2, z), and the private infor-
mation shock is denoted generically by νi.
Each bank maximizes the discounted expected value of future payoffs,
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtpii(aimt, smt, νimt)|sm0, νim0
]
,
where the expectation is taken over beliefs about its competitors’ actions and the
evolution of the market state variables.
I focus on Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) of the game. A MPE is a Subgame
Perfect equilibrium in payoff relevant strategies or Markov strategies. Formally, a
Markov strategy is a mapping σi(s, νi) 7→ {0, 1} which assigns an action to each
possible realization of the state variables. A Markov strategy profile σ = (σ1, . . . , σN)
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assigns an action to each player. Then a Markov strategy is a MPE if and only if for
all s, νi, i, and alternative strategies σ
′
i,
Vi(s, νi|σi, σ−i) ≥ Vi(s, νi|σ′i, σ−i),
where Vi() is the value function of bank i associated to the corresponding strategy
profile. I focus on symmetric MPE. Therefore a Markov strategy for an incumbent
and a potential entrant of each type completely characterize the equilibrium.
The integrated value function is the value function with the private information
shock integrated out. Under an IID assumption for the private information shock there
is no loss of generality in working with the integrated value function.
The integrated value function for the incumbent can be written as the solution of
a functional equation:
V τin(s; θ) = pi
τ (s; θτP ) + β
∫
[max{φτi , V Cτ (s; θ)}] dF (φτi ; θτX), (2.4.1)
V Cτ (s; θ) =
∑
s′
V τin(s
′; θ)P τin(s
′|s, aτi = 1). (2.4.2)
V Cτ () is the continuation value, i.e. the expected value function in t+1 conditional on
the state in t and the bank continuing. P τin() is the transition probability for the state
variables conditional on continuing and it embodies the beliefs about its competitors’
strategies. Equations (2.4.1) and (2.4.2) can be solved for the integrated value function
or the continuation value, but it is straightforward to write optimal policies in terms
of the continuation value.
The optimal choice for a type τ incumbent is to exit if φτi > V C
τ (), otherwise to
continue. The exit probability of a type τ bank i is the expected behavior of the bank
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before the realization of the private information shock,
Pr(τ exits|s; θ) = Pr(φτi > V Cτ (s; θ)),
= 1− F (V Cτ (s; θ); θτX). (2.4.3)
Given arbitrary beliefs on rivals strategies equation (2.4.3) is the expected best re-
sponse of type τ bank, but it is the expected behavior of bank i if other firms are
playing equilibrium strategies.
The integrated value function for the potential entrant can be obtained as the
solution of the following equation
V τen(s; θ) = max{0,−κτi + β V Eτ (s; θ)}, (2.4.4)
V Eτ (s; θ) =
∑
s′
V τin(s
′; θ)P τen(s
′|s, aτi = 1). (2.4.5)
V Eτ () is the entry value or expected value of a potential bank next period conditional
on entry, and P τen() is the transition probability of the state variables conditional on
entry. The entry value is a function of the continuation value through the incumbent
value function.
The optimal choice for a type τ potential entrant is to enter if κτi < β V E
τ (),
otherwise not entering is optimal. The entry probability of a type τ bank is
Pr(τ enters|s; θ) = Pr(κτi ≤ β V Eτ (s; θ)),
= G(β V Eτ (s; θ); θτE). (2.4.6)
The econometric implementation rests on the theoretical exit probability in equation
(2.4.3) and the theoretical entry probability in equation (2.4.6). The estimation strat-
egy is based on finding parameter values that minimize the distance between theoretical
and observed exit and entry probabilities. Under similar observed entry probabilities
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for SM and MM banks can lay heterogeneity in different economic primitives: prof-
itability, sell-off values, or entry costs. I impose the economic structure, and use the
data to identify the parameters that affects the entry/exit behavior of SM and MM
banks.
2.5 Empirical implementation
I estimate the parameters of the model using a 2-stage procedure. In the first stage I
obtain an estimation of V C and V E based on profit, exit probability, and transition
probability estimates. In the second stage I use the estimated continuation value V̂ C
and entry value V̂ E to compute theoretical exit and entry probabilities that depend
on θ. Then the parameter estimates are those values that minimize a distance between
theoretical and observed probabilities.
I assume that sell-off values follow an exponential distribution, and entry costs
follow a logistic distribution. The exponential assumptions allows me to obtain an
explicit expression for V̂ C, but it can be replaced by another parametric distribution
at the cost of complicating the computation of V̂ C. The exponential probability has
also the nice property of restricting sell-off values to be positive.
In theory the CDF for entry costs is non-parametrically identified, in practice data
constraints require to assume a parametric distribution. I choose the logistic distri-
bution because is similar to the normal distribution and its CDF has an analytical
expression which decreases computational time in the estimation. Notice that the in-
dependent of irrelevant alternatives critique of the logistic does not apply here because
there are only 2 choices: continue/exit for incumbents or entry/no entry for potential
entrants.
Assumption 1. Distribution of entry costs and sell-off values.
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1. The sell-off values follow an exponential distribution with mean and variance θτX ,
F (φ; θτX) = 1− exp
(
φ
θτX
)
with φ ∈ (0,∞). (2.5.1)
2. The entry costs follow a logistic distribution with mean θτE and variance pi
2/3,
G(κ; θτE) =
exp(κ− θτE)
1 + exp(κ− θτE)
with κ ∈ R. (2.5.2)
I fixed the variance of the entry costs to be pi2/3 6 and estimate the mean of the
distribution θτE. θ
τ
E might depend on market size so the mean entry cost changes with
market size. Moreover, the effect of market size on entry costs might be different for
SM and MM banks. In the estimation I explore these different alternatives.
I assume that z follows an exogenous Markov process. This assumption helps
to alleviate the curse of dimensionality when estimating transition matrices non-
parametrically.
Assumption 2. Exogenous Markov process for z. z follows an exogenous first order
Markov process, Pr(z′|n1, n2, z, a) = Pr(z′|z).
For an exponential distributed random variable, E[φτi |φτi > V Cτ ] = θτX + V Cτ
holds.7 Then the V C can be written as,
V Cτ (s; θ) =
∑
s′
{piτ (s′; θτP ) + β P τexit(s′) θτX + β V Cτ(s′; θ)}P τin(s′|s, aτi = 1),
where P τexit(s) is the reduced form exit probability in state s. Such a functional equa-
tion can be solved for the continuation value in matrix form as
V Cτ (θ) = [I − βM τin]−1M τin[piτ (θτP ) + βP τexit θτX ], (2.5.3)
6pi2/3 is the variance of a standard logistic random variable
7Due to this property of the exponential distribution the continuation value has an explicit expres-
sion, otherwise the continuation value is a fixed point in a functional equation. Then the exponential
assumption avoids solving a functional equation for each parameter value tried in the estimation.
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where V Cτ ,piτ ,P τexit are vectors that stack the continuation value, profit function, and
exit probability in each state, M τin is a matrix with the transition probability between
states conditional on the incumbent continuing, and I is the identity matrix. Analo-
gously the entry value can be written in matrix form as
V Eτ (θ) = M τen[I + β(I − βM τin)−1M τin][piτ (θτP ) + βP τexit θτX ], (2.5.4)
where M τen is a matrix with the transition probability between states conditional on
entering in the market.
The first stage estimates the profit function, the transition probability for market
state, exit and entry probabilities, and transition probabilities. With these estimates,
continuation and entry values are estimated.
2.5.1 First stage estimation
Profit function
The parameters of the profit function can be estimated with profit and covariates data
without imposing the dynamic model.
Unfortunately I cannot observe bank’s profits at the market level, but I observe the
deposits held in a bank in a market and I can compute average interest rates, average
tax rates, wage expenditure, and other expenses at the bank level. Using the available
data I compute a measure of bank’s current profits using
piimt = (1− taxit)
(
qimt (r
L
it − rDit )− wagesimt − otherimt
)
,
where qimt are deposits held by bank i in market m, r
D
it is the bank’s average deposit
interest rate, rLit is the bank’s average loan interest rate (adjusted by expected loan
losses), taxit is the average tax rate paid by the bank, wagesimt is the wage expenditure
in the market, and otherimt includes other costs incurred by the bank in the market.
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I computed average deposit interest rate as the ratio of interest expense on deposits
net of service charges on deposit accounts to total deposits. Average loan interest rate
are interest and fee income on loans and income from lease financing receivables to
total loans and lease financing receivables. To adjust the loan interest rate for different
risks on the bank’s loans, I subtract from the average loan interest rate the ratio of
allowances for loans and lease losses to total loans and lease financing receivables.
Average tax rate paid by the bank is the ratio of applicable income taxes to income
before income taxes. Wage expenditure in the market is expenses on salaries and
employees benefits allocated to the market using market deposits. Other costs include
expenses of premises and fixed assets allocated to the market using market deposits.
The measure of profits is reasonable because loans and deposits are the main retail
activities carried out by banks. Measurement error in average interest rates measured
at the bank level rather than the bank-market level is a minor concern since empir-
ical evidence supports MM banks charging uniform prices at the state level.8 The
estimating equation for the profit function is,
piτimt =
2∑
τ=1
1(i ∈ τ) gτ(n1mt, n2mt; θτN) + θ′Z zmt + ηm + uimt, (2.5.5)
where
gτ(n1mt, n
2
mt; θ
τ
N) =θ
τ
N,0 + θ
τ
N,1 × presence of first type τ competitor
+ θτN,2 × presence of second type τ competitor
+ θτN,3 × additional type τ competitors
+ θτN,4 × presence of first type τ ′ competitor
+ θτN,5 × presence of second type τ ′ competitor
+ θτN,6 × additional type τ ′ competitors,
8Some papers showing empirical evidence of uniform pricing are Biehl (2002) and Heitfield and
Prager (2004).
59
Chapter 2: Competition between single-market and multimarket
banks: Evidence from the U.S. Banking Industry
where ηm is a market fixed effect, and zmt includes population, income per capita,
number of business establishments, and number of business employees in the market.
Controlling for unobserved market profitability is important for two reasons. First, an
unobserved variable positively correlated with both own profitability and rival’s pres-
ence creates a positive bias in the estimates. Second, the estimated market fixed effects
are used as unobserved correlated state variables in the dynamic game.9 I estimate
equation (2.5.5) by OLS with variance-covariance matrix robust to heteroscedasticity,
and time series and within market correlation.
Transition probability for market state variables
To apply a non-parametric estimator I discretize the market state variables. First,
I construct zˆmt = θˆ
′
Zzmt + ηm to reduce the dimensionality of z. Then, I choose 10
group specific bins for zˆmt such that they contain the same number of observations
and I assign the mean value of zˆmt to each bin. Finally, I estimate separate transition
probabilities for each market type M̂z using a non-parametric estimator:
M̂z(i, j) =
∑
(m,t)∈T (zi) 1(zm,t+1 =zj)
#T (zi)
.
Mz(i, j) is the estimated probability of being in state zj tomorrow give the market
is in state zi, T (z) is the set of observations with market state z, and #T (z) is the
number of observations in T (z).
Exit and entry probability
The exit probability of a type τ bank is estimated as the mean of observed exit prob-
abilities. Let T (n1, n2, z) = {(m, t) : (n1mt, n2mt, zmt) = (n1, n2, z)} be the set of ob-
servations satisfying a given state configuration. Then the estimated exit probability
9Dunne, Klimek, Roberts, and Xu (2013) follow a similar procedure in their paper about dentists
and chiropractors.
60
Chapter 2: Competition between single-market and multimarket
banks: Evidence from the U.S. Banking Industry
is
P̂ τexit(s) =
1
#T (n1, n2, z)
∑
(m,t)∈T (n1,n2,z)
xτmt
nτ
,
where xτmt is the number of type τ banks that exit the market.
The entry probability of a type τ bank is estimated as the mean of observed entry
probabilities:
P̂ τentry(s) =
1
#T (n1, n2, z)
∑
(m,t)∈T (n1,n2,z)
eτmt
Eτmt
,
where eτmt is the number of type τ entrants, and E
τ
mtis the number of type τ potential
entrants. In general is difficult to identify potential entrants so I follow different
approaches. I estimate the maximum number of type τ banks in a market as N τm =
maxt(n
τ
mt), so the number of potential entrants is E
τ
mt = N
τ
m−nτmt. Another approach is
to assume one potential entrant of each type per market. Though both approaches are
imperfect, the estimation results are robust to the chosen potential entrant definition.
Incumbent and potential entrant transition probability
Transition probability estimates are weighted non-parametric estimators with weights
given by the number of incumbents that continue or the number of entrants. The
probability of n1j , n
2
j conditional on being in n
1
i , n
2
i , zi and the type τ incumbent
continuing is estimated by
M̂ τin,n(i, j) =
∑
(m,t)∈T (n1i ,n2i ,zi)(n
τ
i − xτmt)1((n1m,t+1, n2m,t+1)=(n1j , n2j))∑
(m,t)∈T (n1i ,n2i ,zi)(n
τ
i − xτmt)
.
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The probability of n1j , n
2
j conditional on being in n
1
i , n
2
i , zi and the type τ bank entering
is estimated by
M̂ τen,n(i, j) =
∑
(m,t)∈T (n1i ,n2i ,zi) e
τ
mt1((n
1
m,t+1, n
2
m,t+1)=(n
1
j , n
2
j))∑
(m,t)∈T (n1i ,n2i ,zi) e
τ
mt
.
Estimation of the type τ incumbent transition probability matrix M̂ τin derives directly
from M̂ τin,n and M̂z, and similarly for the type τ entrant transition probability matrix
M̂ τen.
Estimation of continuation and entry values
Plugging piτ , P̂ τexit, and M̂
τ
in in equation (2.5.3) we obtain an estimation of the contin-
uation value
V̂ C
τ
(θ) = Ŵ τin,0 pi
τ + Ŵ τin,1 θ
τ
X , (2.5.6)
where Ŵ τin,0 = [I−βM̂ τin]−1M̂ τin, and Ŵ τin,1 = Ŵ τin,0βP̂ τexit. Similarly, plugging piτ , P̂ τexit,
M̂ τin, and M̂
τ
en in equation (2.5.4) we obtain an estimation of the entry value
V̂ E
τ
(θ) = Ŵ τen,0 pi
τ + Ŵ τen,1 θ
τ
X , (2.5.7)
where Ŵ τen,0 = M̂
τ
en[I + β(I − βM̂ τin)−1M̂ τin], and Ŵ τen,1 = Ŵ τen,0βP̂ τexit. Estimated
continuation and entry value are linear functions of the parameters of interest.
2.5.2 Second stage estimation
In the second stage, the estimated continuation and entry value are used to con-
struct theoretical probabilities that depend on the parameters. The estimates are
those parameter values than minimize a distance between theoretical and observed
probabilities.
Plugging the estimated continuation value in equation (2.5.3) in the exit proba-
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bility in equation (2.4.3) and using the distributional assumption, the theoretical exit
probability is
Pr(τ exit|s; θ, P̂ ) = exp
{
− 1
θτX
[Ŵ τin,0(s) pi
τ (s) + Ŵ τin,1(s) θ
τ
X ]
}
. (2.5.8)
P̂ denotes the exit and transition probabilities used to estimate the continuation value.
Plugging the estimated entry value in equation (2.5.4) in the entry probability in equa-
tion (2.4.6) and using the distributional assumption, the theoretical entry probability
is
Pr(τ entry|s; θ, P̂ ) =
exp
{
β[Ŵ τen,0(s) pi
τ (s) + Ŵ τen,1(s) θ
τ
X ]− θτE
}
1 + exp
{
β[Ŵ τen,0(s) pi
τ (s) + Ŵ τen,1(s) θ
τ
X ]− θτE
} .
Finally, I apply a minimum distance estimator that minimize a metric in the dif-
ference between theoretical and observed probabilities,
θ̂ = arg max
θ∈Θ
(pi − ĥ(θ))′AT (pi − ĥ(θ)),
where pi = (P̂ 1′X , P̂
2′
X , P̂
1′
E , P̂
2′
E )
′ is the vector that stacks the reduce form probabilities for
each state, ĥ(θ) = (Pr1(exit; θ, P̂ )′, P r2(exit; θ, P̂ )′, P r1(entry; θ, P̂ )′, P r2(entry; θ, P̂ )′)′
is the vector that stacks the theoretical probabilities for each state, and AT is matrix
that weights the different equalities.
The weighting matrix AT is block diagonal with blocks
AT (i, i) =

#T (s1)2
T 2
2 #T (s1)#T (s2)
T 2
· · · 2 #T (s1)#T (sS)
T 2
2 #T (s1)#T (s2)
T 2
#T (s2)2
T 2
· · · 2 #T (s2)#T (sS)
T 2
...
...
. . .
...
2 #T (s1)#T (sS)
T 2
2 #T (s2)#T (sS)
T 2
· · · #T (sS)2
T 2

,
where #T (s) is the number of observation in state s, and T is the total number of
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observations. AT is not the asymptotic optimal matrix but reduces the finite bias, and
it is equivalent to the method of moments estimator proposed by POB. Pesendorfer and
Schmidt-Dengler (2008) call this class of estimators asymptotic least square estimators
and prove consistence and asymptotic normality. Usual standard errors are not valid
due to the estimation error in the first stage thus standard errors are computed using
a non-parametric bootstrap.
2.6 Empirical results
In this section I comment the results of the estimation. The main results are that
a single-market bank has a profit advantage over a multimarket bank, but it pays a
higher entry cost.
2.6.1 Profit function
The estimates of the profit function shown in table 2.8 have the expected sign, and
are statistically significant. A single-market bank has an advantage in profits over a
multimarket bank, increasing competition decreases profits, and a larger market size
increases profits.
The single-market dummy is positive and significant at 1 percent: in mean the
profits of a single-market monopolist bank is 0.2 million $ higher than the profits of a
multimarket monopolist bank. For the market configuration more common in the data
with 1 SM and 2 MM banks the model predicts an average current profit for a SM bank
of 1.1 million $ and for a MM bank of 0.96 million $. This result is robust to different
specifications of the profit function and alternative profit definitions. A related result
is obtained by Adams, Brevoort, and Kiser (2007) who estimate a deposit demand
using a generalized extreme value model, and find that a SM bank faces a less elastic
demand than a MM bank in both rural markets and MSAs.
A plausible explanation for this SM advantage is the soft vs hard-information story.
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The main idea is that there are different types of loans: transaction loans and relation-
ship loans. Transaction loans are based on hard information like financial statements,
collateral, covenants, credit scoring, etc. Relationship loans are based on soft informa-
tion collected through repeated lender-borrower interactions. Soft information cannot
flow easily within a formal organizational structure, and this creates an advantage for
less hierarchical organizations like SM banks. It is natural to think on small businesses
and farmers relying more in relationship lending.
Complementary evidence supporting this idea is provided by Berger, Bonime, Gold-
berg, and White (2004). Berger, Bonime, Goldberg, and White find an increase in en-
try of small banks after a large out-of-market bank acquires a small incumbent bank.
The authors interpret their findings as small banks entering to supply credit to some
relationship-dependent small businesses.
Another explanation is that the profit approximation includes the traditional retail
banking activities: loans and deposits. A MM bank obtains a higher proportion of
its profits from sources like brokerage fees, securitization, etc. which are not directly
included in the profit approximation use in the empirical application. Then estimation
results highlight that SM might have advantages in retail banking activities while MM
may have advantages in non-traditional banking activities where economies of scale
are more important.
The effect of increasing competition is negative, and almost all of the competition
effects are statistically significant. When there exist 1 SM incumbent and 2 MM
incumbents, the expected effect of an additional SM competitor is to decrease the profit
of the SM incumbent in .086 million $ and to decrease the profit of a MM incumbent
in .153 million $. While the expected effect of an additional MM competitor is to
decrease the profit of the SM incumbent in .101 million $ and to decrease the profit of
a MM incumbent in .087 million $.
The effect of increasing competition on profit is quantitatively similar for competi-
tors of different types, and for the first, second, or additional competitors. Cohen
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and Mazzeo (2007) use data for banks and thrifts in 2001 and 2003, and exploit the
cross-section variation in the number of competitors and market size to estimate a
profit function for banks. They conclude that competition among banks of the same
type is greater than competition among different types, and find decreasing effects of
the number of competitors on profits. Adams, Brevoort, and Kiser (2007) also find
higher cross price elasticities within types than between types.
The effect of average wage, number of business establishments, and number of
employees in the geographic market have the expected positive sign while the effect
of population and income per capita have an negative sign. These results are not
surprising given that the market size regressors are highly collinear but I choose to keep
all of them in the regression to capture more variability of profits. I tried alternatives
functional forms: quadratic, logarithmic, interacted with income per capita. The
estimates were robust to the different specifications I choose a more simple model with
a linear functional form.
A possible concern for the second stage is the fit of the model to the data: the
model explains 1.7 percent of the within profit variation. Although this is expected
given such simple econometric model, it may signal the need of a richer model of firm
heterogeneity to capture the variability observed in the profit data.
2.6.2 Market state variables
The methodology I apply for the estimation requires a discrete state space. Number
of incumbents of each type is a discrete variable, but the market variables must be
discretized. Following Dunne, Klimek, Roberts, and Xu (2013) to reduce the dimen-
sionality of the market state variables I use the estimated coefficients to construct a
new artificial variable that capture the effects of population and income per capita.
I work with the market state variable zˆmt = θˆZzmt + ηm where zmt are market state
variables, ηm is unobserved market profitability, and θˆZ are the estimated coefficients
of the market state variables in the first stage. Then, I choose 10 group specific bins
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for zˆmt such that they contain the same number of observations and I assign the mean
value of zˆmt to each bin.
Table 2.9 shows descriptive statistics for each market state. More profitable markets
tend to be larger and to have larger income per capita. This is the case despite the
estimated coefficient of population and income per capita are negative in the profit
estimation. The fixed effect captures differences that do not change over time between
markets so it is capturing most of the variation in population and income per capita
between markets. The average population is 2,496 inhabitants for the 1st group,
and increases up to 55,000 for the 10th group. The increasing difference in average
population between contiguous groups is due to the skewed population distribution.
As expected the number of banks, single-market banks, and multimarket banks
are increasing in the market state. But the number of MM banks increases at a faster
rate than the number of SM banks. It seems that MM banks presence is relatively
greater in more profitable markets, while the SM presence is relatively greater in less
profitable markets.
Population per bank and profit per bank are increasing in the market state. If
we associate market state with population, the results are in line with Bresnahan and
Reiss (1991)’s seminal paper. Increasing competition decreases markups, and a firm
needs a larger demand to cover its fixed costs. Note that profit increases at the lower
rate than population that seems to confirm the competition story.
2.6.3 Sell-off values and entry costs
I estimate the sell-off values and entry costs using a minimum distance estimator. I
minimize the objective function using a Compass Search algorithm. The standard
errors are computed using a non-parametric bootstrap.
The results of the sell-off value and entry cost estimation are in table 2.10. The
sell-off estimates are basically zero that is not surprising given the low exit probability
in the data. It is reasonable that banks do not close many branches in a period char-
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acterized by expansion in the number of branches. Likely many of the non-profitable
branches were closed during the saving a loan crisis of the ’80s. The reluctance of
banks to close branches can be explained by brand concerns when closing branches.
The main result in the entry cost estimation is that SM banks face a higher entry
costs than MM banks, and the cost of a bank which decides to enter in a new local
market is around 10 million $ for a SM bank and 7 million $ for a MM bank. This
paper is one of the first papers that attempt at measuring entry costs in the banking
industry, and the results and interpretations should be consider as a first approach to
the issue.10
The estimated differences in entry costs are driven by differences in profit: SM
banks have a profit advantage, so they should face a higher entry cost if they enter in
same proportion as MM banks. The result is robust to the pool of potential entrants
used.
A SM bank should pay a entry costs which is around 3 million $ higher than a
MM bank. In relative terms it is a 30 percent more expensive for a SM bank to enter
in a new market than for a MM bank. There are some plausible explanations for
the cost differential. In general, a SM bank that enters in a new market is a denovo
bank and a denovo bank must pay start-up costs than a bank already operating avoid.
Though, a MM bank that enter in a new state could face some red tape costs, it is
reasonable to assume that are less important. Advertisement can be in part fixed at
the bank, at in part fixed at the bank-market level. A MM bank has economies of scale
advantages over the bank level or institutional advertisement. Another factor is hiring
costs for management positions. A multimarket bank has many branches in different
local markets, and could find it less costly to look for a manager for a new branch:
directors can promote an employee to a manager position, or reallocate a manager
from another branch. A single-market bank has to search for a manager in the job
10Up to my knowledge, Aguirregabiria, Clark, and Wang (2015) is the another recent paper that
also seeks to measure to the entry costs in the U.S. banking industry.
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market that is more costly.
Finally, as expected entry costs are higher the higher the market size. But though
this effect is higher for MM banks than SM banks does not close the gap between both
types of banks in larger markets.
2.7 Conclusions
Historic restrictions to the geographic expansion of banks have greatly affected the
market structure of the U.S. banking industry. Recent deregulation, the most impor-
tant the Riegle-Neal Act in 1994, foster a structural change in the market structure in
the industry. These two facts motivate trying to understand the differences between
two types of business models that coexist in the banking industry: single-market and
multimarket banks.
An important result of the paper is that single-market incumbents are more prof-
itable than multimarket incumbents in small local markets. This profit advantage is
consistent with single-market banks having a comparative advantage in loans to small
business and farmers.
Another feature that can differentiate single-market and multimarket banks is ex-
pansion costs, the cost to enter in a new local market. Measuring expansion costs is
particularly relevant after recent interstate branching deregulation (Riegle-Neal Act)
because it can help explain why single-market banks did not exploit new efficiency
opportunities after the deregulation. It can also help in understanding the dynamics
of the industry and some unexpected welfare consequences of the deregulation.
The second important results of the paper is that a single-market bank paid an
entry costs which is 30 percent higher than the entry cost for a multimarket bank.
This higher entry costs can be linked to start up costs, or higher advertisement and
recruitment costs faced by single-market banks.
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Appendix A: Construction of the data set
This appendix defines the relevant market for the U.S. banking industry, describes the
data sources, and the construction of the entry/exit variables.
2.7.1 Definition of the relevant market
In this paper the relevant market for the U.S. banking industry is a geographic market:
a Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA), a Micropolitan Statistical Area (MicroSA)11,
or a county outside a MSA or MicroSA. It is natural to relate MSAs to large urban
markets, MicroSAs to small urban markets, and counties outside a MSA or MicroSA
to rural markets.
Given the size of some geographic markets, distinct or overlapping submarkets
might exist within a geographic market. In turn, this makes difficult to distinguish
which banks are effectively competing with whom within the geographic market. For
this reason I restrict the analysis to those markets with less than 100,000 inhabitants.
This condition follows the selection criteria applied in Cohen and Mazzeo (2007).12
An example of a urban market in the sample is Bogalusa Micropolitan Statistical
Area in Louisiana that had a population of 43,926 in 2000. Figure 2.5 shows the bank’s
branches located in Bogalusa. Almost all branches are located in the two biggest cities
of the local market: Bogalusa and Franklinton.
The definition of a relevant market as a local geographic market seems appropri-
ate for the U.S. banking industry. Indeed several papers present empirical evidence
suggesting the relevant market for financial services is local.
A first strand of papers use survey data to document that households and small
11Micropolitan Statistical Areas are defined by the U.S. Census Bureau and it consist on a urban
center plus adjoining counties. A Micropolitan Statistical Areas (MicroSA) has a smaller population
than a MSA.
12Cohen and Mazzeo (2007) use Labor market areas (LMAs) defined by Bureau of Labor Statistics.
LMAs are MSA, MicroSA, or small labor market areas. In New England, small labor market areas
are based on a geographic level not available in my data. Hence, outside MSA and MicroSA I decided
to work with individual counties rather than excluding New England states.
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businesses use financial services from local institutions. Amel and Starr-McCluer
(2002) using the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) find the median distance
between a household and its depository institution is 3 miles, and for 75 percent of
the households the distance is smaller than 10 miles. Moreover, 90 percent of checking
accounts, savings accounts and certificates of deposits are acquired within 30 miles of
home or workplace. Kwast, Starr-McCluer, and Wolken (1997) find similar results for
small businesses. Using the 1993 Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF) they find
that more than 75 percent of small businesses did their banking business within 15
miles of their offices.
A second strand of papers estimate the demand of financial services by households,
and the sensitivity of demand to changes in distance. Most of these studies use data on
bank’s branch locations (and branch characteristics), household locations (and house-
hold characteristics), market shares and prices to estimate a demand function. Ho and
Ishii (2011) use data for MSA and counties in California, Oregon and Washington, and
find the cross-price elasticities are very low for banks more than one mile away. Ishii
(2005) use data for MSA in Massachusetts. Ishii finds that households are indifferent
between a decrease in 1.1 miles in the distance to the nearest branch or an one stan-
dard deviation increase in the deposit interest rate. Finally, Wang (2009) use data on
132 isolated, middle-sized, U.S. geographic markets, and finds that a branch that is
one mile closer is equivalent to a branch with one standard deviation higher deposit
interest rate.
2.7.2 Data sources
The main data source is the Summary of Deposits (SOD) for the period 1994-2007 col-
lected by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The SOD contains data
for all branches and offices owned by FDIC-insured institutions. The FDIC collects
deposit balances for commercial and savings banks as of June 30 of each year, and
the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) collects the same data for savings institutions.
71
Chapter 2: Competition between single-market and multimarket
banks: Evidence from the U.S. Banking Industry
Data are collected annually. The SOD contains information about location, ownership,
and amount of deposits at the branch level.
I complemented the SOD data with balance sheet data at the bank level. I used
data for the period 1994-2007 from the Call Reports of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago (commercial banks) and the Thrift Financial Reports of the Office of Thrift
Supervision (saving institutions). I used the balance sheet data to compute average
deposit interest rates, average loan interest rates, and other financial ratios.
2.7.3 Construction of entry/exit variables
The SOD reports information for almost all depository institutions in the United
States. But given that it is administrative data it required a lengthy cleaning process
before the data is suitable for research purposes. In particular the construction of
entry/exit variable is sensitive to measurement error problems. For example, missing
information in a year can be interpreted as exit and subsequent entry, or consolidation
of bank charters by a Multibanking Holding Company can be interpreted as bank exit
and bank entry in several markets.
In the SOD there is a bank code (variable cert) and a branch code (variable
uninumbr). The variable uninumbr can be used to build a panel data of branches,
but such a variable presents some problems. First, if there is an ownership change
of the branch, uninumbr usually changes for the same branch. Second, there are
missing values for uninumbr. Missing values in uninumbr are more pervasive for savings
institutions whose information is collected by the OTS.13
Given the above-mentioned problems with the branch code variable, I relied also
on the information provided by other branch variables. I matched observations using
the branch’s code, address, city, ZIP code, state, county, bank code, and bank holding
company code. I used a fuzzy merge14 that links observations based on a matching
13uninumbr is missing for 8.65 percent of the commercial banks and for 57.18 percent of the saving
banks.
14I applied the fuzzy merge using the command reclink in Stata.
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algorithm. If the matching score is higher than a user given threshold, two observations
are linked. I applied the fuzzy merge recursively to observations in t and t+ 1.
Once the panel was constructed at the branch level, I defined the relevant variables
to study the market dynamics: entry, exit, and ownership changes. A branch entry
refers to the opening of a new branch, and a branch exit refers to closing an existing
branch. Hence, entry is defined as
entrymt = activemt × (1− activem,t−1),
and exit is defined as,
exitmt = (1− activemt)× activem,t−1,
where activemt is an indicator function which equals 1 if the branch is active in market
m at time t.
Part of the dynamics in the industry is due to changes in ownership. I considered
a change in ownership when an active branch experiences a change in its bank charter
(variable cert). There are several economic situations behind a change of ownership:
a merger or acquisition of a bank, a bank holding company that consolidates the bank
charters of its subsidiaries, or a bank which sells individual branches. I distinguished
a change in ownership by merger or acquisition (M&A) from other reasons using data
from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago about mergers. As expected most of the
changes of ownership matched mergers at the bank level.
I dropped some observations from the final data set. First, I deleted a branch
that satisfy at least one of the following conditions: (1) it does not have deposits in
more than 75 percent of the observations, (2) it has only 1 observation with positive
deposits, (3) it is active for only 1 period, or (4) it has less than 100,000 $ of deposits
in average. Second, I consolidated branches with the same address and bank code.
Third, I made linear interpolations for deposits in case there is a gap of one period in
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the observations of a branch.
Appendix B: Figures and tables
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Figure 2.3: Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas.
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Figure 2.4: Timing of the game in period t.
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Figure 2.5: Bank’s branch locations in Bogalusa Micropolitan Statistical Area, LA.
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Table 2.4: Descriptive statistics for local markets, Selected local markets, U.S., 1994-2007.
Variable Mean s.d. Median Percentiles
1% 99%
Population 20,097 16,916 15,044 844 78,184
Population density (per squared mile) 37 90 23 1 169
Income per capita (2007 $) 21,545 4,381 21,164 13,234 34,387
Average wage (2007 $) 23,295 3,928 22,853 16,438 35,383
Number of business employees 7,633 7,221 5,172 290 33,834
Number of business establishments 470 418 343 17 1,951
Notes: i Source: Local Area Personal Income of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (population, in-
come per capita, average wage, number of business employees), County of Business Patterns of the
U.S. Census Bureau (number of business establishments), and Summary File 3 of the U.S. Census
2000 (land area). ii Sample: Small urban and rural markets with less than 100,000 inhabitants, less
than 8 SM incumbent banks, and less than 8 MM incumbent banks.
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Table 2.5: Descriptive statistics for single-market and multimarket banks, U.S., 1994 and
2007.
1994 2007
SM MM SM MM
Bank level
Number of markets 1 14 2 73
Number of states 1 2 1 5
Number of branches 4 60 6 570
Employees/branches 12 13 12 18
Multibank holding company 31 50 25 58
Loans & leases/assets 53 61 62 69
Real estate loans/loans & leases 50 58 62 65
Agricultural loans/loans & leases 20 11 13 8
Commercial & industrial loans/loans & leases 13 13 14 15
Loans to individuals/loans & leases 17 18 10 9
Loans to small businesses/loans & leases 23 22 26 20
Loans to small farms/loans & leases 29 16 21 12
Non-performing Loans/loans & leases 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.0
Equity/assets 10.0 8.1 11.4 10.3
Return on equity (ROE) 12.1 11.9 10.7 11.1
Return on assets (ROA) 1.2 0.9 1.1 1.1
Deposit interest rate 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.3
Loan interest rate 6.9 6.8 6.6 6.3
Bank-market level
Number of branches 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8
Deposits per branch 27,460 23,474 34,934 33,729
Notes: i Source: Reports of Condition and Income from Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and Thrift
Financial Reports from the Office of Thrift Supervision.
ii Sample: Banks with branches in the selected local markets. iii Single-market banks are banks that
hold more than 80 percent of its deposits in a single local market. Multimarket banks are banks not
classified as single-market banks. iv Variables computed at the bank level are means weighted by
the number of branches; variables computed at the bank-market level are simple means.
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Table 2.6: Descriptive statistics for the market structure, Selected local markets, U.S, 1994-
2007
Number of multimarket banks
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total
0 0.9 3.8 4.6 4.2 3.4 2.1 1.7 0.8 0.2 21.7
1 2.7 4.7 5.8 4.4 3.2 2.6 1.4 0.8 0.2 25.8
Number 2 2.7 4.9 3.7 3.6 2.7 2.0 1.2 0.7 0.2 21.7
of 3 1.7 2.4 2.8 3.0 1.9 1.2 0.9 0.3 0.1 14.4
single-market 4 0.9 1.1 1.8 1.4 1.2 0.9 0.5 0.2 0.1 8.2
banks 5 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.1 4.3
6 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 2.5
7 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1
8 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4
Total 9.5 18.3 20.3 18.1 13.9 9.8 6.2 3.0 0.9 100.0
Notes: i Source: Summary of Deposits (FDIC).
ii Sample: Small urban and rural markets with less than 100,000 inhabitants, less than 8 SM incum-
bent banks, and less than 8 MM incumbent banks. iii Single-market banks are banks that hold more
than 80 percent of its deposits in a single local market. Multimarket banks are banks not classified
as single-market banks. iv Percentage of total market-year observations.
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Table 2.8: Estimation of the profit function
Dependent variable: bank-market profits (in million of 2007 $)
Single-market bank dummy 0.205***
(0.039)
Effects of competition on single-market banks
First single-market competitor -0.086**
(0.036)
Second single-market competitor -0.091
(0.076)
Additional single-market competitors -0.137***
(0.014)
First multimarket competitor -0.040
(0.025)
Second multimarket competitor -0.141***
(0.025)
Additional multimarket competitors -0.101**
(0.042)
Effects of competition on multimarket banks
First single-market competitor -0.117***
(0.034)
Second single-market competitor -0.153***
(0.016)
Additional single-market competitors -0.081***
(0.015)
First multimarket competitor -0.072***
(0.026)
Second multimarket competitor -0.087**
(0.036)
Additional multimarket competitors -0.141***
(0.016)
Market size controls
Log(population) -0.320***
(0.103)
Log(income per capita) -0.184**
(0.072)
Log(wage) 0.042
(0.072)
Log(n of establishments) 0.178**
(0.073)
Log(n of employees) 0.369***
(0.070)
Market fixed effects Yes
Number of observations 111,484
Number of markets 1,678
Mean of dependent variable 0.703
Notes: i Sample: Small urban and rural markets with less than 100,000 inhabitants,
less than 8 SM incumbent banks, and less than 8 MM incumbent banks.
ii Asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity, and time series and within
market correlation. iii Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10%.
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Table 2.10: Sell-off Value and Entry Cost Parameters (in million of 2007 $)
Potential Entrant Potential Entrant
Definition 1 Definition 2
Mean Entry Cost
Single-market bank 10.374*** 10.434***
(1.037) (0.972)
Multimarket bank 7.058*** 7.070***
(0.632) (0.623)
Single-market bank × market size 1.189*** 1.197***
(0.261) (0.265)
Multimarket bank × market size 1.387*** 1.396***
(0.315) (0.325)
Mean Sell-off value
Single-market bank 0.000 0.000
(0.180) (0.181)
Multimarket bank 0.008 0.008
(0.014) (0.013)
Number of Observations 22,425
Number of Markets 1,725
Notes: i Sample: Small urban and rural markets with less than 100,000 inhab-
itants, less than 8 SM incumbent banks, and less than 8 MM incumbent banks.
ii Estimation: Minimum distance estimator with weighting matrix that replicates
GMM in POB. Optimization using Compass Search. iii Bootstrap standard er-
rors with 500 simulations. iv Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10%.
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Chapter 3
Industry equilibrium with
open-source and proprietary firms
(with Gasto´n Llanes)
3.1 Introduction
Collaboration in research enhances the chances of discovery and creation. This is true
not only for scientific discoveries, but also for commercial innovations. However, inno-
vators face incentives to limit the access of competitors to their innovations. According
to the traditional view in the economics of innovation, innovators innovate because they
obtain a monopolistic advantage over their competitors. Therefore, innovators should
prevent others from gaining access to their discoveries, either by keeping them secret
or by protecting them with patents.
This view contrasts with the open-source development model, which has been in-
tensively used in the software industry and in other industries at various points in time,
as documented in the next section. In open source, developers voluntarily choose to
disclose their technological improvements so that they can be copied, used and im-
proved by other innovators free of charge. But if everybody has access to the same
technologies, then how do developers benefit from their collaborations? What do they
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receive in exchange for renouncing their monopolistic advantage? The answer is that
open-source producers profit by selling goods and services which are complementary
to the open-source good.
The case of the Linux operating system is a good example. Linux receives substan-
tial contributions of commercial firms like IBM, HP and Red Hat, among others, which
benefit from selling complementary goods and services. For example, IBM sells con-
sulting services and complementary proprietary software, HP sells personal computers
and computer servers, and Red Hat sells training and support services.
Still, this leaves open the questions of what determines the choice of development
model for profit-maximizing firms, why open-source and proprietary firms coexist in
the same markets, and what are the implications of coexistence on market structure
and investments incentives. Existing literature has yet to address these questions,
which are instead the main focus of this paper.
We present a model of industry equilibrium with endogenous technology sharing.
Firms sell packages composed of a primary good, such as software, and a complemen-
tary good, such as a smartphone, tablet PC, or support and training services. Firms
choose their development model (open-source or proprietary), how much to invest in
product development, and the price of their products. Open-source firms share their
improvements to the main product, while proprietary firms, develop their products
independently from other firms. Consumers value the quality of both goods (vertical
differentiation) but also have idiosyncratic tastes for the products of different firms
(horizontal differentiation).
We find that the equilibrium may have both types of firms, or only open-source
firms. In the equilibrium with coexistence, the market structure is asymmetric, with
large proprietary firms selling a high quality product and small open-source firms
selling a low quality product. This finding is consistent with the observations of recent
surveys. Seppa¨ (2006) compares both types of firms, and finds that open-source firms
tend to be smaller than proprietary firms. Bonaccorsi and Rossi (2004) show that the
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most important motive for firms to participate in open-source projects is that it allows
small firms to innovate.
The equilibrium depends on the resolution of a trade-off between free-riding and
collaboration, which is governed by a parameter measuring the degree of public good of
the investment in R&D (i.e. the effect of total vs. individual contributions on quality).
When open-source firms invest in R&D, they increase quality for all firms in the
project. As a consequence, open-source firms are able to appropriate a smaller fraction
of their investment, in comparison with proprietary firms. Nevertheless, open-source
firms share their advances on the primary good, which means that, even though each
firm may individually invest less than a proprietary firm, the total investment of all
firms in the project may be larger than the investment of a proprietary firm.
When the degree of public good of the investment in R&D is high, free-riding is
very important, which leads to lower individual investments for open-source firms. As
a consequence, proprietary firms have an advantage over open-source firms in terms
of market share and price. On the other hand, open-source firms benefit from lower
development costs. Therefore, both types of firms coexist in equilibrium: some firms
choose to be proprietary, have a high investment in R&D, and benefit from high market
shares and prices, and other firms choose to be open source and benefit from lower
development costs.
When the degree of public good of the investment in R&D is low, the positive effects
of collaboration are stronger than the negative effects of free-riding, and open-source
firms have higher (total) investment than proprietary firms (individual investments are
similar, but open-source firms share their investments). In this case, all firms choose
the open-source development model to benefit from higher market shares and lower
development costs than proprietary firms.
In the market equilibrium, welfare is suboptimal because of the public good problem
in open source and the duplication of effort of proprietary firms. In Section 3.6, we
show that a subsidy to open-source development can improve welfare not only because
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it increases the investment in R&D, but also because it encourages commercial firms
to participate in open source, enhancing collaboration as a result.
We also study investment incentives and market structure under free entry. When
entry costs are small, the number of firms is large and the market becomes monopolis-
tically competitive. The equilibrium of the limiting economy depends on the limit of
the ratio of investments in R&D of open-source and proprietary firms. Even though
free-riding becomes more important as the number of firms increases, collaboration
becomes more important too, so either type of firm may have an advantage.
We find that when the degree of public good of the investment is at its maximum
level (all investment is shared), the effects of free-riding and collaboration are perfectly
balanced, and the equilibrium of the limiting economy has both types of firms. In this
case, as the degree of horizontal differentiation decreases, the aggregate market share
of open-source firms decreases, but the proportion of open-source firms in the total
of firms increases. Thus, there are fewer but bigger proprietary firms in equilibrium.
When the degree of public good of the investment is less than maximal, on the other
hand, collaboration dominates free-riding and all firms become open-source. Thus, we
find conditions under which large numbers favor cooperation, i.e. open source does not
disappear as the number of firms grows.
We present several extensions to the baseline model in section 3.7. The baseline
model assumes symmetric consumer preferences for open-source and proprietary prod-
ucts. However, given that open-source packages are based on the same primary good,
open-source products are likely to be more similar than the products of proprietary
firms. We modify the baseline model to allow for a higher cross-price elasticity be-
tween open-source products. We find that the main result of the paper still holds:
when open-source and proprietary firms coexist, the market share of proprietary firms
is higher than that of open-source firms. However, in this case, we also find that if
the substitution between open-source products is large enough, there are equilibria in
which all firms choose the proprietary development model.
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The equilibrium with open-source and proprietary firms is characterized by an
asymmetric market structure, even though all firms are ex-ante symmetric. We argue
that this result is even stronger if there are initial asymmetries in firm size. Larger
firms ex-ante have more incentives to remain proprietary, and the difference in market
shares between open source and proprietary will tend to increase.
In the baseline model, firms decide on total investment in R&D which is not fully
appropriable for open-source firms. In an extension we analyze what happens when
firms make a fully appropriable, direct investment in the complementary good. We
show that as the importance of the direct investment in the complementary on total
quality increases, the number of firms in open source decreases. If the effect of direct
investment is high enough, the equilibrium has both kinds of firms for all parameter
values. Therefore, coexistence becomes more likely when firms can invest directly in
the complementary good.
Finally, we study the equilibrium effects of partial and full compatibility between
the primary and complementary goods of different firms. In particular, proprietary
firms can sell the primary and complementary goods for a positive price, while the price
of the open-source primary good is zero. We find that as the degree of compatibility
increases, the market share and profits of proprietary firms increase relative to those
of open-source firms. This suggests that open source will be more successful when the
complementary good is more specific to the primary good, like in the case of support
and training services, customizations, platform-specific software, and mobile devices
(like MP3 players, PDAs or cell phones).
The model and the results are interesting for a variety of reasons. First, endogeniz-
ing the participation decision is crucial for understanding the motivations of commer-
cial firms to participate in open-source projects. Second, to the best of our knowledge,
this is the first analysis of direct competition between for-profit open-source and pro-
prietary firms. Third, we show there are forces leading to an asymmetric market
structure, even when all firms are ex-ante symmetric. Fourth, we obtain conditions
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under which open source can overcome free-riding and produce a good of high quality,
even without coordination of individual efforts. Finally, the model allows an analysis
of welfare and optimal policy.
It is important to remark that even though the model is specially designed to
analyze open source, it has wider applicability. In particular, it can be used to analyze
industries where firms cooperating in R&D coexist with firms developing technologies
on their own (read the literature review for more details on the relation of this paper
with the literature of cooperation in R&D).
The main contribution of this paper is to present the first tractable model of com-
petition between profit maximizing open-source and proprietary firms. As such, the
model captures the main ingredient shaping the decision to share technologies with
rivals or not: the trade-off between appropriability and collaboration. We believe our
paper is an important first step in the analysis of the behavior of profit maximizing
open-source firms. In section 3.8 we discuss interesting directions for further research.
3.1.1 Open source in detail
There are clear antecedents of open-source in the history of technological change and
innovation. Well documented examples are the iron industry in Cleveland, UK (Allen
1983); the Cornish pumping engine (Nuvolari 2004); the silk industry in Lyon (Foray
and Perez 2006); the Japanese cotton textile industry (Saxonhouse 1974); the paper
industry in Berkshire, US (McGaw 1987); and the case of the Viennese chair (Kyriazi-
dou and Pesendorfer 1999). In all these episodes, inventors shared their improvements
with other inventors, which led to a fast technical advance.
One of the characteristics in common with open-source is the presence of comple-
mentarities. For example, in the case of the iron industry in Cleveland, entrepreneurs
were also owners or had mining rights of the mines in the Cleveland district. Improve-
ments in the efficiency of blast furnaces lead to an increase in the value of the iron ore
deposit. In the case of the Cornish engine, technical advances were publicized by mine
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managers, stimulated to do so by the owners of these mines.
Open source has been used to develop software since the early years of computer
science, but gained special relevance in the 1990s, with the success of Linux, Apache
and Sendmail, among other programs. Software programmers started to develop soft-
ware as open source to avoid the restrictions imposed by proprietary firms on the
access to the source code.
The participation of individual developers in open source is still very important,
but the same is true for commercial firms. In the case of embedded Linux, for exam-
ple, 73.5% of developers work for commercial firms and contribute 90% of the total
investment in code Henkel (2006). Lakhani and Wolf (2005) show that 55% of open-
source developers contribute code at work, and these programmers contribute 50%
more hours than the rest. Lerner, Pathak, and Tirole (2006) show that around 30%
of open-source contributors work for commercial firms (however, they cannot identify
non-US commercial contributors). Moreover, they show that commercial firms are as-
sociated with larger and more dynamic open-source projects (commercial contributors
have four times more sensitivity to the growth of the project).
The coexistence of open source and proprietary in software markets is pervasive, as
can be seen in Table 3.1. The server operating system market is a good example. Ac-
cording to IDC (2008), the market shares of server operating systems installed in new
computer servers in 2008 were: Microsoft 38%, Unix 32.3%, Linux 13.7%, and other
16.1%. This shows that Linux has a significant market share in the market for server
operating systems. However, there are reasons to think that Linux’s market share is
underestimated by IDC. First, the measurement is a flow, not a stock. Second, the
operating system is very often changed by users in the years following the acquisition
of a computer server and Linux is considered to run better on old computers. It is
also interesting to notice that most Unix systems nowadays are also open source. If
we sum the shares for Unix-like systems (Unix plus Linux), we get that open-source
operating systems have the largest share in the server operating systems market.
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Table 3.1: Coexistence of O and P software.
Software Open Source Proprietary
Operating Systems Linux, OpenSolaris Windows
Web browsers Mozilla/Netscape Internet Explorer
Web servers Apache MS Internet Information Server
Mail servers Sendmail
IBM Lotus Domino
MS Exchange Server
Databases MySQL, PostgreSQL Oracle 11g, MS SQL Server
Content management Plone MS Sharepoint, Vignette
Application servers JBoss, Zope IBM WebSphere, MS .net
Blog publishing WordPress Windows Live Writer
The decision to become open source is affected by dynamic factors. For example,
the decision to open Netscape’s source code was in part due to the loss of market share
to Internet Explorer. However, it is important to remark that in many opportunities,
open-source products were the first to be introduced in the market and then proprietary
products appeared. Moreover, open-source and proprietary firms coexist even in newly
developed software markets, like application servers, blog publishing applications and
content management systems.
We think static models like ours can be used to study the equilibrium industry
structure in this kind of markets. In particular, there are several factors affecting the
decision to become open source which can be explained in the context of a simple
static model, like the way in which commercial open-source firms profit from their
collaborations, and the exact role of free-riding and duplication of effort in determining
equilibrium market shares and cost of innovation.
Commercial firms participate in open-source projects because they sell goods and
services complementary to the software. For example, IBM provides support for over
500 software products running on Linux, and has more than 15,000 Linux-related
customers worldwide.1
The presence of complementarities in open source has been documented in recent
1www.ibm.com/linux/ (accessed May 15, 2012).
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empirical work. Henkel (2006) presents results from a survey of embedded Linux
developers and show that 51.1% of developers work for manufacturers of devices, chips
or boards and 22.4% work for specialized software companies. Dahlander (2005) finds
that the dominant trend for appropriating the returns of innovation in open source is
the sale of a complementary service. Fosfuri, Giarratana, and Luzzi (2008) show that
firms with larger stock of hardware patents and hardware trademarks are more likely
to participate in open source.
The sale of a complementary service can indeed be profitable. The case of Red
Hat is illustrative. According to its financial statements, in fiscal year 2009 Red Hat
invested $130 million in R&D, and obtained $652 million in revenues for its subscription
and training services.
Many firms develop open-source and proprietary software at the same time. For
example, IBM contributes code to Linux, but makes most of its software revenue in
the middleware segment, where most of its programs are proprietary. Even Microsoft
is becoming increasingly open, with its participation in Cloud computing, for example.
Our model can be used to address this issue, by noticing that the complementary good
sold by open-source firms may be a complementary proprietary software. Another
interesting issue would be to analyze multiproduct software firms, and to determine
which software should be open source and which should be kept proprietary. For the
purposes of this paper, however, we concentrate in the analysis of a particular software
segment, abstracting from the interactions with other segments.
Open-source licenses are the instruments guaranteeing the access of developers to
the source code. Some licenses allow further modification of the source code without
imposing any restriction on developers. Restrictive open-source licenses, on the other
hand, require the disclosure of further improvements to the source code when programs
are distributed (programmers are still allowed to keep their innovations private if
the program is for personal use). The most popular O license is the General Public
License (GPL), which is a restrictive license. The GPL is used by Linux, MySQL,
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Perl and Java, for example. It is true that some open-source contributors disclose
improvements to the source code even when these modifications are for personal use.
However, restrictive licenses are the most important means for the success of open-
source projects. For example, the survey of embedded Linux developers finds that the
main reason why developers disclose their contributions to the code is because they
are forced to do so by the GPL (Henkel 2006).
3.1.2 Related literature
The first papers on open source were mainly concerned with explaining why individ-
ual developers contribute to open-source projects, apparently for free (read Lerner and
Tirole 2005, von Krogh and von Hippel 2006, for excellent surveys). The initial an-
swers were altruism, personal gratification, peer recognition and career concerns. The
motivations of commercial open-source firms, on the other hand, have been studied
less intensively.
Lerner and Tirole (2001, 2002, 2005) identify directions for further research. Some
of the questions related with the present paper are: (i) what are the incentives of
for-profit firms to participate in open source, (ii) what development model provides
higher quality and welfare, and (iii) what is the influence of the competitive environ-
ment in open source. More importantly, these authors remark that direct competition
between proprietary and open-source firms has received little attention. For more
recent surveys, see Maurer and Scotchmer (2006) and Fershtman and Gandal (2011).
Early papers addressing competition between the two paradigms studied duopoly
models of a profit-maximizing proprietary firm and a community of not-for-profit/non-
strategic open-source developers, selling at zero price (Mustonen 2003, Bitzer 2004,
Gaudeul 2007, Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat 2006, Economides and Katsamakas
2006). In these papers, however, open-source firms have no profits, and the choice
of development model is exogenous. Introducing profit-seeking open-source firms is
important because it allows us to analyze the incentives to invest in R&D and the
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decision to become open source.
Later papers introduced profit-maximizing open-source firms (Johnson 2002, Henkel
2004, Bessen 2006, Schmidtke 2006, Haruvy, Sethi, and Zhou 2008, Casadesus-Masanell
and Llanes 2011), but assumed an exogenous market structure. Other papers study in-
dustry dynamics when there is competition between open-source and proprietary firms
but assume that open-source projects are formed by altruistic contributors (Athey and
Ellison 2014) or that open-source firms are non-strategic (Arora and Bokhari 2007).
Likewise, recent papers show that the organizational structure of open-source projects
may lead to better development incentives than the organizational structure of propri-
etary firms (Johnson 2006, Polanski 2007, Niedermayer 2013), but study each model
in isolation and do not study direct competition between the two paradigms.
The main contributions of our paper are (i) to analyze an oligopoly model with
direct competition between for-profit open-source and proprietary firms, in which (ii)
the choice of development model is endogenous, and (iii) the market structure is de-
termined endogenously as a result of firms’ decisions. In this sense, the closest papers
to ours are Jansen (2009) and von Engelhardt (2010).
Jansen (2009) studies a duopoly model with Cournot competition, in which firms
may choose to share their knowledge to signal a low cost position, thereby reducing
competition. In contrast with Jansen, we study an oligopoly with n firms, consider
Bertrand competition, and focus on the effects of technology sharing on investment in-
centives. Von Engelhardt (2010) studies a Cournot oligopoly in which firms may invest
in open-source software, proprietary software, or both. The focus of von Engelhardt’s
paper differs from ours, since he is more interested in studying the effects of the type
of open-source license on the equilibrium. For most of his analysis, von Engelhardt
focuses on studying symmetric equilibria (i.e. all firms are of the same type), but he
also presents simulation results which show that under coexistence, proprietary firms
are larger than open-source firms. We provide theoretical results which formalize these
findings.
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Finally, our paper is also related to the literature of cooperation in R&D and
research joint ventures. A first strand of papers analyzed the effects of sharing R&D
on the incentives to perform such investments (D’Aspremont and Jacquemin 1988,
Kamien, Muller, and Zang 1992, Suzumura 1992). In particular, Kamien, Muller,
and Zang show that free-riding incentives are so strong that a joint venture where
firms share R&D but do not coordinate their R&D levels has a lower total investment
than the individual investment of each of these firms when there is no cooperation
in R&D. We show that this result can be reversed when firms profit from the sale of
complementary private good.
A second strand of papers analyzed the endogenous formation of research coalitions.
Bloch (1995) presents a model in which firms decide sequentially whether to join
the association or not, and compete in quantities after associations are formed. In
equilibrium, two associations are formed. However, firms do not decide their optimal
investments in R&D, so this model cannot be used to analyze the free-riding incentives
created by association. Poyago-Theotoky (1995) and Yi and Shin (2000) assume that
firms set their R&D levels cooperatively after associating. In this case, they show that
firms in the joint venture invest more in R&D, and have higher profits than outsiders.
We show this result is reversed when firms do not coordinate their R&D levels.
A third strand of papers analyzed the endogenous determination of spillovers among
firms conducting R&D. Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998) show that firms selling comple-
mentary goods may choose maximal spillovers (i.e. decide to be open source), even
when they take their decisions non-cooperatively. However, firms are not competing
in the same industry. In our model, firms are direct competitors in the markets for the
primary and complementary goods. Amir, Evstigneev, and Wooders (2003) present a
duopoly model in which firms set cooperatively their R&D levels and the strength of
the spillover. In their model, firms choose maximal spillovers, but this is due to the
fact that they make their decisions cooperatively.
As can be seen, the literature of cooperation in R&D is an important precedent
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for our paper. Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, previous papers have not
analyzed the case of endogenous formation of a coalition cooperating in R&D, when
R&D levels are determined non-cooperatively. In particular, our contribution to this
literature is the result that the equilibrium in which some firms decide to cooperate
and others do not is characterized by an asymmetric market structure, where firms
cooperating in R&D have smaller market shares.
3.2 The model
3.2.1 Technology
There are n firms selling packages composed of a primary good (which is potentially
open-source) and a complementary private good. This assumption fits particularly
well those cases in which the complementary good is essential (or almost essential)
for the primary good, such as the cases of embedded systems in electronic devices
(mobile phones, DVD and MP3 players, smartphones, tablet PCs, medical equipment,
printers, etc.), server software, enterprise solutions, IT technical support, consulting
services, etc.
Firms may improve the quality of their packages by investing in R&D. Let xi be the
investment in R&D of firm i. The cost of investment is c xi, which is an endogenously
determined fixed cost. The marginal cost of producing packages is zero.
Firms may choose to develop their primary goods under the open-source or pro-
prietary development models, which we denote as O and P, respectively. O firms
collaborate in the development of the primary good, and quality is given by qi =
α ln(Σi∈O xi) + (1−α) ln(xi), where Σi∈O xi is the sum of investments of O firms, and
α ∈ [0, 1] represents the degree of public good of the investment in R&D. Proprietary
firms perform their investment individually, and quality is given by qi = ln(xi).
Our specification for the quality of O packages implies that O firms benefit more
from their own investment than from the investment of other firms in the open-source
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project. There are several reasons why this may be the case. First, O firms have incen-
tives to contribute code to sections of the program that benefit them more directly than
what they benefit other firms. Second, even though firms are compelled to share their
improvements to the primary good, there may be a delay until these improvements
are made available to other firms. Third, there may be a within-firm synergy through
which firms gain valuable knowledge and expertise when they increase their partici-
pation in the open-source project, and thus are able to offer a better complementary
good.
Finally, α may also indicate the degree of restrictiveness of the open-source license.
Restrictive licenses, such as the General Public License, force developers to share
their contributions to the code if they distribute the modified program. Permissive
licenses, such as the BSD License, on the other hand, allow developers to keep their
contributions private. Therefore, as α increases, the open-source license becomes more
restrictive and a higher fraction of the source code is shared.
3.2.2 Preferences
There is a continuum of consumers. Each consumer has income y and buys one
package. Consumer j’s indirect utility from consuming package i is
vij = qi + y − pi + εij, (3.2.1)
where qi is the quality of the package of firm i, pi is its price, and εij is an idiosyncratic
shock (unobservable by firms) representing the heterogeneity in tastes between con-
sumers. This specification for preferences allows for vertical (qi) and horizontal (εij)
product differentiation.
Each consumer observes prices and qualities and then chooses the package that
yields the highest indirect utility. The total mass of consumers is 1, so aggregate
demands are equivalent to market shares. To obtain closed-form solutions for the
demands we make the following assumption, which corresponds to the multinomial
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logit model (McFadden 1974):2
Assumption 1. The idiosyncratic taste shocks εij are i.i.d. according to the double
exponential distribution:
Pr(εij ≤ z) = exp (− exp (−ν − δ z))
where ν is Euler’s constant (ν ≈ 0.5772) and δ is a positive constant. We assume that
δ ≤ 1.
Under Assumption 1, the market share (demand) of firm i is
si =
exp (δ (qi − pi))∑
exp (δ (qi − pi)) . (3.2.2)
The taste shocks have zero mean and variance pi2/(6 δ2). As δ increases, consumers
become less differentiated and the degree of horizontal differentiation among varieties
decreases. The assumption on δ requires certain degree of horizontal differentiation
relative to vertical differentiation in the model.
3.2.3 Game and equilibrium concept
The model is a two-stage non-cooperative game. The players are the n firms. In
the first stage firms decide their type (O or P), and in the second stage they choose
investment and prices (xi, pi).
Given investments (quality) and prices, each consumer chooses her optimal package.
These decisions are summarized by consumer demands (si) and embedded into the
firms’ payoffs: pii = si pi − c xi.
The equilibrium concept is subgame perfect equilibrium, and we focus on equilib-
ria where all firms deciding to be of the same type in the first stage play the same
2The logit is a common model in discrete choice theory (Ben-Akiva and Lerman 1985), and has been
widely used in econometric applications (see Train, McFadden, and Ben-Akiva 1987, and references
therein), in marketing (McFadden 1986), and in theoretical work (see, for example, Besanko, Perry,
and Spady 1990, Anderson and de Palma 1992, Anderson and Leruth 1993). See Anderson, de Palma,
and Thisse (1992) for a detailed presentation of its main properties.
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equilibrium strategy in the second stage. We call this symmetric equilibria conditional
on firm type simply a symmetric continuation equilibria.
3.3 Solution of the model
3.3.1 Second stage
Let no be the number of firms deciding to be O in the first stage. In the second stage,
firms choose pi and xi to maximize pii = si pi − c xi, taking as given the decisions of
other firms. Working with the first order conditions and imposing symmetry we obtain
the optimal price:
pi =
1
δ (1− si) , (3.3.1)
and the optimal investment in R&D for O and P firms:
xo =
1
c
so
(
1− α no−1
no(1−so)
)
, (3.3.2)
xp =
1
c
sp. (3.3.3)
The term inside the parenthesis of (3.3.2) represents free-riding. If so = sp, O firms
would invest less than P firms because they can appropriate a smaller fraction of their
investment.
Further intuition on the main differences between the two development models can
be obtained by computing the individual demand sensitivity to changes in investment.
In the case of O firms is
∂si
∂xi
= δ si(1− si)
(
α∑
i∈O xi
1−∑i∈O si
1− si +
(1− α)
xi
)
,
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and in the case of P firms is
∂si
∂xi
= δ si(1− si) 1
xi
.
The expression within parenthesis for O firms shows the free-riding problem for O
firms and it is affected by α. If α = 0, investment is fully appropriable for O firms,
there is no free-riding problem and all firms are alike in the model. If α = 1, the only
incentive to invest for an O firm is the gain in market share to the P firms. In the
extreme when all firms are O and α = 1, investment is a public good and no firm
invest in R&D.
From (3.2.2), we can get the ratio of market shares so/sp. Introducing equations
(3.3.1) to (3.3.3), taking logs and rearranging terms we obtain
(1−δ) ln
(
so
sp
)
+
1
1−so −
1
1−sp = δ ln
(
1− α no−1
no(1−so)
)
+ α δ ln (no). (3.3.4)
Equation (3.3.4) shows that the difference in market shares depends on the reso-
lution of the conflict between free-riding and collaboration. To see this, notice that
the left hand side is increasing in so and decreasing in sp, so the difference in market
shares will increase if the right hand side does. The first term on the right hand side
arises from the difference in individual investments (free-riding). The second term
arises because individual investments in open source are multiplied by the number of
O firms (collaboration).
The trade-off between free-riding and collaboration is determined by α and no.
On one hand, as α increases, the degree of public good of the investment in R&D
increases, and thus the individual investments of O firms (xo) decrease. On the other
hand, as α increases, the joint investment of O firms (no xo) has a greater effect on
quality. Likewise, as no increases, the public good problem becomes more important
(there are more firms sharing), but collaboration also becomes more important (there
are more firms collaborating). Moreover, α and no are complementary. The effects of
a higher no on free-riding and collaboration become more important when α is higher.
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The second-stage equilibrium is completely characterized by (3.3.4) and the condi-
tion that the sum of the market shares is equal to 1:
no so + (n− no)sp = 1. (3.3.5)
Proposition 1. A second-stage symmetric equilibrium exists and is unique. Given no,
the equilibrium market shares solve (3.3.4) and (3.3.5).
All proofs are relegated to the Appendix. In what follows we study the comparative
statics of the second-stage equilibrium. In Lemma 1 we present a simple condition to
determine which type of firm will have higher market share (quality and price).
Lemma 1. sp > so if and only if α > αˆ(no, n), where αˆ(no, n) is increasing in no and
n and solves:
α
nαo
nαo − 1
no−1
no
=
n− 1
n
.
The comparison of prices and quality is equivalent to the comparison of market
shares: if so > sp, then po > pp and qo > qp, and vice versa. Lemma 1 provides an
important result: as no or n increase, it is more likely that O firms will have higher
market share (quality and price) than P firms.
Lemmas 2 and 3 analyze the effects of changes in α and δ on so. The effects on sp
have the opposite sign.
Lemma 2. There exists αs ∈ (0, αˆ) such that so is increasing in α if and only if
α < αs.
Lemma 2 implies that the graph of so with respect to α (the degree of public good
of the investment) is hump-shaped. When α is close to zero, the investment of O firms
is mostly private, and individual investments are close to the investments of P firms.
Therefore, the positive effects of collaboration are more important than the negative
effects of free-riding. For high values of α, free-riding becomes more important and
the difference in individual investments between O and P firms increases. Therefore,
for large α, free-riding dominates collaboration.
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Lemma 3. so is increasing in δ if and only if α < αˆ(no, n).
Lemma 3 shows that the effect of a higher δ depends on the value of α. When δ
increases, vertical differentiation gets more important relative to horizontal differen-
tiation. As a consequence, investing in R&D has a greater effect on demand, which
benefits firms with higher quality products. If α < αˆ, O firms have higher quality
products, and therefore, their market share increases relative to the market share of
P firms. The opposite happens when α > αˆ.
3.3.2 First stage
In the first stage of the game, firms choose to be O or P, taking as given the decisions
of the rest of firms and forecasting their equilibrium payoffs in the second stage. Let
pi(no) be the second stage equilibrium payoffs when no firms decide to be O. Replacing
the second stage equilibrium values of prices and investments for both types of firms
we obtain
pio(no) =
so
1− so
(
1
δ
− (1− so) + α no−1
no
)
, (3.3.6)
pip(no) =
sp
1− sp
(
1
δ
− (1− sp)
)
, (3.3.7)
where so = so(no) and sp = sp(no) are the second stage equilibrium market shares.
Equilibrium profits are always positive, given that α, δ, so and sp are all between 0
and 1. Comparing equations (3.3.6) and (3.3.7), we can see that collaboration has a
direct effect on profits (third term inside the parenthesis of equation 3.3.6): if so = sp,
the investment of O firms is lower than the investment of P firms (xo = xp/no), and
the effect is larger, the larger is α.
A number no of firms in the open-source project is an equilibrium if and only if
pio(no) ≥ pip(no−1) and pip(no) ≥ pio(no+1). These conditions were called internally
stable and externally stable coalition conditions by D’Aspremont, Jacquemin, Gab-
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szewicz, and Weymark (1983). The first inequality says that firms deciding to be O
cannot gain by deviating and becoming P. The second inequality is a similar condition
on the decision of being P. Using the function f(no) = pio(no)− pip(no−1), equilibrium
conditions can be restated as f(no) ≥ 0 and f(no + 1) ≤ 0.
The equilibrium may be such that both types of firms coexist (interior equilibrium)
or all firms choose to be of the same type. no = 0 is a trivial equilibrium because an
industry with (n − 1) P firms and one O firm is equivalent to an industry with n P
firms. Hence we focus on equilibria with no ≥ 1. For no = 1 to be an equilibrium we
need f(2) ≤ 0. Likewise, for no = n to be an equilibrium we need f(n) ≥ 0.
Figure 3.1 shows an example of the f(no) schedule when α = 1, δ = 0.7 and n = 10.
In this case, there are 6 firms in the open-source project in equilibrium.
Figure 3.1: Equilibrium number of firms in open source.
When firms choose between O or P, they compare the relative benefits of collabo-
ration and secrecy. There are two elements associated with this trade-off. On the one
hand, free-riding and collaboration affect the equilibrium market shares, as analyzed in
Section 3.3.1. On the other hand, O firms have a lower investment cost. Being P will
be more profitable than being O only if free-riding is sufficiently strong as to overcome
the positive effects of collaboration. Proposition 2 characterizes the equilibrium of the
game.
Proposition 2. A symmetric continuation equilibrium for the game exists. Given
n > 3 and δ, there exist 0 < α¯ < 1, such that:
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(i) If α > α¯, in the industry equilibrium both types of firms coexist.
(iii) If α ≤ α¯, in the industry equilibrium all firms decide to be O.
Proposition 2 shows there are two equilibrium regions. When α is large, the degree
of public good of the investment in R&D is high, and free-riding is very important,
leading to low individual investments for O firms (see Lemma 2). As a consequence, P
firms have an advantage over O firms in terms of market share and price. On the other
hand, O firms benefit from lower development costs. Therefore, there is room for both
types of firms in the industry equilibrium: some firms choose to be P and have a high
investment in R&D to benefit from high market shares and prices, and other firms
choose to be O to benefit from low development costs. When α is small, the positive
effects of collaboration on investment incentives are stronger than the negative effects
of free-riding (see Lemma 2), and the total investment in the open-source project is
larger than the investment of a P firm. Therefore, in the industry equilibrium all firms
choose to be O. The next lemma characterizes the industry equilibrium when there is
coexistence.
Lemma 4. The industry equilibrium with coexistence is characterized by large P firms
producing a high quality product and small O firms producing a low quality product.
Figure 3.2 shows the equilibrium regions for different values of α and n, when
δ = 1. The area corresponding to equilibria with coexistence first increases but then
decreases with n, which means that large numbers favor cooperation, even without
coordination of individual investments. In the following section, we elaborate on this
point.
3.4 Entry
In previous sections, we assumed a fixed number of firms. Implicitly, we were assum-
ing an exogenous cost of entry, in addition to the endogenous cost of developing the
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Figure 3.2: Equilibrium regions.
primary good. Concretely, suppose firms decide to enter the industry before deciding
to become O or P. As the cost of entry decreases, the number of firms in equilibrium
increases and we move along the curve of Figure 3.2.
The fixed cost of entry may be a consequence of entry barriers in the market of
complementary goods. The market of smartphones, for example, has high barriers to
entry. Even though the Android operating system is free for firms wanting to develop
a smartphone, this industry has few producers, because developing the hardware that
goes with the software is expensive. In other markets of complementary goods, how-
ever, the cost of entry is small and a large number of firms is present. For example,
the cost of entering the market of software training, support, and customization is rel-
atively small, and a large number of independent software programmers provide such
services. In fact, the open-source movement started precisely among these independent
programmers.
For this reason, studying the case of a small cost of entry is of interest. In our
model, as the cost of entry goes to zero, the number of firms in the industry goes to
infinity and the industry structure becomes monopolistically competitive. As Besanko,
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Perry, and Spady (1990) show in their analysis of the logit model of monopolistic
competition, price converges to a constant margin over marginal cost, which depends
on the substitution parameter δ. The key assumption is horizontal differentiation,
which allows any firm to enter and supply a differentiated product (Dixit and Stiglitz
1977).3 Proposition 3 characterizes the equilibrium of the limiting economy.
Proposition 3. A symmetric continuation equilibrium of the limiting economy (n→
∞) exists and is unique. The equilibrium is characterized as follows:
(i) If α < 1, all firms decide to be O.
(ii) If α = 1, both types of firms coexist, the ratio of market shares (so/sp) is 1− δ,
the aggregate market share of O firms (no so) is 1− (1− δ) 1−δδ and the proportion
of O firms (no/n) is
1−(1−δ)(1−δ)/δ
δ−(1−δ)(1−δ)/δ .
Proposition 3 shows the incentives to participate and to invest in an open-source
project do not disappear when the number of firms goes to infinity. This result is
somewhat surprising because as no increases, free-riding intensifies and individual in-
centives to invest in open source decrease. In the limit, we would expect the incentives
to invest in open source to disappear completely. However, as no increases, collabora-
tion between O firms also intensifies (individual investments of O firms are multiplied
by a larger factor), which compensates for the negative effects of free-riding.
As n→∞, investment in R&D and market share converge to zero for both O and
P firms, as firms become infinitesimally small. However, studying whether investments
and market shares converge faster to zero for O or P firms (i.e., determining the limits
of the ratios of investments and market shares) is interesting because doing so allows
us to determine if large numbers favor cooperation in R&D.
As no →∞, the ratio of individual investments (xo/xp) converges to 1−α. When α
is close to 1, individual incentives to invest in the open-source good are low. However,
3In the logit model, the support for consumer tastes (εij) is the real line, which means a new
firm can always grab some market share with a small investment in R&D, even under Bertrand
competition.
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as long as α < 1, the ratio xo/xp is strictly positive and the individual investment
of O firms is multiplied by a factor that goes to infinity. Therefore, no xo
xp
→ ∞ and
so/sp →∞, which means all firms choose to be O.
When α = 1, on the other hand, no →∞, xo/xp → 0, and their product converges
to a constant. In equilibrium, the ratio of market shares converges to 1 − δ and the
ratio of profits converges to 1, so both types of firms coexist. As in Proposition 2, in
the equilibrium with coexistence, P firms are larger than O firms.
In the equilibrium with coexistence, the aggregate market share of O firms is de-
creasing in δ, but the proportion of O firms is increasing in δ. As δ increases, two
effects occur: competition intensifies, which lowers mark-ups; and vertical differen-
tiation becomes more important, which increases the returns to investment. As a
consequence, P firms become larger, the aggregate market share of O firms becomes
smaller, and there is room for fewer P firms.
3.5 Open membership and open-source licenses
In this section we analyze the effects of changes in no on individual profits for an O
firm, and on individual profits for a P firm. Figure 3.3 shows the profit schedules of
an O and a P firm for α = 1, δ = 1 and n = 10. We can see that pio increases, keeps
approximately constant for some values of no and finally increases again. Interestingly,
at the equilibrium (no = 6), the profits of an O firm are increasing in no, which means
that O firms would not find it profitable to limit access to the open-source project.
This gives a rationale for open-source licenses, such as the GPL, guaranteeing open
membership in open-source projects (as we explained above, the only restriction in the
GPL is that whenever modifications to the program are distributed, they have to be
made available to the rest of developers in the project).
Simulations show that the profit of an O firm is increasing in no at the equilibrium
for any α and δ. Interestingly, the profit of an P firm is also increasing when the
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Figure 3.3: Firm profits as functions of no.
equilibrium has both kinds of firms. This means that both O and P firms prefer to
compete against O firms rather than P firms.
Notice that the result holds even though O firms are direct competitors in the
markets for the primary and complementary goods. If the firms were not direct com-
petitors but were benefiting from the development of the open-source good, the result
would be even stronger. However, the result also depends on the fact that the number
of firms in the industry is fixed. If free-entry into the project would stimulate the entry
of new firms in the industry the result could be reversed.
3.6 Welfare analysis
One of the advantages of the logit model is that it can be used to construct a repre-
sentative consumer whose utility embodies the aggregate behavior of the continuum
of users (Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse 1992).
Let si be the quantities of each package the representative consumer consumes,
and let
∑
si = 1. Total income is y, and z represents consumption of the numeraire.
The utility of the representative consumer is
U =
∑
qi si − 1
δ
∑
si ln(si) + z.
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The utility function embodies two different effects. The first term represents the direct
effect from consumption of the n packages, in the absence of interactions. The sec-
ond term introduces an entropy-effect, which expresses the representative consumer’s
preference to consume multiple packages.
The utility function is quasilinear, which implies transferable utility. Thus, social
welfare is the sum of consumer utility and firm profits:
W =
∑
qi si − 1
δ
∑
si ln(si) + y −
∑
c xi. (3.6.1)
Let us define formally the Social Planner’s problem.
Definition 1. The Social Planner’s problem is
max
{si,xi,τi}ni=1
∑
qi si − 1
δ
∑
si ln(si) + y −
∑
c xi
subject to
∑
si = 1
si, xi ≥ 0, τi ∈ {O,P} ∀i
where τi denotes whether firm i is O or P.
Given the number of firms n, the Social Planner’s problem is to choose the quantity
produced (si) for each firm, the investment in R&D (xi) for each firm, and whether
a firm should be O or P (τi). In the optimal solution, the Social Planner will have
all firms sharing their investment in R&D. Also, given the concavity and symmetry of
the utility function, the Social Planner will set si = 1/n for all i. To determine the
optimal investment, the Social Planner maximizes
W = α ln(nx∗) + (1− α) ln(x∗) + 1
δ
ln(n) + y − n c x∗,
which leads to an optimal investment equal to x∗ = 1/(c n).
In the market equilibrium, product quality is suboptimal regardless of the number
of O and P firms: O firms are subject to free-riding, which leads to a suboptimal
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investment in R&D, but P firms do not share their improvements on the primary
good, generating an inefficient duplication of effort.
3.6.1 Government policy
Now we turn to an analysis of government policy. We will show the first best can be
achieved by using a tax-subsidy scheme provided α < 1. The cost of R&D for O is
co = (1−κ) c, where κ is a proportional subsidy on the investment of O firms. This
subsidy, in turn, is financed by proportional or lump-sum taxes paid by consumers.
The ratio of investments of O and P firms becomes
xo
xp
= (1− κ)−1 so
sp
(
1− α no−1
no
1
1− so
)
,
and the equation characterizing the equilibrium market shares becomes
(1− δ) ln
(
so
sp
)
+
1
1− so −
1
1− sp = δ ln
(
1− α no−1
no(1−so)
)
+ α δ ln (no)− δ ln (1− κ).
An increase in the subsidy increases the difference in investments and market shares
between O and P, and also decreases the cost of investment for O, so firms are more
tempted to become O. Lemma 5 shows that if the subsidy is high enough, O firms will
have a higher market share than P in a second-stage equilibrium.
Lemma 5. so > sp in a second-stage equilibrium if and only if
κ > 1−
(
1− α n
n− 1
no − 1
no
)
nαo .
In particular, if κ > 1 − (1− αn(n− 2)(n− 1)−2) (n − 1)α, then so > sp for no =
n− 1; therefore, all firms want to be O. Proposition 4 shows the optimal policy.
Proposition 4. If α < 1 then the optimal subsidy is κ∗ = α, which attains the first-
best levels of investment. In equilibrium, all firms decide to be O.
The optimal subsidy is computed such that the investment of an O firm (when all
firms are O) xo = (1− α)/(n co) equals the first best investment x∗ = 1/(c n).
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Proposition 4 has an intuitive interpretation. Provided that an O firm can appro-
priate a portion of its investment in R&D, a R&D government subsidy can provide
enough incentives to achieve the first best solution. Moreover, the optimal subsidy
increases in the degree of public good of the investment in R&D.
The subsidy has a double effect: it increases the investment of O firms, and it
encourages P firms to become O (to share R&D). The optimal subsidy is increasing
in the degree of public good of the investment in R&D. In other words, the subsidy
should be higher for projects for which the direct appropriability of the investment in
R&D of O firms is not very high.
Finally, note that in our model, lump-sum or proportional taxes are equivalent,
because each consumer buys one product; therefore, proportional taxes do not affect
the quantities sold. Thus financing the subsidy with proportional taxes does not cause
a deadweight loss and the policy maker can achieve the first best.
3.7 Extensions to the baseline model
In this section of the paper we discuss the modeling assumptions of the baseline model,
and we present extensions showing the results that are not dependent on the basic
assumptions.
3.7.1 Modeling assumptions
In this section we discuss the main assumptions of the model, and the consequences
of relaxing them.
Bundling and compatibility. We have assumed that firms sell packages (bundles) com-
posed of one unit of the primary good and one unit of the complementary good.
Under this assumption, the two goods become effectively one and each firm sets only
one price, which greatly simplifies the model and allows us to focus on the effects of
technology sharing on the decision to be O or P.
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Implicitly, we are assuming that (i) primary and complementary goods are perfect
complements, and (ii) complementary goods designed for one primary good are in-
compatible with other primary goods. Under these assumptions, each consumer must
choose a primary good and a complementary good from the same firm.
Industry examples and economic theory indicate that the incompatibility assump-
tion may be a good description for several markets in which open source is important.
On the theory side, Carmen Matutes (1992) present a duopoly model to study
compatibility and bundling decisions. Each firm sells two perfectly complementary
components (consumers need one component of each kind), and components may be
compatible or incompatible across firms. Matutes and Regibeau show there are equi-
libria where firms choose to make their components incompatible in order to commit
to pure bundling.
There are many examples of incompatible components in the software industry. For
example, Red Hat specializes in providing support services for Linux, and this support
service has little value for Windows users (likewise, Microsoft’s support service has
little value for Linux users). Also, many applications that run in Mac OS X cannot
run in Windows, (and many applications for the iPhone do not run on other mobile
devices).
Clearly, the case of compatible components is also pervasive. For example, MS
Office can be used in Macs, and Sun servers can run a variety of operating systems
(although they are designed to run better on Sun’s OpenSolaris). For this reason,
in section 3.7.5 we modify the model to analyze the partial compatibility and full
compatibility cases. Firms become multiproduct firms, and set separate prices for the
primary and complementary goods. P firms obtain revenues from selling the primary
and complementary goods, whereas O firms only obtain revenues from selling the
complementary good (the price of the primary good is zero).
For tractability, we assume there is only one P firm competing against several O
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firms,4 and we focus on the analysis of the equilibrium prices, investments and market
shares as a function of the degree of compatibility.
We find that as goods become more compatible, the market share of the open-
source complementary goods falls. Also, the profit of the P firm increases relative to
the profit of an O firm. Therefore, open source will tend to perform better when the
complementary good is more specific to the primary good, like in the case of support
and training services, customizations, platform-specific software, and mobile devices
(like MP3 players, PDAs or cell phones).
Investment in the complementary good. In the baseline model, firms cannot invest
directly to increase the quality of the complementary good. Instead, the quality of
the complementary good increases with individual investments in the primary good.
This may happen because there is a synergy effect (the support service of a firm which
contributes more code to Linux is likely to be better than the support service of a
firm that contributes less), or because firms contribute in areas of the primary good
that are more relevant for their own complementary goods (a firm selling financial
software will be more interested in developing Linux’s mathematical capabilities, and
will benefit more from these contributions than the rest).
As we will see, the assumption of a synergy effect is not essential for our key result
–the existence of an equilibrium with both kinds of firms, in which P firms have a
larger market share and quality than O firms– which obtains when the synergy effect
is small (even zero). Instead, the synergy effect allows for the possibility that O firms
have higher quality and market share than P firms, and for the existence of equilibria
with only O firms, which will happen if the synergy effect is large enough.
However, it is interesting to ask what would happen if firms could invest in the
complementary good without contributing to the primary good. In section 3.7.4 we
extend the baseline model to allow for this possibility. Now, the quality of the comple-
4In general, models with multiproduct firms are usually very difficult to solve. They usually
consist of a duopoly game, and only symmetric continuation equilibria are analyzed, which limits
applicability for the present case (n firms of two different types).
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mentary good is a weighted average of the individual investment in the primary good
(synergy effect) and the direct investment in the complementary good. We show that
as the importance of the direct investment increases relative to the synergy effect, the
incentive to be O decreases, and the model converges to the equilibrium with both
kinds of firms.
Demand specification. Logit demands follow from our assumption of the double ex-
ponential distribution for the idiosyncratic taste term. This distribution is similar to
the normal distribution (which would yield the probit model when applied to equation
(3.2.1)), but has the advantage of providing an analytically tractable demand system
whereas the normal does not.5
We have assumed a specific demand structure due to the difficulty of analyzing
asymmetric equilibria. While we are confident that our results will continue to hold
with other models of product differentiation, the formal extension of our analysis to
a general demand system is by no means straightforward. As a first step, it therefore
seems reasonable to study a simple case, such as the logit, which provides explicit
expressions for the demand functions.6
Given that taste shocks are distributed in the real line, every firm will have some
consumers with strong preferences for its products, and therefore even firms with very
low quality products will end up with some positive demand. It could be argued
that this is the reason why O firms may subsist in equilibrium, even when they have
lower quality than P firms. However, this argument would be only relevant if O
5The logit is a common model in discrete choice theory (see, for example Ben-Akiva and Lerman
1985), and has been widely used in econometric applications (see Train, McFadden, and Ben-Akiva
1987, and references therein), in marketing (McFadden 1986), and in theoretical work (Anderson,
de Palma, and Thisse 1992, Besanko, Perry, and Spady 1990, Anderson and de Palma 1992, Anderson
and Leruth 1993).
6Other alternatives for modeling an oligopoly with vertically and horizontally differentiated goods
are the linear demand model and Salop’s circular city with exogenous locations. We have studied
the linear demands case, and have found that results still hold under this alternative specification.
However, the analysis becomes much more complex. An appendix with the analysis of the linear
demand case may be obtained from the authors upon request. The circular city model would add
additional complications because the equilibrium would depend on whether O and P firms were selling
neighboring goods or not.
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firms were selling an extremely low quality product, which is never a optimal decision
whenever: (i) Inada conditions hold for the quality improving technologies, (ii) firms
can appropriate some fraction of their investment.7
Finally, the assumption that the taste shocks are i.i.d. across packages implies
that the differentiation between O and P firms is symmetric. However, O packages
share the same primary good, so they are likely to be more similar than P packages.
In section 3.7.2 we introduce a nested logit model to introduce a difference in the
substitutability between O and P firms.
We find that as O packages become more similar, the equilibrium number of firms
in O decreases. Depending on parameter values, the equilibrium may have only O
firms, only P firms, or both kinds of firms. If the difference in substitutability is
high enough, all firms will decide to be P in equilibrium. This extension provides an
important result: we should expect to see a higher proportion of O firms in industries
where firms have more possibilities to differentiate their complementary goods.
3.7.2 Lower differentiation for open-source products
Given that O packages share the same primary good, they are likely to be more
similar to each other than P packages. To introduce this difference in the degree of
substitution, we use a nested logit model (Ben-Akiva 1973), which adds an element
of endogenous horizontal differentiation to the trade-off between collaboration and
secrecy. By becoming P, firms are able to differentiate their product more than O
firms.
The main consequences are that (i) the equilibrium number of firms in O is smaller
than in the previous model, (ii) equilibria with only P firms exist, and (iii) parameter
values exist that lead to multiple equilibria.
Consumers are heterogeneous in two different dimensions: they have idiosyncratic
7This condition holds if there is at least one P firm or α < 1. There is zero appropriability only if
all firms are O and α = 1, but in this case the comparison between O and P quality is irrelevant.
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tastes for the primary good and idiosyncratic tastes for the complementary good. The
relative strength of these two forces drives the differences in substitution. Following
the nested logit representation of Cardell (1997), consumer j’s indirect utility from
consuming package i, based on primary good k, is
vikj = qi + y − pi + ηkj + (1− σ) εij,
where qi is defined as in section 3.2, ηkj is a primary good idiosyncratic component,
and σ ∈ [0, 1] weighs the different idiosyncratic components. Assumption 2 replaces
Assumption 1 for the standard logit case.
Assumption 2. The idiosyncratic components εij, corresponding to complementary
good i, are i.i.d. according to the double exponential distribution with scale parameter δ.
The idiosyncratic components ηkj, corresponding to primary good k, are i.i.d. according
to a distribution such that ηkj + (1− σ) εij is distributed double exponential with scale
parameter δ.
Assumption 2 implies the horizontal differentiation term ηkj + (1 − σ) εij has the
same distribution as εij in the previous model. The variance of ηkj is σ(2−σ)pi2/(6 δ2).
Cardell shows a unique distribution for ηkj exists such that Assumption 2 holds.
Parameter σ determines the relative strength of the horizontal differentiation forces.
As σ increases, consumers become more differentiated in their tastes for the primary
good and less differentiated in their tastes for the complementary good. When σ =
0, consumers only have idiosyncratic preferences for the complementary good, and
the model becomes the standard logit model of previous sections. When σ = 1,
consumers only have idiosyncratic preferences for the primary good, and O firms sell
a homogeneous good.
The proportion of consumers choosing open-source variant i can be decomposed in
the following way:
si = si|o So, (3.7.1)
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where So is the aggregate market share of the open-source primary good, and si|o is
the share of variant i within the open-source project.
Under Assumption 2, i’s market share within the open-source project depends on
its individual contribution to the project:
si|o =
exp
(
δ
(1− α) ln xi − pi
(1− σ)
)
∑
i∈O exp
(
δ
(1− α) ln xi − pi
(1− σ)
) .
The aggregate market share So depends on the average value of the O varieties
(the expected value of the maximum of the utilities), Vo:
So =
exp (δ Vo)
exp (δ Vo) +
∑
i∈P exp (δ(qi − pi))
,
Vo =
(1− σ)
δ
ln
(∑
i∈O
exp
(
δ(qi − pi)
(1− σ)
))
.
P nests are composed only of one P product, so the average value of the nest is the
value of its only component. Therefore, the market share of a P firm is simply
si =
exp (δ(qi − pi))
exp (δ Vo) +
∑
i∈P exp (δ(qi − pi))
. (3.7.2)
Further intuition on the substitution patterns implied by the assumptions on pref-
erences can be obtained by computing the demand sensitivity to changes in price. The
slope of the demand function for a P firm is
∂si
∂pi
= −δsi(1− si),
and for an O firm, it is
∂si
∂pi
= −δsi
(
1
1− σ −
σ
1− σsi|o − si
)
.
These expressions summarize the substitution patterns in the nested logit model: O
firms face a more elastic demand than P firms, and the price elasticity for O firms is
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increasing in σ. If σ = 0, the slope of the demand is the same for O and P firms, as
in the standard logit model. If σ = 1, the slope of the demand for O firms goes to
infinity.
The optimal price and investment of P firms have the same functional forms as
before. The optimal price and investment of O firms become:
po =
1
δ
(
1− so + σ1−σ no−1no
) , (3.7.3)
xo =
1
c
so
1− α
1− σ
(no−1)/no(
1− so + σ1−σ no−1no
)
 . (3.7.4)
Conditional on market shares, optimal prices for O firms are decreasing in σ, whereas
optimal prices for P firms are independent of σ.
From (3.7.2) and (3.7.1), we obtain the ratio of market shares so/sp. Introducing
prices and investments, taking logs and rearranging terms, we obtain
(1−δ) ln
(
so
sp
)
+
1
1− so + σ1−σ no−1no
− 1
1− sp (3.7.5)
= δ ln
1− α
1−σ
(no−1)/no(
1− so + σ1−σ no−1no
)
+ (α δ − σ) ln (no).
As in the standard logit case, to guarantee the existence of a symmetric equilib-
rium we need enough horizontal differentiation relative to vertical differentiation. We
assume σ ≤ 1 − δ, which is a sufficient condition. Proposition 5 summarizes the
equilibrium of the second-stage of the game.
Proposition 5. A second-stage symmetric equilibrium for the nested model exists and
is unique. Given no, the equilibrium market shares solve (3.7.5) and (3.3.5).
Comparing equations (3.3.4) and (3.7.5), we can see the higher substitution between
O varieties has three effects on equilibrium market shares. First, a lower investment
of O firms occurs due to the lower return to investment (first term on the right-
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hand side of 3.7.5). Second, the higher substitution directly and negatively affects the
average value of the complementary good (second term on the right-hand side of 3.7.5).
Consumers care for variety; therefore, the value of choosing an O package decreases
when the complementary good becomes less differentiated. Third, the equilibrium
price of O firms is smaller because of the higher substitution (second term on the left-
hand side of 3.7.5). The first two effects tend to reduce the market share of O relative
to P, and the third effect tends to increase it.
To solve the first stage of the game, we calculate f(no) = pio(no)−pip(no−1), where
pi(no) = pi si− c xi. Equilibrium conditions are the same as in the standard logit case.
Figure 3.4 shows the graph of f(no) for different parameter values. We can make
three interesting observations. First, as σ increases for given α and δ (O varieties
become more similar), the equilibrium number of firms choosing O decreases (Figure
3.4a). Second, if σ is high enough, equilibria with only P firms exist (Figure 3.4b).
Third, for some parameter values, the model exhibits multiple equilibria (in Figure
3.4c an equilibrium exists with no = 2 and another with no = 10). In this case,
coordination failures may imply a desirable open-source project fails to form.
Figure 3.5 shows the equilibrium regions for different values of α and σ, given
δ = 0.6 and n = 10 (in case of multiple equilibria, we take the equilibrium with highest
no). Open source will subsist if the differentiation between O varieties is high enough
(σ is low enough). Also, values of α exist such that as σ increases, the equilibrium goes
from all O, to coexistence and then to all P. For coexistence, we need a combination
of low σ and high α. Finally, our simulations show that whenever O and P coexist,
the quality and market share of P firms is larger than that of O firms, which means
that the main result of the paper still holds.
As in the case of the standard logit, studying what happens when the number of
firms goes to infinity is interesting. Proposition 6 characterizes the equilibrium of the
limiting economy for the nested logit model and formalizes the previous intuition on
the effects of σ on the equilibrium.
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(a) Decrease in no when σ increases. (b) All P Equilibrium.
(c) Multiple Equilibria.
Figure 3.4: Equilibrium of the nested logit model.
Proposition 6. A symmetric continuation equilibrium of the limiting economy exists,
but the model may exhibit multiple equilibria. A threshold 0 ≤ σ˜(α, δ) < α δ exists such
that
(i) If α < 1 and σ < α δ, an equilibrium exists in which all firms decide to be O.
(ii) If σ ≥ σ˜(α, δ), an equilibrium exists in which all firms decide to be P.
(iii) If α = 1 and σ < σ˜(1, δ), an equilibrium exists in which both types of firms
coexist.
As σ increases, O products become more similar. When α < 1, the ratio of equi-
librium market shares depends on the factor no
α δ−σ. When α δ − σ > 0, the effects
of collaboration in R&D are stronger than the effects of lower substitution, and the
difference in market shares between O and P firms grows large as no goes to infin-
ity. As a consequence, an equilibrium exists in which all firms decide to be O. When
α δ − σ ≤ 0, collaboration in R&D is not strong enough to compensate for the effects
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Figure 3.5: Equilibrium regions for the nested logit.
of having a lower substitution; therefore, P firms obtain an advantage in market share.
Thus, no equilibrium with O firms exists. For intermediate values of σ, two equilibria
exist, one in which all firms choose to be O and another in which all firms choose to
be P.
Finally, when α = 1, two types of equilibria exist. If σ < σ˜(1, δ), the unique
equilibrium has both types of firms. As σ gets closer to 0, the number of O firms in
equilibrium increases.8 If σ ≥ σ˜(1, δ), on the other hand, the unique equilibrium has
only P firms.
3.7.3 Initial asymmetries
We have assumed firms are ex-ante symmetric, which allowed us to concentrate on ex-
post differences arising endogenously in the model. However, it would be interesting
to analyze what happens when there are initial asymmetries, which could be due to
initial differences in the stock of R&D or installed base.
Specifically, suppose all firms are initially P and have different stocks of R&D.
Firms can increase quality by investing in R&D, and have to choose to become O
or remain P. Firms deciding to become O will have to share not only their current
investment in R&D, but also their initial stocks.
For P firms, initial differences will persist ex-post. Larger firms may invest more or
8Unlike the case of σ = 0, when σ > 0 and α = 1, the number of O firms in equilibrium is finite.
See the proof of Proposition 6 for more details.
127
Chapter 3: Industry equilibrium with open-source and proprietary
firms (with Gasto´n Llanes)
less than smaller firms, but will finish with a larger stock of R&D. Firms deciding to
be O, on the other hand, will tend to be more similar because they have to share their
initial R&D stocks. This means that larger firms will have less incentives to become
O. In equilibrium, firms deciding to be O will be smaller ex-ante and ex-post. The
reason is twofold: larger firms ex-ante have more incentives to remain P, and P firms
have more incentives to maintain a larger stock of R&D ex-post.
3.7.4 Direct investment in the complementary good
In the baseline model, the quality of the complementary good is determined by indi-
vidual investments in the primary good (xi). This means that firms cannot increase
the quality of the complementary good without increasing the quality of the primary
good at the same time.
In this section, we extend the baseline model to allow for direct investment in the
complementary good. The indirect utility of consumer j from consuming package i is
still:
vij = α ai + (1− α) bi + y − pi + εij,
where ai = ln(xi) for P firms and ao = ln(Σi∈o xi) for O firms, but now, bi = ω ln(xi) +
(1 − ω) ln(zi) for all firms, where zi is the direct investment in the complementary
good, and ω ∈ [0, 1] measures the importance of the synergy effect vis-a-vis the direct
investment. The total cost of the investment is c (xi + zi).
Demands are still given by (3.2.2), and firms maximize pi = pi si − c (xi + zi).
Equilibrium price is:
pi =
1
δ(1− si)
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for all firms, and equilibrium investments in the primary good for O and P firms are:
xo =
α + (1− α)ω
c
so
(
1− α
α + (1− α)ω
no−1
no(1−so)
)
,
xp =
α + (1− α)ω
c
sp.
Finally, equilibrium investment in the complementary good is:
zi =
(1− α) (1− ω)
c
si
for all firms.
An increase in the importance of direct investment with respect to the synergy
effect will decrease the optimal investment in the primary good and increase the op-
timal investment in the complementary good, for given si. Substituting prices and
investments in the ratio of market shares, taking logs and rearranging terms we get:
(1−δ) ln
(
so
sp
)
+
1
1−so −
1
1−sp (3.7.6)
= δ (ω+(1−ω)α) ln
(
1− α
ω + (1−ω)α
no−1
no(1−so)
)
+ δ α ln (no),
where α and δ are defined as in section 3.2.2. Notice that we can get the baseline
model by making ω = 1 in equation (3.7.6). As ω decreases, the market share of O
firms decreases for given no. Thus, the change in the composition of investments as ω
decreases has a higher impact on O firms because of the lower appropriability of the
investment in the primary good.
To solve the first stage of the game, we calculate f(no) = pio(no)−pip(no−1), where
pi(no) = pi si−c xi. The equilibrium conditions are the same than in the baseline model.
Figure 3.6 shows the equilibrium for α = 0.9, δ = 0.7, n = 10, and different values
of ω. We can see that as ω decreases, the equilibrium number of firms in O decreases.
In the limit, when ω = 0, the equilibrium has both kinds of firms (coexistence).
Simulations show that this result holds for any value of δ and α.
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Figure 3.6: Equilibria with direct investment in the complementary good.
The analysis of this section shows the effects of allowing firms to invest solely
in the complementary good. Direct investment in the complementary good is fully
appropriable. As the importance of this kind of investment relative to the synergy
effect increases, the quality differential between O and P firms decreases, reducing the
incentives to participate in O. However, the main result of the paper still holds: there
are parameter values for which both kinds of firms coexist in equilibrium, and these
equilibria are characterized by an asymmetric market structure, with a few large P
firms and many small O firms.
3.7.5 Compatibility between open source and proprietary
In previous sections, we assumed that complementary goods could only be used with
the primary good for which they were developed. In this section, we analyze what
happens when complementary goods can be combined with any primary good, that is,
when O and P goods are compatible.
A direct implication is that primary and complementary goods will have separate
prices. Let rk be the price of primary good k, and pi be the price of complementary
good i. P firms can set a positive price for both goods. O firms, on the other hand,
are selling an homogeneous primary good, and price competition implies that ro = 0.
Therefore, O firms can set a positive price only for the complementary good.
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As a result of compatibility, the model becomes highly complex. Therefore, to keep
the model tractable, we will assume there is only one P firm, competing against no
O firms. In other words, we will fix the number of O and P firms and we will focus
on studying equilibrium investment and pricing decisions on the second stage of the
previous models.
The model is based on the nested logit. There are two nests, one corresponding to
users of the O primary good, and the other corresponding to users of the P primary
good. Within each nest, consumers can choose between the complementary goods of
all firms.
The quality of the O primary good is ao = ln(Σi∈o xi) and the quality of the P
primary good is ap = ln(xi), where xi are individual investments in the primary good.
The quality of the complementary good is determined by a synergy effect as in the
baseline model, but this synergy effect is discounted when the complementary good is
used with the primary good for which it was not developed. Specifically, the quality
of complementary good i developed for primary good k is bik = ln(xi) when used with
k, and bik′ = ln(θ xi) when used with k
′ 6= k.
θ ∈ [0, 1] measures the degree of compatibility between the primary and comple-
mentary goods of different firms. When θ = 0, goods of different firms are incom-
patible, and we obtain the model of previous sections. 0 < θ < 1 implies partial
compatibility, and θ = 1 implies full compatibility.
Consumer j’s indirect utility from consuming good i with primary good k is:
vkij = α ak + (1− α) bik + y − rk − pi + σ ηkj + (1− σ) εij.
The distributions of the taste shocks ηkj and εij are given in Assumption 2.
Let So and Sp be the market shares of the O and P primary goods. The market
share of complementary good i can be decomposed in the following way:
si = So si|o + Sp si|p,
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where si|o is the market share of firm i inside the O nest, and si|p is the market share
of firm i inside the P nest.
The market share of complementary good i inside nest k is:
si|k =
exp
(
δ((1− α) bik − pi)
1− σ
)
∑
exp
(
δ((1− α) bik − pi)
1− σ
) .
As in section 3.7.2, the market share inside a nest depends only on the relative quality
and price of the different complementary goods. This is true for O and P firms. The
only difference is that now all firms sell complementary goods in both nests.
The market share of the O primary good is:
So =
exp (δVo)
exp (δVo) + exp (δVp)
,
and Sp = 1− So, where Vo and Vp are the average values of the complementary goods
within each nest:
Vo = α ao +
1
δ
(1− σ) ln
(∑
exp
(
δ((1− α) bio − pi)
1− σ
))
,
Vp = α ap − r + 1
δ
(1− σ) ln
(∑
exp
(
δ((1− α) bip − pi)
1− σ
))
.
The profit of O firms is pio = si pi − c xi, whereas the profit of the P firm is
pip = sp pp + Sp rp − c xp. Notice that when θ = 0, Sp = sp and the P firm chooses a
single price equal to pp + rp, as in previous sections. As in section 3.7.2, we assume
σ < 1− δ, which guarantees the quasiconcavity of the maximization problem of O and
P firms.
The optimal price and investment for O firms are:
po =
1
δ
(1− σ)
1− so − σ SoSp (si|o−si|p)
2
so
xo =
α
c
So Sp (si|o − si|p) δpo
no
+
(1− α)
c
so.
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The optimal price for the primary and complementary good of the P firm, and its
optimal investment are:
pp =
(1− σ) si|o
δSo si|o(1− si|o) + Sp si|p(1− si|p)
rp =
1
δ(1− Sp) − (si|p − si|o) pp
xp =
α
c
Sp +
(1− α)
c
sp;
Replacing optimal prices and investments into the market share equations, and
noticing that Sp = 1 − So, sp|o = 1 − no so|o, and sp|p = 1 − no so|p, we can get a
system of three equations with three unknowns characterizing the equilibrium market
shares. These equilibrium expressions are difficult to analyze because of their analytical
complexity. Therefore, it is useful to begin by analyzing the full compatibility case
(θ = 1), which provides a tractable set of equilibrium conditions.
Full compatibility
When θ = 1, si = si|o = si|p and equilibrium prices and investments become:
po =
(1− σ)
δ(1− so) ,
pp =
(1− σ)
δ(1− sp) ,
rp =
1
δ(1− Sp) ,
xo =
1− α
c
so,
xp =
α
c
Sp +
1− α
c
sp.
The ratios of market shares are:
so
sp
= exp
(
δ(1− α)
(1− σ) ln
(
xo
xp
)
− δ(po − pp)
(1− σ)
)
,
So
Sp
= exp
(
δα ln
(
no xo
xp
)
+ δr
)
.
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Operating, we get:
ln
(
so
sp
)
= −δ(1− α)
(1− σ) ln
(
α
1− α
Sp
so
+
sp
so
)
− 1
1− so +
1
1− sp , (3.7.7)
ln
(
So
Sp
)
= δα ln(no)− δα ln
(
α
1− α
Sp
so
+
sp
so
)
+
1
1− Sp . (3.7.8)
The equilibrium is characterized by the previous equations and the condition that the
sum of market shares is equal to 1:
So + Sp = 1, (3.7.9)
no so + sp = 1. (3.7.10)
Proposition 7. A symmetric continuation equilibrium for the full compatibility case
exists and is unique. Equilibrium market shares solve (3.7.7) to (3.7.10). In equilib-
rium, sp ≥ so and So ≥ Sp, and the profit of the P firm is always higher than the profit
of an O firm.
It is important to remark that the result that So > Sp for all parameter values
depends on the fact that there is only one P firm, and may not longer hold if we
introduce more P firms in the market.
Lemma 7 provides simple results which can be compared with those of the nested
logit model of section 3.7.2, where it is assumed that θ = 0. When θ = 0, O firms
could have a higher market share and profits than P firms, depending on α, δ and σ.
When θ = 1, on the other hand, the complementary goods market share and profit of
the P firms will always be higher than the market share of O firms.
These results suggest that O will perform better when the complementary good is
more specific to the primary good. Good examples of these kinds of complementary
goods are support and training services, customizations, platform-specific software,
and mobile devices (like MP3 players, PDAs or cell phones), among others.
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Partial compatibility
We now turn to the analysis of the effects of changes in θ on the equilibrium. As θ
increases, the degree of specificity of the complementary goods decreases. This means
that O firms tend to have similar market shares in the O and P primary goods markets,
and therefore have less incentives to invest in the primary good. The P firm, on the
other hand, keeps its incentives to invest in the primary good because it sells this good
for a positive price. Therefore, as θ increases, the investment of the P firm increases
relative to the investment of the O firms.
The above argument implies that as θ increases, we should see an increase in the
market shares of the primary and complementary goods of the P firm, and also an
increase in the profits of the P firm relative to the profit of the O firms.
Figure 3.7 shows the effects of changes in θ on the natural logarithm of the ratios
so/sp, So/Sp and pio/pip, for no = 10, α = 0.3, δ = 0.8, σ = 0.1 and c = 1. We can see
that these three ratios decrease with θ, which confirms our previous assertions. Our
simulations for different values of the parameters indicate that So/Sp > 1 for all θ.
Figure 3.7: Effects of changes in θ on equilibrium.
In Figure 3.7, O firms have higher market shares in the complementary goods and
higher profits than the P firm for small θ, but have lower market shares and profits for
high θ. More generally, we know that so/sp and pio/pip may be larger or smaller than
1 when θ = 0, which depends on α, δ and σ. However, what is more important is that
these two ratios are decreasing in θ and that they will always be smaller than 1 when
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θ = 1, by Lemma 7.
Finally, it is important to remark that introducing compatibility strengthens our
results of an asymmetric market structure, where P firms have a higher market share
than O firms (in the complementary goods market).
3.8 Conclusions
This paper investigates the motivations of commercial firms to participate in open
source, and the implications of direct competition between open-source and proprietary
firms on R&D investments and equilibrium market shares. We present a model in
which firms decide whether to become open source or proprietary, and their investment
in R&D and price. Both types of firms sell packages composed by a primary good
(e.g., software) and a complementary private good (e.g., support and training services
or hardware). The difference between both types of firms is that open-source firms
share their investments in R&D, whereas proprietary firms develop their products on
their own.
Our main contribution is to determine conditions under which open-source and
proprietary firms coexist in equilibrium. An asymmetric market structure characterizes
such equilibria: proprietary firms invest more in R&D and obtain a larger market share
than open-source firms. Open-source firms, on the other hand, benefit from lower
development costs. This result is robust to the introduction of a lower differentiation
among open-source varieties. We also study a limiting economy, and show conditions
under which large numbers favor cooperation in R&D.
Our model points to several important characteristics of open source. In particular,
the success of open source will depend on (i) the strength of the complementarity
between primary and complementary goods, (ii) the possibility to differentiate the
firm’s open-source variant from other open-source and proprietary products, and (iii)
the degree of appropriability of investments in R&D.
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The welfare analysis shows the equilibrium with coexistence is suboptimal for two
reasons: too little collaboration (caused by proprietary firms) and too little investment
in R&D (caused by open-source firms). We show a subsidy to open-source develop-
ment can improve welfare not only because it increases the investment in R&D, but
also because it encourages commercial firms to participate in open source, thereby
enhancing collaboration. This finding explains the active involvement of governments
in promoting open source.
Our objective was to present a tractable model analyzing the coexistence of open-
source and proprietary firms. We believe our paper is an important first step in the
analysis of the behavior of profit-maximizing firms in open source. Several direc-
tions for further research are possible. First, the model could be modified to study
bundling and compatibility decisions. Second, consumer preferences could be modi-
fied to introduce network effects. Third, an important technological difference between
open-source and proprietary firms is that the former benefit more from user innovation
than the latter. In open source, users can access the source code, which allows them
to customize the software program to their needs and to correct bugs at a faster rate.
Appendix: proofs of theorems in text
Proof of Proposition 1. The first order conditions with respect to pi and xi are
∂pii
∂pi
=
∂si
∂pi
pi + si ≤ 0 with equality if pi > 0, (3.8.1)
∂pii
∂xi
=
∂si
∂xi
pi − c ≤ 0 with equality if xi > 0. (3.8.2)
For the moment, assume that pi > 0 and xi > 0 in equilibrium, so the first order conditions hold
with equality. Later, we will show there are no corner equilibria. Working with equation (3.8.1) we
obtain the optimal price:
pi =
1
δ(1− si) . (3.8.3)
Equation (3.8.3) holds for both types of firms (O and P). To find the optimal investment in R&D
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we need to calculate ∂si/∂xi, which in the case of O firms is
∂si
∂xi
= δ si(1− si)
(
α∑
i∈O xi
1−∑i∈O si
1− si +
(1− α)
xi
)
,
and in the case of P firms is
∂si
∂xi
= δ si(1− si) 1
xi
.
Imposing symmetry and introducing these expressions into (3.8.2) we obtain
xo =
1
c
so
(
1− α no−1
no
1
1− so
)
, (3.8.4)
xp =
1
c
sp, (3.8.5)
and the ratio of optimal investments in equilibrium,
xo
xp
=
so
sp
(
1− α no−1
no
1
1− so
)
. (3.8.6)
From (3.2.2) we obtain the ratio of market shares between O and P firms:
so
sp
= exp (δ(qo − qp + pp − po)), (3.8.7)
ln
(
so
sp
)
= δ (qo − qp) + 1
1− sp −
1
1− so , (3.8.8)
and from the definition of qo and qp, we obtain
qo − qp = ln
(
xo
xp
)
+ α ln (no). (3.8.9)
From equations (3.8.6), (3.8.8) and (3.8.9), we obtain equation (3.3.4), which is an implicit
equation determining the relation of market shares between O and P firms in equilibrium. This
equation, together with the equation establishing that the sum of the market shares is equal to 1,
completely characterizes the equilibrium.
Now we will show there are no corner solutions (xi > 0 and pi > 0 in the symmetric continuation
equilibrium). If pi = 0, then profits are zero and the firm would find profitable to increase pi. To
analyze xi = 0 we have to specify what happens with si when xi = 0. Assume that if xi = 0 and
xj > 0 for at least one j 6= i, then si = 0. When xi = 0 for all i, on the other hand, si = exp (−δ pi)∑ exp (−δ pi) .
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There are 3 cases: xp = 0 and xo > 0, xp > 0 and xo = 0, and xp = 0 and xo = 0. If xp = 0 and
xo > 0, then sp = 0 and a P firm makes zero profits. But a P firm can deviate to pi =
1
δ (1−si) and
xi =
si
c with si > 0. Such a deviation is profitable if si > 1 − 1δ which always holds. If xp > 0 and
xo = 0, then so = 0 and an O firm makes zero profits. But an O firm can deviate to pi =
1
δ(1−si)
and xi =
si
c obtaining positive profits. If xp = 0 and xo = 0, then sp = so =
1
n . An O or a P firm
can deviate to xi =  > 0 obtaining a discontinuous jump in revenue (si = 1) and a small increase in
costs.
Finally, to show existence and uniqueness, we need to prove two things: (1) there is only one
fixed point of the system of equations in Proposition 1 (there is only one symmetric continuation
equilibrium), and (2) the profit function is concave at the equilibrium (the second order conditions
for optimality hold).
Let us first show there is only one fixed point in term of equilibrium market shares. Define the
function g(so) by plugging equation (3.3.5) in equation (3.3.4):
g(so) = (1− δ) ln
(
(n− no)so
1− noso
)
− δ ln
(
1− α no − 1
(1− so)no
)
+ (3.8.10)
− α δ ln(no)− n− no
n− 1− no(1− so) +
1
1− so .
By construction, so solves equations (3.3.4) and (3.3.5) if and only if g(so) = 0. Existence of at
least one so such that g(so) = 0 follows from continuity of g and the fact that limso→0 g(so) = −∞
and limso→ 1no g(so) = +∞. To show that there exists only one such so, it is sufficient to show that g
is strictly increasing. Computing this derivative, we obtain
∂g
∂so
=
1− δ
so(1− no so) +
α δ (no−1)/(1− so)
(1− α)(no−1) + 1− so no+
+
(n− no)no
(1 + no(1− so)− n)2 +
1
(1− so)2 .
All terms are positive because sono ≤ 1. It follows that there exists a unique (so, sp) solving the
system of equations.
To prove that the profit function is concave at the equilibrium candidate, we will show that
the Hessian of the profit function (at the equilibrium price and market share) is negative definite.
A necessary and sufficient condition for negative definiteness is that the leading principal minors
alternate sign. To simplify the exposition here we show the determinants of the Hessian of both
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firms:
|Hp| =
δ s2p
x2p
(
1− δ (1− sp)2
)
,
|Ho| ≥ δ s
2
o
x2o
((
1− no so
(1− so)n2o
α+ (1− α)
)
− δ (1− so)2
(
1− no so
(1− so)noα+ (1− α)
)2)
.
A sufficient condition for both determinants to be positive is δ ≤ 1, which has been assumed through-
out the paper. Thus, the concavity of the profit function at the equilibrium is guaranteed for both
types of firms.
Proof of Lemma 1. To prove the first part of the lemma we only have to check the sign of g
(
1
n
)
,
where g is defined in (3.8.10). If g
(
1
n
)
< 0, then so > 1/n and therefore so > sp. Then,
g
(
1
n
)
= −δ
(
ln
(
1− α n
n− 1
no−1
no
)
+ α ln (no)
)
,
and g
(
1
n
)
< 0 if and only if
α
nαo
nαo − 1
no−1
no
>
n− 1
n
.
Let h(α, no) = α
nαo
nαo−1
no−1
no
. Given that h(α, no) is increasing in α, and h(0, no) < (n−1)/n < h(1, no)
there exists only one αˆ such that h(αˆ, no) = (n − 1)/n. Moreover, for α > αˆ we have h(α, no) >
(n− 1)/n and sp > so, and viceversa.
Finally, the proof that αˆ(no, n) is increasing in n and no follows from applying the implicit
function theorem to F (α, no, n) = h(α, no)− (n− 1)/n, and by observing that ∂h/∂no < 0.
Proof of Lemma 2. By the implicit function theorem, ∂so∂α = − ∂g/∂α∂g/∂so . We know that ∂g/∂so > 0.
Let us now compute ∂g/∂α:
∂g
∂α
= ln (no)− no − 1
α+ (1− so − α)no
Therefore, ∂so/∂α = 0 when ∂g/∂α = 0. Solving for the value sˆo that makes ∂g/∂α = 0 we obtain
sˆo =
ln (no)(no(1− α) + α) + 1− no
no ln (no)
Substituting sˆo in g = 0, we obtain an equation determining the value αs that makes the derivative
equal to zero. To prove that to the right of αs the graph of so(α) is decreasing, assume this is not
the case, so ∂g/∂α > 0. Then, for α > αs it has to be the case that so > sˆo, but this implies that
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∂g/∂α < 0, which is a contradiction. This means that ∂so/∂α < 0 for α > αs. A similar reasoning
implies that ∂so/∂α > 0 for α < αs.
Proof of Lemma 3. By the implicit function theorem, ∂so∂δ = − ∂g/∂δ∂g/∂so . In the proof of Proposition
1 we showed that ∂g/∂so > 0. Next, we will determine the sign of ∂g/∂δ. Computing this derivative,
we obtain
∂g
∂δ
= −α lnno − ln
(
1− α no − 1
no(1− so)
)
− ln
(
(n− no)so
1− noso
)
= −1
δ
[
(1− δ) ln
(
so
sp
)
+
1
1− so −
1
1− sp
]
− ln
(
(n− no)so
1− noso
)
. (3.8.11)
In the second row we use the expression for g(so) = 0. If α > αˆ then so < sp (by Lemma 1),
∂g/∂δ > 0 (by equation (3.8.11)), and ∂so/∂δ < 0. Conversely, if α < αˆ then so > sp, ∂g/∂δ < 0,
and ∂so/∂δ > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. We begin by showing existence. For no = 1 to be an equilibrium we only
need f(2) ≤ 0. Likewise, for no = n to be an equilibrium we only need f(n) ≥ 0. In order to have an
equilibrium with both types of firms (1 < no < n), we need that f(no) ≥ 0 and f(no+1) ≤ 0 at the
equilibrium no. Suppose there is no equilibrium with no = 1 or no = n. Then, f(2) > 0 and f(n) < 0
so f(no) goes from positive to negative at least once when going from no = 1 to no = n. Therefore,
existence of an equilibrium is guaranteed.
Next, we show that f(2) > 0 for any n, α and δ, which means that the equilibrium always has at
least two O firms. From the definition of f(no), we obtain
δ f(2) =
so(2)
1− so(2)
(
1− δ (1− so(2)) + αδ
2
)
− 1
n− 1
(
1− δ n− 1
n
)
.
Let s¯o be the maximum value of so(2) for which f(2) ≤ 0. From the above equation, we obtain
s¯o =
αn− 2
4 (n− 1)n −
n
(
1− δ (1− α2 ))
2 δ (n− 1) +
√√√√δ + (1− δ)n
δ (n− 1)n +
(
n
2 δ (n− 1) −
(
1 +
(
1− α2
)
n
)
2n
)2
.
Let w = g(s¯o), where g(so) is defined in (3.8.10). w < 0 implies that so(2) > s¯o, which means
that f(2) > 0. w is strictly increasing in n, and has the following upper bound, as n→∞:
w¯ = −α δ ln(2) + (1− δ) ln
(
1− δ
1− δ (1− α2 )
)
− δ ln
(
1− α
2
)
.
w¯ is strictly convex in δ and α, which means that the maximum is at δ = 0 or δ = 1, and α = 0 or
α = 1. It is straightforward to show that w¯ goes to zero as δ or α go to zero, and also when both δ
and α go to 1. Given that w is strictly increasing in n, this means that w(n, δ, α) is negative for any
finite n. Therefore, f(2) > 0.
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Lemma A1 will prove very important in characterizing the subgame perfect equilibrium of the
game. In order for an O firm to find it profitable to become P (f(no) < 0), it has to be the case that
the increase in market share from becoming P is large enough to compensate for the increase in cost.
If α < αˆ(no−1, n), then O firms have a larger market share so it is not profitable for them to deviate
(f(no) > 0). Corollaries A1 and A2 are two important implications of this lemma.
Lemma A1 (Sufficient condition for positive f). If α < αˆ(no−1, n) then f(no) > 0.
Proof. Rearranging f(no) and multiplying by δ we obtain
δ f(no) =
so
1− so (1− δ(1− so))−
s˜p
1− s˜p (1− δ(1− s˜p)) + αδ
so
1− so
no−1
no
where so = so(no) and s˜p = sp(no − 1). The sign of f depends on the sign of the right-hand side of
the equation. The first two terms have the same functional form and are increasing in s. The last
term is always positive. Therefore, if so(no) ≥ sp(no−1), then f(no) > 0. A sufficient condition is
that so(no−1) ≥ 1/n and so(no) ≥ 1/n, which is equivalent to α < αˆ(no−1, n) and α < αˆ(no, n).
However, αˆ(no, n) is decreasing in no, so α < αˆ(no−1, n) implies f(no) > 0.
Corollary A1 (Necessary condition for an interior equilibrium). At an interior equilibrium no it is
necessary that α ≥ αˆ(no, n).
Proof. For an interior equilibrium at no we need that f(no) ≥ 0 and f(no+1) ≤ 0, but Lemma A1
implies that for f(no+1) ≤ 0 we need α ≥ αˆ(no−1, n).
Corollary A2 (Sufficient condition for an equilibrium with no = n). If α ≤ αˆ(n − 1, n) then all
firms decide to be O in equilibrium.
Proof. If α ≤ αˆ(n − 1, n) then f(n) ≥ 0, so if no = n then no firm would gain by becoming a P
firm.
Corollary A1 states that in any interior equilibrium it has to be the case that the P firms have
a larger market share than O firms, and therefore a higher quality product. Corollary A2, on the
other hand, shows that if the degree of public good of the investment is low enough, O firms have
a larger market share for any no, and therefore all firms decide to collaborate in the open-source
project. Lemma A2 complements Corollary A2, by providing the necessary and sufficient condition
for an equilibrium with no = n.
Lemma A2 (Necessary and Sufficient condition for equilibrium with no = n). Given n > 3 and δ,
there exists α¯ ∈ (αˆ, 1) such that f(n) ≥ 0 if and only if α ≤ α¯.
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Proof. The equilibrium condition with no = n depends only on the sign of f(no) so, to simplify
things, we will work with a scaled version of f(no), δ f(no), for the rest of this proof. We know that
f(n) > 0 for α < αˆ(n−1, n). We need to determine the sign of f(n) for the rest of values of α. When
no = n, so = 1/n. Therefore,
f(n) =
1
n− 1 −
δ(1− α)
n
− s˜p
1− s˜p (1− δ(1− s˜p)) , (3.8.12)
where s˜p = sp(n− 1). We need to find the value of s˜p that makes f(n) = 0. There are two roots of
this equation. The only positive root is
s˜p =
−n2(1− δ)− (1− α)δ − nαδ +√n4 − 2(n− 1)n2(n− 1− α)δ + z2
2δ n (n− 1)
where z = δ (n− 1) (n− 1 + α). The corresponding value for so(n− 1) is
s˜o =
n2 + z −√n4 − 2(n− 1)n2(n− 1− α)δ + z2
2δ n (n− 1)2
Plugging this value in the equilibrium condition (3.8.10) and solving for α we obtain the value α¯
where f(n) = 0. Lemma A1 implies that α¯ ≥ αˆ(n− 1, n). Lemma 2 implies that ∂s˜p/∂α > 0 in the
relevant area. This means that α¯ is the unique value of α such that f(n) = 0.
To finish the proof we need to show that f(n) > 0 for α < α¯ and f(n) < 0 for α > α¯. Given the
continuity and monotonicity of sp, it suffices to show there is some value to the right or to the left of
α¯ such that these inequalities hold.
Consider first the case of α < α¯. We know that at α = αˆ(n − 1, n), f(n) > 0. This proves that
f(n) > 0 for α < α¯. For α > α¯, consider α = 1. When α = 1, the investment of O firms is very
low, and P firms have the largest advantage. In this case, f(n) < 0, which proves that this inequality
holds for any α > α¯.
Proposition 2 follows directly from Corollaries A1 and A2, and Lemma A2.
Proof of Lemma 4. Lemma 4 follows directly from Corollary A1.
Proof of Proposition 3. When n→∞, there are three types of equilibria. Remember we defined
pik(no) as the profit of firm type k when there are no O firms. For an equilibrium with coexistence,
we need limn→∞
pio(no)
pip(no)
= 1. For an equilibrium with only O firms, we need limn→∞
pio(n)
pip(n)
≥ 1, and
for an equilibrium with only P firms, we need limn→∞
pio(2)
pip(1)
≤ 1.
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Taking the limit of equation 3.3.4, we obtain a function determining the limit of the ratio of
market shares,
(1− δ) ln lim
n→∞
so
sp
= δ ln lim
n→∞
[(
1− α no − 1
no(1− so)
)
nαo
]
,
and from the definition of pio and pip in equations (3.3.6) and (3.3.7), we obtain the ratio of profits,
lim
n→∞
pio
pip
= lim
n→∞
1− δ
(
1− αno−1no
)
1− δ limn→∞
so
sp
.
In an equilibrium with coexistence, no → ∞ as n → ∞. There are two cases. If α < 1, then
so
sp
→∞ and piopip →∞, which contradicts the necessary condition for an equilibrium with coexistence.
α = 1, on the other hand,
(1− δ) ln lim
n→∞
so
sp
= δ ln lim
no→∞
(1− no so),
so sosp may converge to a constant if no so converges to a constant. Specifically, if no so → 1−(1−δ)
1−δ
δ ,
then sosp → 1− δ and piopip → 1, and there is an equilibrium with coexistence.
Let us now look for an equilibrium with only O firms. If α < 1, sosp → ∞ and piopip → ∞, which
verifies the condition for an equilibrium with only O firms. If α = 1, no so → 1, which means that
so
sp
→ 0 and piopip → 0, which contradicts the necessary condition for an equilibrium with only O firms.
Finally, let us look for an equilibrium with only P firms. We have to show that when no = 2, O
firms would gain by becoming P. When no = 2,
lim
n→∞
so
sp
=
[(
1− α
2
)
2α
] δ
1−δ
,
lim
n→∞
pio(2)
pip(1)
=
1− δ (1− α 12)
1− δ
[(
1− α
2
)
2α
] δ
1−δ
.
The above expression is larger than 1 for all α and δ. Therefore, there is no equilibrium with only P
firms.
Proof of Lemma 5. The equilibrium condition for the second stage is fully characterized by
(1− δ) ln
(
so
sp
)
+
1
1− so −
1
1− sp = δ ln
(
1− α no−1
no(1−so)
)
+ α δ ln (no)− δ ln (1− κ), (3.8.13)
and the market clearing condition no so + (n − no) sp = 1. The left-hand side in equation 3.8.13 is
zero when so = sp and it is strictly increasing in so. Then so > sp if and only if the right-hand side
is positive. Finally, the right-hand side is positive if and only if 1− κ <
(
1− α nn−1 no−1no
)
nαo .
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose that all firms are O and let us compute the optimal subsidy
that achieves the first best solution. Later we will show the optimal subsidy indeed induced all
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firms to be O. When no = n an individual O firm invest xo = (1 − α)/(n co). The first best
optimal investment is x∗ = 1/(c n). A government achieves the first best solution if and only if
c = co/(1 − α) = c(1 − κ)/(1 − α). Then the optimal subsidy is κ∗ = α. By lemma 5, if κ∗ = α >
1−
(
1− αn(n−2)(n−1)2
)
(n− 1)α then all firms are O. But this condition holds for any α ∈ [0, 1].
Proof of Proposition 5. The first order conditions are (3.8.1) (3.8.2). As in the standard logit
model, there are no corner solutions so the first order conditions hold with equality. Equilibrium
prices and investment for P firms are identical to the logit model so we will focus on the O firms. In
the case of O firms the partial derivative of the market share with respect to the price is
∂si
∂pi
= − δ
(1−σ)si(1− σ si|o − (1−σ) si).
Then from the equation (3.8.1) and imposing symmetry we obtain the optimal price in equation
(3.7.3). To find xo we need to calculate ∂si/∂xi for O firms:
∂si
∂xi
= δ (1−
∑
i∈O
si)
α∑
i∈O xi
+ δ
si(1− σ si|o − (1−σ) si)
(1−σ)
(1− α)
xi
.
From equation (3.8.2) and imposing symmetry we obtain equation (3.7.4), and the ratio of optimal
investments in equilibrium:
xo
xp
=
so
sp
1− α
1−σ
(no−1)/no(
1− so + σ1−σ no−1no
)
 . (3.8.14)
The ratio of market shares between O and P firms is
so
sp
= n−σo exp (δ(qo − qp + pp − po)), (3.8.15)
ln
(
so
sp
)
= −σ lnno + δ (qo − qp) + 1
1− sp −
1
1− so + σ1−σ no−1no
, (3.8.16)
and from the definition of qp and qo we obtain:
qo − qp = ln
(
xo
xp
)
+ α ln (no). (3.8.17)
From equations (3.8.14), (3.8.16) and (3.8.17), we obtain equation (3.7.5), which is an implicit
equation determining the relation of market shares between O and P firms in equilibrium. This
equation, together with the equation establishing that the sum of the market shares is equal to 1,
completely characterizes the equilibrium.
Finally, to show existence and uniqueness, we need to prove two things: (1) there is only one
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fixed point of the system of equations in Proposition 5 (there is only one symmetric continuation
equilibrium), and (2) the profit function is concave at the equilibrium (the second order conditions
for optimality hold).
To show (1), define g(so) by plugging (3.3.5) in equation (3.7.5). Then, the result follows from
an application of the mean value theorem as in the standard logit model.
To prove that the profit function is concave at the equilibrium candidate, we will evaluate the
determinant of the Hessian of the profit function at the equilibrium price and market share, and show
that it is positive definite. The determinant of the Hessian for O firms is
|Ho| ≥ δ s
2
o
(1− σ)x2o
(1− σsi|o)
(
(1− σ)
δ
(
(1− σ)(1− no so)
(1− σsi|o − (1− σ)so)n2o
α+ (1− α)
)
+
−
(
(1− σ)(1− no so)
(1− σsi|o − (1− σ)so)noα+ (1− α)
)2)
.
The determinant of the Hessian for P firms is equivalent to that of the standard logit model. A
sufficient condition for both determinants to be positive is (1−σ) ≥ δ or σ ≤ (1− δ), which has been
assumed for this section of the paper. Thus, the concavity of the profit function at the equilibrium is
guaranteed for both types of firms.
Proof of Proposition 6. We have characterized the equilibrium when σ = 0 in Proposition 3.
Therefore, for the rest of the proof, assume σ > 0. Taking the limit of equation (3.7.5) we obtain
the ratio of market shares in equilibrium, and from the definition of pio and pip, we obtain the ratio
of profits,
lim
n→∞
pio
pip
= lim
n→∞
1
1 + σ1−σ
no−1
no
lim
n→∞
1− δ + δ1−σ (α− σ) no−1no
1− δ limn→∞
so
sp
.
First, we look for equilibria with no →∞ (coexistence or only O firms). If α < 1, then
(1− δ) ln lim
n→∞
so
sp
= σ + δ ln
[
(1− α) lim
no→∞
nα−(σ/δ)o
]
.
There are three cases when α < 1. If α > σ/δ, then sosp →∞ and piopip →∞ when no →∞; therefore,
there is an equilibrium with only O firms. If α < σ/δ, then sosp → 0 and piopip → 0, so there is no
equilibrium in which no →∞. Finally, if α = σ/δ, then sosp → e
σ
1−δ
(
1− σδ
) δ
1−δ < 1 and piopip → sosp , so
there is no equilibrium in which no →∞. If α = 1, then
(1− δ) ln lim
n→∞
so
sp
= σ + δ ln lim
no→∞
[
(1− σ) (1− no so)n−σ/δo
]
,
so sosp → 0 and piopip → 0 when no →∞, so there is no equilibrium in which no →∞. Therefore, there
is an equilibrium with no →∞, only when σ/δ < α < 1, and in such equilibrium, all firms choose to
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be O.
Next, we look for an equilibrium with only P firms, for which we need limn→∞
pio(2)
pip(1)
≤ 1. Given
that firms are infinitesimal when n → ∞, the market share of P firms is the same when no = 1 and
no = 2. Taking the limit of equation (3.7.5), we obtain
lim
n→∞
so
sp
= 2
α δ−σ
1−δ e
σ
(1−δ)(2−σ)
(
1− α
2− σ
) δ
1−δ
,
and therefore, the limit of the ratio of profits is
lim
n→∞
pio(2)
pip(1)
=
2 (1− σ) (1− δ) + δ (α− σ)
(1− δ) (2− σ) 2
α δ−σ
1−δ e
σ
(1−δ)(2−σ)
(
1− α
2− σ
) δ
1−δ
.
Denote the right-hand side of the above expression by F (α, δ, σ), and let σ˜(α, δ) be the value of σ
which solves F (α, δ, σ) = 1. F (α, δ, σ) is decreasing in σ, which means that limn→∞
pio(2)
pip(1)
≤ 1 (i.e.,
there is an equilibrium with only P firms) if and only if σ ≥ σ˜(α, δ). Note that this condition holds
not only for α < 1, but also for α = 1.
Next, we show 0 < σ˜ < α δ. We know σ˜ > 0 from Proposition 3. Also, σ˜ ≥ α δ if and only
if F (α, δ, α δ) ≥ 1. Substituting σ = α δ into F (α, δ, σ), and rearranging, we obtain the following
condition:
α
2− α δ + ln
(
1− α
2− α δ
)
≥ 0,
which is not possible, given that α/(2− α δ) > 0. Therefore, σ˜ < α δ.
Finally, we know that when α = 1, there is no equilibrium such that no → ∞, i.e. there is no
equilibrium in which all firms choose to be O, and there is no equilibrium in which a proportion of
firms chooses to be O. We also know there is an equilibrium with only P firms only when σ ≥ σ˜(α, δ).
Therefore, it remains to show what is the equilibrium when α = 1 and 0 < σ < σ˜(α, δ).
It is easy to see that in this case, there is an equilibrium with coexistence, in which the number
of O firms converges to a constant. To see this, note that σ < σ˜(α, δ) implies that pio(2)pip(1) > 1, and
that we have shown that limno→∞
pio
pip
< 1 when α = 1. Therefore, there is a constant 2 ≤ n∗o < ∞
such that
pio(n
∗
o)
pip
≥ 1 and pio(n∗o+1)pip ≤ 1 (the market share of P firms does not change when no changes
and no is finite, since in this case O firms have an aggregate market share equal to zero).
Proof of Proposition 7. To show existence, we begin by noticing that for any value of So ∈ [0, 1],
there is a value of so ∈ (0, 1/no) that solves equation 3.7.7. This is because the left hand side is
continuous for so ∈ (0, 1/no), and goes from −∞ when so → 0 to ∞ when so → 1/n. By a similar
argument, for any value of so ∈ (0, 1/no] there is a value of So ∈ [0, 1] that solves equation 3.7.8. This
implies that an equilibrium exists.
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To show uniqueness, let us denote equation (3.7.7) by f(so, So) = 0 and equation (3.7.8) by
g(so, So) = 0. By the implicit function theorem we can write So = f1(so) using the first equation,
and So = g1(so) using the second equation. It is straightforward to show that both functions are
continuously increasing, but the slope of f1 is always less than 1, while the slope of g1 is always larger
than 1. This means that the two curves cross only once, so the symmetric continuation equilibrium
is unique.
Now we show that sp > so. In equilibrium, the following condition must hold:
ln
(
so
sp
)
+
1
1− so −
1
1− sp = −
δ(1− α)
(1− σ) ln
(
α
(1− α)
Sp
so
+
sp
so
)
. (3.8.18)
When sp = so = 1/n, the condition becomes
0 = −δ(1− α)
(1− σ) ln
(
1 +
α
(1− α) Sp n
)
.
Define m as the right hand side of the previous equality. sp = so is not an equilibrium because m < 0
when sp = so. For equation (3.8.18) to return to the equilibrium, sp has to increase and so has to
decrease relative to sp = so. Therefore, the equilibrium has sp > so.
Next, we show that So > Sp. We will prove this by contradiction. By a similar argument than
before, for So ≤ Sp the following condition must hold:
− ln (no) + ln
(
1− noso
so
+
α
2(1− α)so
)
− 2
δα
≥ 0.
This implies that we should have so ≤ α+2(1−α)2β(1+e2/(δα))no in equilibrium. If we introduce so =
α+2(1−α)
2(1−α)(1+e2/(δα))no
in the equilibrium condition (3.7.7), and rearrange terms, we get that for this value of so to be an
equilibrium the following should hold:
0 = − 2(1− α)
α+ 2(1− α)
(
1 + e
2
(δα)
)
+ log
(
α+ 2(1− α)
2(1− α)e 2(δα) − α
)
+
2(1− α)
α(1− σ) (3.8.19)
+
no
no −
(α+2(1−α))
(
1−tanh
(
1
(δα)
))
4(1−α)
+
(
δ(1− α)
(1− σ) − 1
)
log(no)
Let mˆ be the right hand side of the previous expression. It can be shown that mˆ < 0 for any value
of the parameters. Therefore, so >
α+2(1−α)
2(1−α)(1+e2/(δα))no in equilibrium, and therefore, So ≤ Sp cannot
hold.
Finally, to see that the P firm will always have a higher profit than an O firm, notice that the
P firm can always choose the same investment and price than an O firm. The P firm will have the
same revenues due to the complementary good, and the same cost of R&D, but it will also have some
revenue on the primary good side.
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